1. ' AFTAB AHMED GORAR, J.--- By this single order I propose to dispose of above said three Constitutional Petitions as in all the petitions respondent/landlord is the same, besides the facts as well as law involved in all the petitions are also almost same.
2. ' Brief facts of the case, as disclosed in the memo of petitions, are that the petitioners in all the petitions were initially the tenants of Messrs Ideal Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (ILACO) in respect of respective tenements in Ideal Life Building, Dundas Street, off Abdullah Haroon Road, Karachi. ILACO filed ejectment cases against the petitioners on the ground of personal bona fide need viz reconstruction of a multi-storeyed building. Subsequently by virtue of President's Order No,10 of 1972 ILACO was nationalized and all its properties and assets were taken over by the respondent and consequently the respondent was substituted in place of ILACO in the ejectment application.
3. Thereafter the rent cases were dismissed by VIth Rent Controller, Karachi South vide Judgment dated 4-9-1977 on the sole point of jurisdiction whereas other points touching the merits of the case were not discussed. The said judgment was challenged in appeals and the learned District Judge, Karachi South vide order dated 24-12-1986 while disposing of the appeals remanded the matter for fresh decision with direction to give findings on all the issues. On remand the learned Rent Controller vide Judgment dated 15-10-1987 allowed the rent cases and the tenants were directed to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the tenements in question to the respondent/landlord within a period of 90 days. The petitioners/tenants preferred appeals against the said judgment which was dismissed vide Judgment dated 19-11-2005 passed by VIIth Additional District Judge, Karachi, hence these petitions.
4. ' It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the two courts below erred in law and on facts while passing the impugned judgments; that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the rent cases and the appellate court also failed to take into consideration this legal aspect of the case and even otherwise Rent Controller misread the evidence adduced before him; that, in fact, the tenements in question were not required by the petitioners/landlord for personal bona fide need i,e, reconstruction of new building but the petitioner wanted to sell the entire building which is apparent from the advertisement of sale got published by the petitioners in the newspaper. According to him, the premises in question has been declared as Protected Heritage under the Sindh Cultural Heritage Act, 1994, as such the alleged requirement for reconstruction has become infructuous; that the sanction/plan for reconstruction has since expired therefore the requirement on such ground has become redundant. He further contended that the building in question cannot be demolished until and unless permission from the competent authority under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act is obtained. He prayed for setting aside of the judgments of the two courts below or in the alternative to stay the proceedings till the permission for demolition and reconstruction is granted by the competent authority under the Sindh Cultural Heritage Act. He relied upon the decisions reported in PLD 2005 Karachi 684 and 1991 MLD 294 [Karachi].
5. ' On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the respondent/landlord has established the personal bona fide need on the ground of reconstruction as necessary sanction and approval from KDA and permission from Deputy Commissioner, Karachi for raising construction on the premises in question have been produced in evidence; that renewal of such sanction is merely a formality and it was not necessary for the petitioner/landlord to get the renewal every year during the pendency of the proceedings. He further argued that the advertisement of sale of the building was got published in the newspaper only in order to ascertain the present market value of the premises and even otherwise if a landlord intends to sell out his property, such fact, it in any way, could not defeat his plea for personal requirement. He further contended that Petitioner Corporation being a separate entity from the Central Government and the properties and assets of ILACO having been transferred in the Corporation, they were competent to continue the ejectment proceedings against the tenants. He relied upon the decisions reported in 2004 YLR 3278, 2007 SCMR 46, 2003 MLD 480, PLD 1988 Karachi 164, PLD 1982 Lahore 380, 1982 CLC 1743, 1992 MLD 1690, 1987 CLC 702, 1984 CLC 1713, 1990 MLD 2182 and unreported judgments passed in F.R.A. No,517 of 1993.
6. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with their assistance.
7. ' From the perusal of the record it appears that in order to establish the personal bona fide need of the premises in question i,e, to demolish the old structure and raise new construction thereon the respondent/landlord got examined two witnesses namely R.M. Castailiro, Civil Engineer of Ideal Life Insurance Company and R.S. Rustamji, the Architect. The first witness in his evidence deposed, "The applicant in good faith requires the premises in question for purposes of reconstruction," He further deposed, "The applicant intends to demolish the present premises and building new building thereon. In December, 1962 the applicant got the building Plan sanctioned from K.D.A. I produce the sanctioned plan as Exh.2.". His evidence could not be shaken during cross-examination. In the case reported in 1997 SCMR 1062 honourable Supreme Court has held that sole testimony of the landlord is sufficient to establish his personal bona fide need if the statement of the landlord on oath is consistent with his averments made in the ejectment application. During cross-examination learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to establish that the statement of the A petitioner/landlord made on oath is not consistent with the averments made in the ejectment application.
8. ' In the instant case the petitioners have also produced the sanctioned approval of KDA for reconstruction. In the case reported in 1992 MLD 1690 it was held as under:--- "Mere requirement of premises for purpose of reconstruction was sufficient to seek eviction of tenant---Words "reasonable" or 'good faith' should not be read in S.15(2)(vi) which had been omitted deliberately by legislature. No enquiry by Rent Controller was envisaged into genuineness or otherwise of requirement of landlord, who had simply to satisfy Rent Controller that he had obtained necessary sanction for such reconstruction or erection of building from Authority competent to accord such sanction."
9. Regarding renewal of the sanction/approval it has been held in various cases that renewal of sanction is only a formality and it was not reasonable for landlords to get sanction renewed every year during the pendency of proceedings and that expiry of period of sanction during pendency of ejectment application would not frustrate cause of action nor render it infructuous. If any case-law is needed, reference may be made to 1990 MLD 2182, 1987 CLC 702 and 1982 CLC 1743.
10. ' As regards the contention of petitioners' counsel that Rent Controller had no jurisdiction, suffice it to say that in the appeal filed against the first order passed by the learned Rent Controller whereby he dismissed the suit on the point of jurisdiction and did not touch the rest of the issues on merits, the case was remanded with direction to pass fresh order by giving findings on all the issues.
11. Against the said order the petitioners had filed Second Appeal in the High Court but subsequently withdrew the same which fact has been admitted by the petitioners in para 11 of the petitions. If the petitioners were aggrieved by the order of remand passed by this Court, they would have agitated the second appeal and should have got decided the point of jurisdiction but they did not do so but, on the other hand, they withdrew the appeal and did not agitate the point of jurisdiction. In these circumstances, now they cannot take a somersault and come with a stand that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. It is settled law that one cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate.
12. The contention of petitioners' counsel that, in fact, the respondent wanted to sell out the building in question which is evident from the advertisement published in the newspaper for sale of the building in question which would adversely affect personal bona fide need of the respondent, is also devoid of force. Now it is well-settled that the intention or efforts of the landlord to sell out the premises, would not disentitle him to subsequently seek eviction on the ground of personal need. In the case reported in 1989 CLC 162 it was held as under:--- "Lastly, turning to the argument of Mr. Sibghatullah Hameed that the respondent had agreed to sell the property in question to one Atiq Siddiqui, it may be pointed out that even if the contention of the appellant before the learned Controller, was right, the same in any way could not defeat the respondent's plea for personal requirement as admittedly, such transaction had ultimately not materialized."
13. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the building in question cannot be demolished and reconstructed unless and until permission from the competent authority under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act is obtained is concerned, it may be observed that this has no concern with the tenants and such affairs are between the landlord/owner and the concerned authorities under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act and a tenant cannot escape eviction on such ground if otherwise he is liable to be evicted under the law. The facts of the case relied upon by petitioners' counsel in this context i,e, PLD 2005 Karachi 684 are distinguishable. Moreover, in the said case ultimately the case was decided against the tenants. Even otherwise, with utmost respect for the honourable Single Judge, the judgment in the cited case is only persuasive in nature and not authoritative.
14. In the instant case there are concurrent findings of the learned Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Court. Needless to emphasize that constitutional jurisdiction of this Court in rent matters is very much limited and confined only to ascertain whether the appellate court has not flouted provisions relating to the statute or failed to follow the law relating thereto. In the case reported as Hafiz Shafatullah v. Mst. Shamim Jehan and another (PLD 2004 Karachi 502) this Court held as under:--- "By conferring only one right of appeal under section 21 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, Legislature in its wisdom seemed to have tried to shorten the span of litigation in rent case and in such circumstances interference by High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in judicial order passed by Tribunal of competent jurisdiction, merely on ground that another view of the matter was also possible, would not serve any other purpose, but would add to the misery of prolonged litigation for the parties and would defeat the spirit and object of statute."
15. ' In 2010 SCMR 1025 the honourable Supreme Court held as under:-- "...Jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be invoked as substitute of another appeal against the order of the appellate Court. Therefore, mere fact that upon perusal of evidence, High Court came to another conclusion would not furnish a valid ground for interference in the order of the appellate Court, which is final authority in the hierarchy of rent laws i,e, Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979."
16. ' For the foregoing reasons, I do not see any justification to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two courts below, with the result petitions are dismissed in limine.