' JAWAID, MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN.---These two Sales Tax Appeals have been filed by an exporter of ready-made garments under the name and style of "JARIT INTERNATIONAL" at Sialkot holding STRN 09-05-6200-083-73 assailing the order-in-appeal passed by the learned CIR(Appeals), Appeal Zone, Gujranwala in Sales Tax Appeals Nos. 518 and 519-ST/2011, which has upheld the Order-in-Original Nos. 5 and 6/2009, dated 15-7-2009 passed by the learned Additional Collector, Sales Tax and Federal Excise, R.T.O., Sialkot.
2. In both the orders in original, it was alleged that this appellant/ registered person was a dummy and bogus entity, and it claimed refund of input tax invoices which had been got issued by the dummy and bogus firms. The refund issued to this appellant/registered person has been sought to be recovered through the impugned Order-in-Originals by invoking section 36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.
3. The Order-in-Original No, 5 of 2009 was in respect of the tax period 01/2004 and the refund sought to be recovered was at Rs,3,260,641, which was alleged to have been issued twice. Input Tax Invoices had been issued by Messrs Farooq Impex of Pakistan, Karachi, which existed at S.T.R.N. 12- 04-999-693-82.
4. The Order-in-Original No, 6 of 2009 sought to recover the refund issued at Rs, 17,145,862 in respect of .The following Tax Periods:-- Tax Period Refund Revived 5/2003 Rs,650,863 6/2003 Rs,2,380,365 7/2003 Rs,4,369,985 8/2003 Rs,886,536 9/2003 Rs,746,404 10/2003 Rs,3,288,085 11/2003 Rs,2,314,142 12/2003 Rs,2,506,482 Total Rs,17,145,862
5. The appellant/registered person challenged the said orders-in-original on a number of legal as well as factual grounds, but the learned CIR(Appeals) rejected the appeals on all the scores, hence, the instant appeals before us on all the grounds canvassed before the learned CIR(Appeals).
6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/registered person has at the very outset drawn our attention to the basic requirement for initiation of an action under section 36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which is the issuance and valid service of the Show-Cause Notice under section 36(1)
(ibid), which, according to the Adjudicating Officer's own verdict, though issued, yet it was never served upon this appellant/ registered person. The learned counsel drew our attention to Paras 4 and 5 of the Order-in-Original No,5 of 2009, which contained the following findings as to service of the Show Cause Notice:-- "4 The show cause notice and hearing notices were sent at the declared registered addresses of the units but were received back undelivered with the remarks that addressee is untraceable. It was also verified by GPO, Sialkot that the P.O. Box # 1370 has been cancelled due to non-payment of annual post Box fee. Hence, the unit is not traceable at the given registered address. The notices were also fixed on the notice board."
"5 The respondent Messrs Jarit International is not traceable at the given registered address and all notices sent to the declared registered address have been received back undelivered which shows that the refund claimant is dummy and bogus firm".
' The Order-in-Original No, 6 of 2009 also contains the identical findings in Paras 4 and 5.
7. The learned counsel contended that the Show Cause Notice under section 36(1)(ibid) is sine qua non without no action under section 36(1) could be taken. When the said Show Cause Notice had not been served to the very knowledge of the Adjudicating Officer, he had no warrant to make the impugned order-in-original.
8. When enquired as to the Adjudicating Officer's finding that the Show Cause could not be served as this appellant was allegedly a "bogus and dummy firm", he drew our attention to the service of "Demand Notice under section 48(1)(CA) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 r/w Rule 71(2)(c) of Recovery Rules, 2006", dated 6-11-2009 at the following address through TC Receipt No, 1405330650 (copy of which is at page 40 of this Appeal):- "Messrs JARIT INTERNATIONAL, ' P.O. BOX 1370, Commissioner Road, Sialkot".
' ---He argued that when the Demand Notice was duly served at the above address, why the Show Cause Notices allegedly issued under section 36(1)(ibid) could not be served? Had they been duly issued, they too could have been duly served.
9. The learned CIR(Appeals) while giving findings on the issue of service of Show Cause Notices under section 36(1)(ibid) disposed of the matter with the following observations:-- "7. The appellant through an arrangement with the bogus dummy firms managed to defraud the government through obtaining of inadmissible refund on the basis of invoices of bogus/dummy firms and also obtained illegally double cheques of the same amount from the department. This fact was confirmed/verified by the Department, by obtaining the bank statement of the taxpayer, whereby the credit entries confirmed this reality. Being a typical fraudulent unit, it had quit its registered address soon after committing tax frauds, so notices issued by the department were received back undelivered, but these legal notices were also affixed by the department on the notice board in terms of the then prevalent section 56(b) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.
' Therefore, the department had fulfilled all the legal requirements according to law, regarding service of notices upon the taxpayer. After all the demand notice was served and responded by the taxpayer and as a consequence appeal was filed at this forum. This shows that the ignorance of proceedings taken up against him by the department and non-compliance on the part of the taxpayer was wilful and deliberate.".
10. As to the allegation of ante-dating of the impugned Order-in-Appeal, the learned counsel drew our attention to Para 8 of the impugned Order-in-Appeal which reads as under:- "8. Federal Board of Revenue has already granted extension in time limitation for decision of these cases vide Board's letter C. No, 4(6)S(L-IDT)/2011 dated 16-12-2011 and letter C.No,4(7)S(L-IDT)/2012 dated 19-5-2012." ----The learned counsel argued that the impugned Order-in-Appeal is allegedly dated "3-5-2012", whereas it contains a reference to the "F.B.R.'s Letter C. No 4(7)S(L-IDT)/2012 dated 19-5-2012", which could not find mention in the impugned Order-in-Appeal, had it been passed on "3-5-2012".
11. The learned counsel further drew our attention to the learned CIR(Appeals) Order Sheet entry as to the disposal of appeal dated 21-12-2011, which reads as under:-- "21-12-2011 Present M. Syed Ali Imran Rizvi, Advocate/LEARNED COUNSEL of the tax-payer. Case discussed in the light of docts on record". ----This entry neither shows appearance of any Departmental Representative, nor the filing of any para wise comments by the Department, but the learned CIR(APPEALS) has not only marked presence of "Mr. Shahbaz Ahmad, IRO/DR" for the Respondent/Department, but also he has observed in Para, 7: "keeping in view the grounds of appeal and para wise comments submitted by the department....".
12. The learned counsel further drew our attention to the fact that the learned CIR(Appeals) has passed the impugned Order-in-Appeal far beyond the period prescribed for making the decision of appeal under section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which is not permissible.
' He argued that these appeals were filed on "14-6-2011". The learned CIR(Appeals) was bound to decide the same by "12-10-2011". This period could have been extended by 60 days i,e, up to "12-12- 2011", for reasons to be recorded. The impugned Order-in-Appeal allegedly passed on "3-5-2012" was thus far beyond the prescribed limitation.
13. As to the allegation of issuance of the illegal refund, the learned counsel argued that making of the claimed refund is not a unilateral act of the registered person. A registered person is only a claimant, who may be right or wrong. Refund Payment Order (R.P.O.) is made by the Deputy Collector (Refund) after fully examining the claim in accordance with the relevant Sales Tax Refund Rules, and Refund Voucher is issued in pursuance thereof. Therefore, an alleged erroneous refunding is not the act of the claimant registered person, rather it is act of the "Officer of Sales Tax", who is liable to make good the loss occasioned to the State exchequer due to the erroneous refunding. A registered person cannot be penalised for any act of an Officer of Sales Tax in line with the maxim that no litigant can be made to suffer due to any mistake of a court.
' As neither some collusion' of the appellant/registered person with any Officer of Sales Tax has been alleged and made out in the impugned Order-in-Original, nor any 'deliberate act' of erroneous refunding of the concerned Deputy Collector (Refund) has been alleged and made out in the impugned Order-in-Original, the impugned Order-in-Original under section 36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is unwarranted, void ab initio, illegal and without lawful authority, and the learned Addl. Collector (Adj.) is liable to be proceeded against for illegally exercising power under section 36(1) (ibid) to the prejudice of the appellant/registered person.
' The following case-law has been cited on the issue:- 0) GST 2002 CL 270,
(ii) 2003 PTD 1257
(iii) 2001 SCMR 838
(iv) PLD 1989 Lah. 47 and
(v) 2003 PTD 1797
14. The learned counsel argued further that the issuance of refund under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is a conscious act of the Deputy Collector (Refund) performed after fully examining the Refund. Claim and the documents filed by the claimant registered person in support thereof in accordance with the relevant Sales Tax Refund Rules.
' An adjudication of refund made in the, aforesaid conscious manner is not susceptible to re- opening on any pretext, as held by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in NTR 1990 SC 1 that:- "Once all the facts have been fully disclosed by the assesse and considered by the Income Tax Authorities and the assessm ents have been consciously completed, and no new fact has been discovered, there can be no scope for interference with these concluded transactions.". (at p. 24)
15. According to the learned counsel, to form another opinion on the same (facts and circumstances available at the time of original adjudication of refund amounts to 'change of opinion', which never warrants re-opening of past and closed transactions concluded after conscious application of mind of the then adjudicating authority.
' If re-opening is allowed on mere 'change of opinion', no lis can come to an end and attain finality.
' The following citations have been relied upon on the issue:-- (i) 1993 PTD 697;
(ii) 2000 PTD -(Trib.) 329;
(iii) 2004 PTD (Trib.) 1052 and
(iv) 2007 PTD 1560.
16. The learned counsel also contended that the Additional Collector (Adjudication) has mechanically acted upon the dictates of the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (Direct and Indirect Taxes), FBR-Range Office, Gujranwala, which rendered the impugned Order-in- Original void ab initio and untenable. He cited the following Authorities on the issue:--
(i) 1992 PTD 1671;
(ii) 1991 PTD 217;
(iii) 1995 PTD 268
(iv) NTR 1999 (Trib.) 46;
(v) 2001 PTD (Trib.) 3810
(vi) 2003 PTD (Trib.) 1158
17. On the factual plane, the learned counsel explained that the refund of Rs,3,260,641 in respect of Tax Period 01/2004 was issued lawfully after fully examining and verifying the Input Tax Invoices issued by the Supplier, Messrs Farooq Impex of Pakistan, Karachi existing at Sales Tax Regime. No, 12-04-9999-693-82.
' According to the learned counsel, the refund of Rs,17,145,862 in respect of Tax Periods 5/2003 to 12/2003 was issued lawfully after fully examining and verifying the Input Tax Invoices issued by the following Suppliers:-- {{TABLE}} Sr.No, Supplier S.T. Regd. No, Input Tax I M/s. Aysha Textiles, Kasur. 03-01-5811-005-37 Rs .1,418,473 ii M/s. Master Apparel Industries 03-02-6200-526-46 Rs, 23 ,535 (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore. iii M/s. Meltex Exports, Karachi. 12-04-9999-660-73 Rs,3,183,968 iv M/s. Hanzla Textile, Karachi. 12-00- 5205-572-64 Rs,4,820,624 v M/s. Farhan Tex Int'l, Karachi. 11-01-6200-180-19 Rs,724,840 vi M/s. Al- Sheraz Intl Trading 03-98-9999-145-73 Rs,4,199,171 Company, Lahore. vii M/s. Marhaba Industry, Gujran- wala. 09-03-5111-008-64 Rs,99,366 viii M/s. A.T. Enterprises, Karachi. 12-04-9999-658-19 Rs,1,457,586 ix M/s. Samira Fabric, Lahore. 03-99-9999-935-19 Rs,1,186,016 X(a) M/s. F.B Embroidery 08-01-5810-088-55 Rs,18,824 Sr.No, Supplier S.T. Regd. No, Input Tax X(b) M/s. Sultan Embroidery 08-01-5810-036-46 Rs,5,329 X(c) M/s. Rauf Embroidery 04-03-5810-003-91 Rs,8,112 TOTAL Rs,17,145,844 {{TABLE}} ---Granting registration to a unit under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is a conscious act of the Registration Division, Central and Local Registration Offices of the Sales Tax Department. Having granted registration after ascertainment of full facts in accordance with the relevant Rules, Sales Tax Department is stopped from alleging that the unit issuing input tax invoices is a dummy / bogus unit.
' It is evident from Para III(1) of the impugned Order-in-Original (at pp. 2 to 5) that physical verification of the business addresses of the above-said suppliers was conducted by the Addl.
Collector (Adj.) in January, 2008, and it was reported by the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation, Karachi by the end of March, 2008 that the said 'units did not exist on ground meaning thereby that the said units were dummy/ bogus units' and were 'established with the mala fide intention to issue fake invoices'.
' It is, thus, evident that the above reports as to non-existence of the said units were made after five years of the issuance of the invoices-in-question and making of refund based thereon.
' It is not the case of the Respondent/Department that the said units did not exist in the relevant Tax Periods, rather they did exist at that time, and the input tax invoices issued by them were so reliable that the then refund sanctioning authority issued the refund after due scrutiny in accordance with the Sales Tax Refund Rules, 2002.
' Subsequent suspension of registration or black-listing of the unit has no effect upon the invoices issued during the period when it was active.
' There was in fact no provision in the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as to black-listing up to the 30th June, 2004: Subsection (2) of section 21 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 providing for black-listing of 'a registered person who is found to have issued fake invoices, or has otherwise committed tax fraud', came on the statute book through the Finance Act, 2004.
Case-law on the issue has been cited as under:--
(i) 2007 PTD 1982;
(ii) 2011 PTD (Trib.) 791
(iii) 2011 PTD (Trib.) 808.
18. As to the allegation that the said firm (appellant/registered person) instead of doing business in furtherance of its declared business activity indulged in malpractice of purchasing fake/flying invoices in order to get illegal sales tax refund by submitting the refund claims on the basis of said fake invoices', the learned counsel contended that this appellant/registered person did make the purchases-in-question from the said suppliers, and exported the goods out of Pakistan. Business transacted through Account No, 011012572401 with M/s. Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Limited, Sialkot and the export documents do bear testimony to the business actually done by this appellant/registered person.
' This appellant/registered person did make exports during the continuance of his business, which is evident from the export realizations declared as per Income Tax Returns as under:- Tax Year Export Realizations W.H.T.
2003 Rs,5,963,699 Rs,45,411 2004 Rs,150,582,627 Rs,1,129,347 2005 Rs,7,485,137 Rs,56,139 ' It is trite law that a refund cannot be refused where the transaction is genuine; goods supplied were duly exported; and the Department has never raised eye-brow to the export documents.
Case-law cited on this issue is as under:-
(i) 2003 PTD 63;
(ii) 2005 PTD 1390;
(iii) 2004 PTD 1893;
(iv) 2004 PTD 1659;
(v) 2004 PTD 2845;
(vi) 2004 PTD 1805;
(vii) 2007 PTD 1982; and
(viii) 2011 PTD (Trib.) 773.
' The learned counsel argued further that the learned CIR (Appeals) has maliciously and wrongly held that the appellant failed to satisfy and build up his case even at this forum; regarding dislodging the departmental allegation against the illegal claim and obtaining of Sales Tax refund cheques, issuance of duplication of Sales Tax Refund cheques, which tantamount to commission of tax fraud as defined under section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the fake/flying invoices as claimed by the Taxpayer'. (at p.11 of the impugned Order-in-Appeal.)
19. As to the allegation of fake input tax invoices, the learned counsel contented that it has been held by the Tribunal in the case of this appellant/registered person's Appeal Nos. S.T.As. Nos. 73 to 75/LB/ 2008, dated 21-5-2011 in respect of Tax Periods 2/2004, 4/2004 and 5/2004 as under:-- "15 In the case of this appellant, it is not the case of the Department that the input tax invoices produced by the appellant/regd. Person did not qualify to be "Tax invoices" within the meanings of section 23 (ibid), rather the invoices-in-question were so perfect and confidence inspiring that during scrutiny of the same none of the refund sanctioning authority raised any eye-brow to any of the invoices, and sanctioned issuance of R.P.O. On 24-8-2004."
"16 We wonder that the Departmental officers dubbed the input tax invoices produced by this appellant/regd. Person to be "fake" notwithstanding the fact that the same had been considered by their predecessors to be "genuine" and R.P.Os. Had been sanctioned to be issued on 24-8-2004.
If the then refund sanctioning authority had treated the allegedly 'fake' invoices to be 'genuine', that authority was involved in, the 'tax fraud', and action ought to have been taken against him too. If he was not tried for tax fraud, how his decision of issuance of refund can be dissented from, and the same are ignored in the lighter vein and one can refuse to issue an already determined refund to this Appellant /Regd. Person".
20. When confronted as to the allegation of commission of sales tax fraud by way of duplication of refund cheque of Rs,3,260,641 the learned counsel explained that the Tax Period 1/2004 was not the only Period in respect of which refund was due, rather this appellant/ registered person had filed refund claims in respect of many other Tax Periods, and when he received Cheque No, 386644, dated July 2, 2004 he remained under the impression that the same had been partly issued out of the refund claims pending, in respect of which due scrutiny had been carried out, and the refunds had become mature to be issued. Details of the then pending refund claims according to learned counsel are as under:- Tax Period Refund Claimed 2/2004 Rs.1,586,012 4/2004 Rs.3,124,843 5/2004 Rs.1,052,352 ' According to learned counsel, had there been no other refund claims of this appellant/registered person except Tax Period 1/2004, the allegation of receipt of double refund might have been levelled? But according to her in presence of many pending mature refund claims, the allegation levelled by the Addl. Collector (Adj.) is 'logically absurd' in his own words. He has therefore contended that the appellant/registered person committed no "tax fraud" within the meanings of section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 or otherwise under any section of the Act.
' The learned counsel contended that the learned CIR(Appeals) has maliciously and wrongly held that 'the appellant failed to satisfy and build up his case even at this forum; regarding dislodging the departmental allegation against the illegal claim and obtaining of Sales Tax refund cheques, issuance of duplication of Sales Tax Refund cheques, which tantamount to commission of tax fraud as defined under section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the fake/flying invoices as claimed by the Tax-payer'. (at p.11 of the impugned Order-in-Appeal.)
21. We have heard the learned representatives from both the sides and have perused the impugned order in appeal passed by the learned CIR(A), order in original, the relevant provisions of law, the case-law referred and others available record of the case. Having given deep deliberation to the facts of this case and the relevant provisions of law, we find the impugned order-in-originals and the Order-in-Appeal replete with illegalities and maliciousness, which render them null and void.
' In this respect the relevant provisions of law have been considered section 36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 reproduced hereunder: - "36. Recovery of tax not levied or short-levied or erroneously refunded.--
(1) Where by reason of some collusion or a deliberate act any tax or charge has not been levied or made or has been short-levied or has been erroneously refunded, the person liable to pay any amount of tax or charge or the amount of refund erroneously made shall be served with a notice, within five years of the relevant date, requiring him to show cause for payment of the amount specified in the notice."
The above section empowers to recover the amount "erroneously refunded", yet the action under this section cannot be taken unless the tax-payer has been served with a show cause notice within a period of five years of the "relevant date", which, according to clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 36(ibid) is "the date of refund".
' As in this case, the show cause notice under section 36(1)(ibid) has admittedly not been served upon appellant/registered person, neither the Additional Collector (Adjudication) ever assumed jurisdiction to make the impugned Order-in-Original, therefore there was no jurisdiction to uphold the Order-in-Original by the learned CIR(A).
' It is the duty of the Court to weigh conflicting evidence and to draw its own inferences and conclusions in order to administer substantial justice. But in this case, we have observed observed that the learned CIR(Appeals) has turned a deaf ear to the assertions of this appellant/registered person, and has miserably failed to take notice of the departmental illegalities. The learned CIR(Appeals) ought to have acted as an unbiased and impartial umpire, otherwise it will be very hard to escape from the allegations of mala fides. When an illegal action will flow from a public functionary, it will certainly be tainted with mala fide.
' Now we come to another relevant section which is Proviso to subsection (2) of section 45-B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 reproduced hereunder:-- "45B. Appeals.---(1) ............................................................. . (2) The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such order as he thinks fit, confirming, varying, altering, setting aside or annulling the decision or order appealed against: Provided that such order shall be passed not later than one hundred and twenty days from the date of filing of appeal or within such extended period as the Commissioner (Appeals) may, for reasons to be recorded in writing fix: ' Provided further that such extended period shall, in no case, exceed sixty days: ' Provided further that any period during which the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order or Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings or the time taken through adjournment by the petitioner not exceeding thirty days shall be excluded from the computation of aforesaid periods."
Above provisions of law clearly prescribe a period of 120 days for decision of appeal, which may be extended by 60 days for reasons to be recorded in writing. No further extension is allowed.
' In this case, the appeals were admittedly filed on 14-6-2011 which ought to have been adjudicated upon by 12-10-2011. This period could have been extended by 60 days i,e, up to 12-12-2011. No extension beyond this period is permissible.
' We have not been able to lay hands to any provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the Rules made thereunder, which allow the F.B.R. To extend the period prescribed by the 1st and 2nd Provisos to Section 45-B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Without there being any enabling provision, the extension allowed by the F.B.R. Cannot be permitted.
' We have not been able to see any reason for delaying the rendering of decision by the learned CIR(Appeals) for about six months when the appeal had been finally heard on 21-12-2011. Such a delay cannot be ignored which clearly smacks that mala fide which has been imputed by the learned counsel in his affidavit, which we refrain to comment upon, as there are other administrative authorities for taking cognizance of such glaring maladministration.
22. As regards the ante-dating of the impugned Order-in-Appeal, we are again facing an ugly gesture on the part of the first appellate authority. Had the impugned Order-in-Appeal been made on "3-5-2012", it could not contain a reference to the F.B.R.'s Letter C. No, 4(7)S(LIDT)/2012 dated "19- 5-2012". This is again a glaring instance of maladministration, which is unbecoming of a judicial authority.
' Learned counsel of the appellant has referred the decision of the Tribunal reported in 2011 PTD (Trib.) 2347 wherein it has been held that:-- "Sub-Rule (5) of Rule 12 clearly emphasizes that refund claimed by a registered person shall not be entertained if invoices are issued by his supplier unit during suspension of registration or after black listing. There is no provision for effecting recovery from the person, who has received refund against invoices of a registered supplier black listed at a later stage. In other words Rule-12(5) does not contain any procedure for recovery of already refunded amount, but it provides, a legal safeguard against any amount of refund being claimed from such black listed concerns. The past liabilities on this account should have been assailed by invoking provisions of section 45A of the Act instead. At this juncture, we have no ambiguity in our mind to hold that in case of the already refunded amount, provisions of Rule 12(5) are least sufficient to effect its recovery against black- listing of the suppliers units at subsequent stage and this act of recovery of already refunded amount does not find any support from Rule 12(5) of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 as this Rule only comes into play where refund is being processed but not sanctioned. However, where refund has been sanctioned /received, it is not applicable. As far as question of retrospective application of an executive order of black listing is concerned, we have observe that purchases made by the appellant pertain to the periods from May, 2004 to November, 2004 when the alleged suppliers were not black-listed but were actually having operative status. Their subsequent inclusion in the years 2005 and 2006 in the list of black-listed units cannot be implemented retrospectively. Rule 12(5), clearly stipulates that claim of refund shall not be entertained if invoices are issued during suspension of registration and claim shall be rejected it supplier unit is black listed subsequently.
We firmly of the view that the word "prior" used in the said rule, does not cover, the period beyond the suspension of registration but it includes the period-after suspension of its registration and its ultimate black-listing thereafter. This rule would be applicable when a registered person purchases goods from another person during the period when his registration was suspended or after its black listing, but would not be applicable, before the period-of suspension of registration or black listing. The golden rule of interpretation of statutes that the statutes should be given their ordinary meaning should be strictly applied to the fiscal statute, if there is ambiguity should always be resolved in favour of assesse. The taxing statute must be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed."
Relying on the above decision, we have no option except to hold that the action of the Sales Tax Department to recover the amount of tax refunded to the appellant/registered person due to subsequent blacklisting of any of his suppliers does not find nay support from any legal provision of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the Rules .Made thereunder. The demands raised through the impugned Orders-in-Original Nos. 5 and 6 of 2009, dated 15-7-2009 are therefore held to be void ab initio, illegal, and without authority, hence, annulled, consequently the impugned order-in- appeal in this regard is vacated.
' The appeal is allowed.