' TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILLANI, J.---Facts giving rise to the instant petition briefly stated are that petitioner's case for promotion from BS-20 to BS-21 in the Government of. Punjab was considered by the Provincial Selection Board-I but she was superseded in the meeting held on 29-6-2011 and the recommendations made by the said Board were duly affirmed by the Competent Authority. Her representation against her supersession was dismissed by the Chief Minister Punjab on 10-9-2011, which order she assailed in a Constitutional petition, which was dismissed inter alia on the ground that the issue raised was relatable to the fitness of the petitioner which entailed objective evaluation and further that the matter may not even fall within the jurisdiction of the. Punjab Service Tribunal. This judgment was assailed in Intra Court Appeal (No, 653 of 2011), which was partly allowed with the observation that the petitioner may avail alternate remedy of appeal where-after she filed appeal before the Service Tribunal and the same stands dismissed vide the impugned judgment dated 2-5-2012.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave on the ground that the petitioner was ignored by the Selection Board; that the oppressive discretionary power of awarding 15 marks reserved for the Promotion Board was arbitrary and subjective; that the discretion of the Promotion Board, must filter through clearly defined parameters, criteria and standard; that the recommendations of the Selection Board reflected mala fides on the part of the respondent No 3 (Nasir Mehmood Khosa, Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Lahore) who presided over the Board and that the Service Tribunal has failed to advert to these issues. In support of the submissions made, learned counsel relied on a judgment of this Court reported at Muhammad Rahim Khan v. Chief Secretary, N.-W.F.P.
3. Having heard petitioner's learned counsel at some length, we find that in not finding the petitioner fit to be promoted, the Selection Board kept in view the quantification criteria laid down in the Promotion Policy, 2010 and found that she obtained only 70.38 out of 100 marks, which is less than the minimum threshold of 75% required for promotion to BS-21. The Service Tribunal specifically addressed this issue and came to the conclusion as follows:- "The appellant's case for promotion was considered by the Provincial Selection Board-I in its meeting held on 29-6-2011 in A the light of provisions contained in Promotion Policy 2010, which was in force since 1-1-2011. According to the quantification criteria provided in the aforesaid policy, the appellant obtained 70.38 out of 100 marks whereas minimum threshold of 75 was required for promotion to BS-21 in view of para 12(1) of the policy ibid. Therefore, the Board recommended that the appellant may be superseded for promotion to BS-21 as she had failed to attain the eligibility threshold, as envisaged under para 10(1) of the Promotion Policy, 2010."
4. The fact that she was duly considered by the Selection Board and not found fit would clearly indicate that the- issue related not to the eligibility but fitness of the petitioner to be promoted, which question could not be a subject matter of appeal and the appeal was not maintainable in view of section 4(1)(b) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, which reads as under:-- "no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher grade".
5. . In Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Tufail (2011 SCM R 1871), this Court reiterated the law laid down in Muhammad Iqbal v. Saeeda Bano (1991 SCM R 1559) as also in Muhammad Anis v. Abdul Haseeb (PLD 1994 SC 539) and quoted the following para with approval:-- "The question of eligibility relates primarily to the' terms and conditions of the service and their applicability to the civil servant concerned; and, therefore, the Tribunal has jurisdiction,-and whereas the question of fitness is a subjective evaluation on the basis of objective criteria where substitution for an opinion of the competent authority is not' possible by that of a Tribunal or of a Court and, therefore, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction on the question of fitness."
6. So far as the mala fides attributed to respondent No, 3 are concerned, the same are vague, remained unsubstantiated and could not be a ground to interfere with the order of the competent Board determining the fitness of the petitioner to be promoted. Law is settled that a presumption of regularity is attached to official acts and those cannot be annulled on vague allegations. In Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad (PLD 1974 SC 151), this Court reiterated this principle and observed at page 170 as follows:-- "We are not also impressed by the arguments based upon the difficulties of the Government or the possibilities of chaos that are allegedly likely to result from the interpretation adopted by us. These are more imaginary than real. We do not envisage any such calamity. If a law is made for the implementation of a policy of reforms and that law, though of doubtful validity has been subsequently validated, then all acts legitimately and honestly taken in the exercise of powers given by those laws will also be valid; but if an authority concerned has taken action in fraud of that law, that is to say, mala fide, we see no legitimate reason, why the Government should be anxious to protect such a dishonest officer or authority, The cause of the reform will not be advanced by such dishonest exercise of power by individuals out of personal malice or for personal gain. Indeed, if an officer has so acted, we would expect the Government to see that the officer concerned is appropriately punished and the injustice done to the unfortunate victim righted. We do not appreciate the anxiety of the appellant-Governments to protect such male fide actions."
7. For what has been discussed above, we do not find any merit in this petition, which is dismissed and leave refused.