1. ' MUSHIR ALAM, C.J.---The petitioner has impugned the show-cause notice dated 1-9-2010 available at Page 33 of the Court File calling upon the, petitioner to show cause as to why the license should not be revoked under section 30 of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002 and the hearing was fixed on 20-9-2010.
2. ' It appears that the reply to the show-cause notice was filed on 6-9-2011. However, hearing was antedated to 17-9-2010, which prompted the petitioner to approach this court to seek restraining order against the impugned show-cause notice.
3. ' It was contended by the learned counsel for .The petitioner that the impugned show-cause notice is mala fide, in violation of the law and without any cause of action to the petitioner. It was alleged that as per consultation paper of PEMRA enclosed as Annexure P/6 at Page 49, maximum 106 channels can be broadcasted on equipment holding 860 MHz, but more than 112 channels are permitted by the PEMRA making such allocation to congest or create disturbance, making it impossible for the petitioner to air the channel. It was further urged that the matter was antedated to 17-9-2011 from 20-9-2011, which shows mala fide of the PEMRA, therefore, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present petition. When learned counsel was confronted that he can defend the impugned show cause notice before the authority, it was urged that since it was prompted by malice and in violation of the summary of consultation paper, there is no justification to take such action against the .Petitioner. In support of his contentions, reliance was placed upon the case of Riffat Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 PLC (C.S.) 562).
4. ' Mr. Kashif Hanif, learned counsel for the PEMRAthas opposed the petition. According to him; the license was issued on 22-5-2008, which clearly provided that the petitioner will air the channels within 12 months, from the date of issuance and thereafter in terms of license it could be deemed to be cancelled without any further action. It was urged that despite such conditionality, the petitioner was extended further one year time on the request upto 21-5-2010 and after availing such extension instead of deeming license cancelled, in terms of Clause 6, petitioner was issued show cause notice in terms of Section 30, (c) of the Ordinance, 2002. It is urged that before the Authority could take decision, ad interim order was obtained to preempt the lawful exercise of the authority of the PEMRA. He further urged that in presence of alternate remedy under section 30(A) of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 writ jurisdiction could not be invoked on the basis of impugned notice. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for PEMRA has placed reliance upon the case of Mir Nabi Bakhsh Khan Khoso v. Branch Manager, National Bank of Pakistan, Thatpat (Dera Allah Yar) Branch (2000 SCMR 1017) and Pakcom Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 44).
5. ' Learned Standing Counsel adopts the arguments of learned counsel for the PEMRA.
6. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the material on record. Admittedly the license was issued on 22-5-2008. _ Relevant terms and conditions of the license are Clauses 3.1 and 3.6 which are reproduced herein below: "3.1. The Licensee shall commence its Licensed Service within 12 months for the issuance of the License and shall inform the Authority one-month in advance of the start of the service.
7. 3.6. The license shall be deemed to have been withdrawn and cancelled, if the Licensee fails to put into operation the broadcast station with a period of one year from the date of its issuance."
8. ' From perusal of the above, it seems that Clause 6 of the agreement is self-executory. The petitioner having agreed that in case the licensee fails to put into operation broadcast station within one year from the date of issuance of license, license shall be deemed to have been withdrawn and cancelled, yet such conditions were relaxed by the PEMRA. At the request of the petitioner one year time was extended upto 21-5-2010, which also lapsed and the impugned notice dated .1-9-201p was issued under section 30 of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002.
9. ' The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned show cause notice suffers from malice as the date of hearing was fixed on 20-9-2010 which was antedated without consultation of the petitioner to 17-9-2010 as per intimation dated 6-9-2010. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to satisfy the Court as to what prejudice has been caused by antedating the matter. If C at all, it was antedated for any reason, lie could have approached the Authority for extension in time and fixation of the date as may be suitable to the petitioner and the respondent/Authority, but instead petitioner filed the instant petition a day earlier on 16-9-2010 in this Court and obtained ad-interim order on 17-9-2010 for suspension of impugned notice.
10. ' As regards the second ground that it was in violation of law, no provision of law has been pointed out to supplement the arguments that the authority had no power or jurisdiction to issue impugned show cause D notice as mandated in terms of section 30(c) of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002, which inter alia empowers the Authority to very condition suspend or revoke the license, where "the licensee has failed to comply with the conditions of license". Adverting to the third argument that it has been issued by a person not competent, we are afraid that such arguments are fallacious, there is nothing on record to substantiate such plea. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not attracted for more than one reason. The petitioner in the instant petition has failed to demonstrate that impugned notice has been issued without any reason or was prompted by malice nor, it was shown that the authority was not competent or that it was issued in violation of any provisions of PEMRA Ordinance 2002.
11. ' When special enactment setout mechanism and hierarchy for redressal of grievance, more particularly in cases where the High Court is ultimate repository of justice in its appellate and/or revisionary jurisdiction one may gain fully see Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore (1999 SCMR 1881), Marhaba Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (2003 CLD 1822) and Messrs Unicorn Enterprises v. Banking. Court No,5, City Court Building, Karachi (2004 CLD 1452). The apparatus for redressal of grievance in special enactments, has to be exhausted before invoking extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Since the present petition is nothing but to pre-empt the exercise of jurisdiction of the authority, therefore, we would dismiss this petition with cost of Rs,25,000 to be deposited, in H.C. Bar Library Fund.