S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-S. M. Zafar Babar has filed this appeal on 3rd February, 1979 under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act of 1974 with the prayer that the impugned order dated 10th September, 1978 may be modified to the extent it fixes 1st June, 1978 as the data of regular appointment of the appellant as an Additional District and Sessions Judge and the respondent be directed to fix the original date of appointment as the regular date of appointment with all the consequential benefits.
2. Similarly, Saleem Akhtar, Additional District and Sessions Judge has filed appeal No, 382/505 of 1978 with the identical prayer as given in the above-mentioned para regarding S. M. Zafar Babar.
During the pendency of these appeals unfortunately Muhammad Saleem Akhtar died and an application was made by Mr. Shujaat Ameen on 31st March, 1980 on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 5, Mr. Azeem Khan Niazi, Additional District & Sessions Judge and Mian Abdur Rahman, Additional District and Sessions Judge that they may be transposed as appellants in this case as they would be supporting the interest of the said Malik Saleem Akhtar. As none of the parties made any objection to this request the Court vide its order dated 31st March 1980 allowed the application and Mr. Azeem Khan Niazi and Mian Abdur Rahman, respondents, were treated as appellants. As all the three appellants have identical cases involving a common point of law as well as facts therefore we will proceed to dispose of Appeals Nos. 31/503 of 1979 and 382/505 of 1978 with single judgment, which will he delivered in the case of S. M. Zafar Babar in Appeal No, 31/503 of 1979.
However Mr. Saleem Akhtar has died during the pendency of these appeals.
3. Brief facts of the case are that vide notification dated 12th. October, 1974 the Governor of Punjab was pleased to relax the provisions of rule 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 in favour of the appellants alongwith six others and appointed them as Additional District and Sessions Judges. However, vide para. 2 of the same notification the Governor of the Punjab approved their appointments on ad hoc basis for a period of six months.
The appellants continued to serve as such and their ad hoc appointments were revived after the expiry of every six months by separate notifications dated 3rd May, 1975, 3rd November, 1975, 19th April, 1976, 1st October, 1976 and 15th April, 1977, The Government issued an order dated 10th September, 1978 approving the appointment of the appellants as well as six others. According to this order the appointments of the appellants were deemed to have taken place from 1st June, 1978. In other words the service rendered by the appellants from 22nd October, 1974 to 1st June 1978 was not to be considered at all for any of the purposes of law and no benefit of that service was to be available to the appellants. The appellants made a representation to the Government but the same was rejected. Hence these appeals.
4. We have heard Messrs Muhammad Arif and M. A. Riaz, learned counsel for the appellants, as well as Messrs Mumtaz Hussain, Shahzad Jehangir, Mushtaq Masood and Tanweer Ahmad Khan (Assistant Advocate-General) on behalf of the respondents at length and have perused the record of this case carefully with their assistance. It has been urged on behaif of the appellants that the notification of appointment describes the appointment of the appellants as 'ad hoc' yet for all practical purposes the appointment was considered as 'regular' and the service rules applicable to the general cadre of regular service were also applied to the appellants. To substantiate this argument it was pointed out that (I) the appointments of the appellants were made on the recommendations of the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Lahore High Court, (ii) the posts against which these appointments were made in 1974 were vacant and regular to he filled in by permanent appointments, (iii) the yearly increment were allowed to the appellants and other similarly appointed persons and in accordance with the rules of regular service and (iv) the benefit of the Provident Fund was also allowed to the appellants and others after two years of service. The /earned counsel also relied on the following precedents where the Government in similar circumstances ordered regular appointment of ad hoc appointees from the date they joined the service
(a) Absorption of Lawyer-Magistrates in regular cadre of P. C. S.
(b) Appointment of ad hoc Social Welfare Officers in regular service.
(c) Regularising service of some ad hoc Additional Sessions Judges, e. g. Mr. Amir Akbar Khan.
It was also further submitted that the Government adopted more than one method in the appointment of Additional District and Sessions Judges from amongst the Lawyers as in the case of Messrs Bashiruddin Ahmad and Jameel Asghar who were directly appointed as District and Sessions Judges in 1966 on regular basis. Similarly, the cases of Mr. Justice Gulbaz Khan and Mr. Justice Rafique Tarar were also quoted to show that these two Judges were inducted into service as Additional District and Sessions Judges from amongst the Lawyers on regular basis. By citing these examples the learned counsel for the appellants tried to make out that the Government had discriminated in the case of the appellants and thus it should have rectified this injustice by endorsing their ad hoc appointment as regular from the date they were appointed as such. The treatment meted out to the appellants in disallowing them the benefit of for years service was assailed as arbitrary which according to the learned counsel should not be approved in law.
Arguing the case of Mr. Azeem Khan Niazi a few further points were urged in addition to those one already submitted in the case of S. M. Zafar Babar. It was argued that the appellants being the selectees of the Honourable Judges of the High Court their appearance before the Public Service Commission for determination of their suitability was dispensed with by the Government.
According to the learned counsel once a high-powered forum has given its opinion about the suitability, etc. Of the appellants it would be improper to decline to give them the status of regular appointees on the date of their appointment and to term them as ad hoc was an act of sheer injustice. It was further emphasized that since the selection was final as it was ultimately accepted to be, there was little justification to treat the appointments made as a result of that selection to be ad hoc appointments. Taking the background of their appointments it was submitted that at that time there were no Service Rules with regard to appointments of Additional District and Sessions Judges therefore it would be correct to assume that Civil Services of Pakistan (Composition and Cadre) Rules, 1954 were in vogue to induct them into service. Although it was accepted by the learned counsel during the course of arguments that rule 7 (2) of the 1954 Rules was deleted vide notification dated 20th January, 1973 yet the Government followed the 1954 Rules throughout.
According to the learned counsel the Government was at liberty to follow these Rules in the absence of any specific Service Rules prescribing the specific method of recruitment to a particular post. Reliance in this respect was placed on Dr. N. A. Supil v. Governor, Punjab . It was furtner pointed out that the respondents themselves have benefited from the principles of 1954 Rules in the matter of their promotion and therefore it would not lie in their mouth to say that the recruitment of the appellants could not be made under the said Rules. It was specifically pointed out at this stage that the respondents were promoted as Additional District and Sessions Judges on the strength of the 1954 Rules only. The arguments were concluded on behalf of the appellants by resubmitting that the existence of word 'ad hoc' in their appointment order was redundant and illegal as the appointments were made as a result of competitive and valid selection. Reliance was placed on N 1 R. 1981 T P 51 and 1975 SCMR 457.
5. On the other hand the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents introverted the contention so raised on behalf of appellants by submitting that it would be in the fitness of things if the appointment letter of the appellants was looked into to find their status and it will only be reasonable to interpret the same in the light of law laid down in this respect. According to the learned counsel the appellants were appointed on ad hoc basis which is a term familiar to the Civil Servants Act, 1974 and the implications of the same have been completely made out vide rule 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. Their appointment was approved by the Governor for six months only which was subsequently extended from time to time in terms of the aforementioned proviso to rule 22 (ibid) and thus it was not possible for the appellants to protest or challenge their terms of service (ad hoc) when they accepted the same and continued serving as such till their services were regularised in 1978. With regard to the claim of the appellants that they were the selectees of the Honourable Judges of the Lahore High Court and were appointed for all purposes not on ad hoc basis but on regular basis, it was pointed out that when their case was recommended by the High Court to the Government for the regularization of their service, the appellants were described as ad hoc. Thus the High Court itself treated them as 'ad hoc' which is apparent from the letter of the said authority. Therefore, it would be improper on their part to consider their appointments from the very beginning as regular. With regard to the claim of the appellants that their initial appointments were regulated by relaxation of rules 5, 6 and 7 of the Civil Service of Pakistan (Composition and Cadre) Rules, 1954 it was argued that these rules were omitted on 22nd August, 1973 by a notification and thereafter in Article 240 of the 1973 Constitution it was provided that the appointments to and the conditions of service of a person in the case of the service of a Province and post in connection with the affairs of a Province, shall be determined by or under an Act of the Provincial Assembly. Under the aforementioned Article of the Constitution, the Civil Servants Act of 1974 was promulgated on 4th June, 1974 and section 23 thereof authorised the Governor to make such Rules as may appear to him to be necessary for carrying out the purposes of the said Act. Under section 23 (ibid) the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 were enforced on 24th August, 1974 and the appellants were obviously appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judges along with1 six others vide notification dated 12th October, 1974 of the said Act and therefore their claim of being appointed under 1954 Rules (rules 5-7) will stand belied. It was vehemently argued that the appellants being appointees under the Civil Servants Act, 1974 were bound by the rules of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, without any exception.
6. The Assistant Advocate-General, Mr. Tanweer Ahmad Khan, has placed on record Annexures A to IC to prove the above contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents, to which we will advert at the proper time. The crux of the arguments of the Assistant Advocate-General is that the proviso to rule 22 is fully applicable to the case of the appellants despite the relaxation made in their case by the Governor and thus their status remained ad hoc right from the date of appointment till they were regularised. He also referred to a letter of one of the appellants, Mr. S. M.
Zafar Babar dated 2nd February, 1978 which, according to him, foreclosed his case as he himself admitted to he an ad hoc appointee and prayed that the notification for his further extension te issued otherwise he was likely to lose his job. The learned Assistant Advocate-General relied on PLD 1968 Kar. 693, PLJ 1979 Tr, C (Service) 51 and PLD 1978 Lah.
752. Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, one of the learned counsel for the respondents, laid a lot of stress on the point that although under rule 22 of the Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service)
Rules, 1974, conditions 1-5 were relaxed the proviso to the same remained intact. According to him, this notification has to be read as a whole and not in parts. Mr. Mumtaz Hussain, one of the learned counsel for the respondents, analysed the Punjab Civil Servants Act of 1974 bit by bit to show that the word 'ad hoc' was neither alien nor redundant as claimed by the appellants but had its meaning in the terms of the Act itself. He referred to section 2, subsection (1), clause (a) ibid where there is a mention of ad hoc appointment. He also referred to clause ( f ) which has defined the meaning of the permanent post. He also referred to sections 3, 4, 7 and even to section 23 enabling the Governor to make the rules to show that the ad hoc appointments do not come within Part 2, 3 or 4 of the scheme of this Act. He has cited the following cases to show that ad hoc appointments were always a stopgap arrangement, clearly hit by rule 22 of the Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 and in no way could such appointments be equated with the regular appointments made in favour of Civil Servants :-
(I) PLD 1968 Kar. 693. (11) 1972 PLC (C. S. T.) 31.
(iii) 1972 PLC (C. S. T.) 95. (iv) PLJ 1974 Tr. C. (Service) 239.
(v) 1977 PLC (C. S. T.) 80. (vi) 1977 SCMR 365.
(vii) 1977 PLC (C. S. T.) 165 (viii) PLD 1978 Lah 752.
7. We are firstly called upon to settle the controversy raging between the parties about the nature of appointment of the appellants in this case. As mentioned in the earlier part of or judgment the respondents claim that appointments of the appellants as Additional District and Sessions Judges were made under the Civil Servants Act, 1974 and that the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules of 1974 were fully applicable to them, whereas the appellants' claim is that as no Rules existed for the appointment of lawyers on permanent basis in this cadre therefore it would be safe to assume that their appointments were regulated by rules 5-7 of the Civil Service of Pakistan (Composition and Cadre) Rules, 1954. According to the appellants even if these rules stood deleted vide notification of 22nd August, 1973, still the Government followed these rules in their principle. It was urged that it was open to Government to follow the principles laid down in other Service Rules which had some similarity when no specific Service Rules presenting the specific method of recruitment to a particular post were available at a particular time.
8. What we find is that after the deletion of the 1954 Rules (rules 5-7) by virtue of Article 240 of the 1973 Constitution it was provided that the appointments to and the conditions of service of a person in the case of service of a. Province and a post in connection with the affairs of a Province, shall be determined by or under an Act of the Provincial Assembly. This Article created the Civil Servants Act of 1974 and section 23 thereof authorised the Governor to make such rules as may appear to him to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the said Act. So came in the wake of the 1974 Act the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. We have carefully scanned the scheme of things for initiating the persons into service directly or by promotion and find that section 2 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, defines in clause (a) 'ad hoc approximant' and then in clause ( f ) 'permanent post' and in clause (k) 'temporary post'.
We have given the definition of 'ad hoc appointment in the earlier part of or judgment and the "permanent post" has been defined as 'a post sanctioned without limit of time' whereas a 'temporary post' means "a post other than a permanent post". Section 4 of Chapter II of this Act deals with appointments and section 5 with probation. With regard to appointments it has been laid down that appointments to a civil service of the province or to a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Province, shall be made in the prescribed manner by the Governor or by a person authorised by him in that behalf. In this context the word 'probation' has been explained as 'an initial appointment to a service or post referred to in section 4, not being on ad hoc appointment, shall he on such probation and for such period of probation as may be prescribed'. Section 6 deals with confirmation and clause (4) of this section states that "there shall be no confirmation against any temporary post". Section 7 deals with 'seniority' which makes it clear that 'seniority in the grade to which a civil servant is promoted shall take effect from the date of regular appointment to that grade'. It is only when we read this Act along with the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 do we find that the method of appointment on ad hoc basis is dealt with in Part IV under rule 22 of the latter Rules. The notification of 12th October, 1974 by virtue of which the appellants were inducted into service states clearly that the Government of the Punjab has been pleased to relax the provision of rule 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, in favour of the appellants and six others for the purpose of their appointments as Additional District and Sessions Judges. In para. 2 of the same notification it was made clear to them that they were appointed on ad hoc basis for a period of six months only. So this notification is sufficient by itself to conclude the controversy between the parties. We have no hesitation to hold that the appellants were appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judges under the 1974 Act after relaxation of the provisions of rule 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. Thus the claim of appellants is wholly misconceived that they should be considered to have been recruited under the 1954 Rules and there was no specific method available for their recruitment into his service at the time when they were so recruited.
9. After resolving this issue we now proceed further to examine the implications of the word 'ad hoc' used by the appointing authority in the notification of appointment of the appellants as well as the extent of relaxation of rule 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service)
Rules of 1974. In the Civil Servants Act of 1974, 'ad hoc appointment' has been defined as "appointment of a duly qualified person made otherwise than in accordance with the prescribed method of recruitment, pending recruitment in accordance with such method". The expression 'ad hoc' is a Latin expression and literally means 'arranged for a purpose' or in other words for a particular business or occasion. This term necessarily involves temporariness. It can well be.
Termed by the dictionary as a stopgap-arrangement. So the word 'ad hoc' being not alien to the Civil Servants Act of 1974 was used with a purpose by the Government while appointing the appellants. The appellants were made clear that in the ordinary course in accordance with the prescribed method they could not be recruited into service therefore it was considered necessary to relax the provisions of rule 22 in their favour, so as to make them eligible for being inducted as Additional District and Sessions Judges. Rule 22 falls under Part IV of the Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules of 1974 and expressly relates to ad hoc appointments. Clause (2) of this rule runs as under :- "After forwarding a requisition to the Selection Authority, the appointing authority may, if it considers necessary in the public interest, fill the post on ad hoc basis for a period not exceeding six months pending nomination of a candidate by the selection authority.
Provided-
(1) the vacancy is advertised properly in the newspapers ;
(2) the appointment is made of a person duly qualified in accordance with the provisions of the rules and orders applicable to the post ;
(3) the selection is made on the basis of merit determined by objective criteria ;
(4) the appointment order certifies that a requisition has been sent to the selection authority ; and the appointment is made subject to revocation at any time by the competent authority :
(5) Provided further that ad hoc appointment shall not confer any right on the persons so appointed in the matter of regular appointment to the same post nor the service will count towards seniority in the grade. Sub-clause (3) of rule 22 empowers the Governor to relax any of these conditions in any individual case for special reasons. Similarly rule 23 empowers the Government for special reasons to be recorded in writing to relax any of the rules in any individual case of hardship, to the extent prescribed by the Government. So we now see that the appointments of the appellants were made possible only when the Governor acting under sub- clause (3) of the rule 22 relaxed all the five conditions in order to make the appellants eligible for their appointments as Additional District and Sessions Judges. The fact of the case is that all the appellants were practising lawyers and were straightaway recruited without any recourse to be taken under the five conditions of rule 22. Another controversy had arisen at this stage when it was urged by the appellants that the Governor while relaxing the conditions under rule 22 also relaxed the proviso of the same rule whereas the respondents vehemently opposed this contention.
10. We have given or anxious thought to this contention and are inclined to accept the contention of the respondents that relaxation under rule 22 was only relaxation of the conditions and could by no stretch of imagination delete the proviso of this rule, the reason being that is always the conditions which are relaxed which come in the way of an appointment and the proviso being independent of the conditions had its own meaning. If the Governor/Government wanted to confer the status of regular appointment on the appellants the said authority was not precluded under the rules to do so. This point has been; highlighted by the appellants themselves when they bring to or notice certain cases of appointments of District and Sessions Judges and Additional District and Sessions Judges directly on regular basis. They call this an act of discrimination against them but we call it the prerogative of the Appointing Authority to act as it deems fit. We are not in a position to question the wisdom of the Appointing Authority which in the case of the appellants chose to appoint them only on ad hoc basis whereas in the cases of Mr. Justice Bashiruddin Khan and Mr. Justice Jamil Asghar who were initiated into service as District and Sessions Judges on regular basis it chose otherwise. Similarly, Mr. Justice Rafique Tarar and Mr. Justice Gulbaz Khan were recruited directly on regular basis as Additional District and Sessions Judges. If the appellants were dissatisfied with their terms and conditions of appointment they could easily have challenged the same or refused to accept such recruitment. It is pertinent to note here that this proviso was repeated again and again as after every six months a new notification was effected to allow them to continue in service and it was only in 1978 that they were finally regularised and that too by a clear statement that this regularisation was from 1978 only. At this juncture it could be useful to refer to 1981 PLC (C. S.) 92 which is a Division Bench ruling of Mr. Justice Abdul Hayee Kureshi and Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian of the Sind High Court. On this ruling reliance has been placed by both the parties. The Head Notes favour the case of the appellants but if the whole case is analysed the view-point of the respondents is liable to be upheld. The Head Note runs as under :- "Appointees appointed on ad hoc basis for limited period specified in appointment letters-Their appointments regularised in relaxation of relevant rules by competent authority through notification in official Gazette-Held, such appointees can no longer be treated as ad hoc appointees within purview of M. L.
0. 55."
While going into the facts of that case we find that there were five petitioners viz. (1) Allah Bakhsh Baloch, (ii) Abdul Hakim, (iii) Ashfaque Ahmad, (iv) Asrar Hussain and (v) Muhammad Abdul Wahab Siddiqui who were appointed on ad hoc basis for a period of six months, in various capacities in the Education Department. On account of their satisfactory performance the petitioners' appointment (confirmation) was regularised through notifications with effect from the date of their initiation into service on ad hoc basis. With this statement of facts we need not go further to uphold the contention of the respondent as the notification itself regularised the service with retrospective effect. If the same had been done in the case of the appellants by the Governor/Government in 1978 at the time when the appellants' service was regularised we would have upheld the same. Therefore, 1981 p L C (C. S.) 92 cited above does not help the appellants in any manner.
11. The learned Assistant Advocate-General has placed on the record, with the permission of this Court a number of documents from Annexure 'A' to Annexure 'K' to illustrate that every notification which extended the life of appellants' service for a period of another six months always mentioned that the appointment was 'ad hoc'. Similarly, as we go through Annexure 'A' which is a letter from Chaudhry Bashir Ahmad, Registrar Lahore High Court, to the Chief Secretary, SGA &I D, dated 16th April, 1978, we find that the 'subject' of the said letter reads as "Regularisation of appointments of ad hoc Additional District and Sessions Judges from the Bar". We also find in Annexure 'H' an order of the Governor, dated 10th September, 1978 whereby the services of the appellants were regularised with effect from 1st June, 1978. So if the Governor of the Punjab wanted to give them the benefit of their earlier service of for years he could have done so and would not have given a particular date of regularization against the names of the appellants. Annexure 'I' is a letter from Malik Lehrasap Khan, Registrar, Lahore High Court, to the Chief Secretary of Government of the Punjab, S G A & I Department dated 20th November, 1978, forwarding the representation of the appellants for assignment of date of regular appointment as Additional District and Sessions Judges, which has been forwarded without comments. This would show that if the Honourable- High Court had given any assurance of the kind claimed by the appellants at the time of their selection as Additional District and Sessions Judges on ad hoc basis it would have clearly stated it in Annexure 'I' and would not have forwarded their case without comments. While adverting to the point of view enunciated in Annexure 'K' by the Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab on the representation of Messrs Abdur Rehman, Muhammad Azim Khan Niazi and Saleem Akhtar Malik (deceased), Additional District and Sessions Judges, it was observed in para. 2 as under :- "The Officers were at first appointed on ad hoc basis and their appointment had to be regularized through the Public Service Commission under the then existing Law and Rules. The regularization could not take place automatically because the Commission had to advertise vacancies and invite applications. The Officers might or might not have been selected by the Commission.
However, later the Public Service Commission Ordinance and the Service Rules were amended and the posts were taken out of the purview of the Commission. Their regular appointment under the old Law and Rules was not possible."
' Similarly, we cannot ignore an admitted fact that two of the appointees on ad hoc basis, namely, Baseer Ali and Muhammad Akram Baitoo went out of service when the life of their service was not extended after the expiry of their ad hoc appointments. In 1972 PLC (C. S. T.) 31 Mr. S. A. Mahmood, Chairman and Messrs Bashir Ahmad Khan and Ashfaq Ali Khan, Member, Sh. Muhammad Attaullah Qureshi v. The Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and 67 others observed as under :- "We have no doubt that in this case the appointment of the appellant was a local arrangement on a short term basis in the nature of ad hoc appointment and be was not appointed to the service by this order. The appellant is not thus entitled to count his seniority from 15th July, 1958, as is claimed by him. Our reasons for coming to this conclusion are detailed by us in the order in the case of Mr. Abdul Majid Jamil, which may be read as a part of this order."
' Similarly, in P L I 1978 Tr. C (Services) 256 it was held that ad hoc appointment confers no right on the appointee to hold the post indefinitely. In case of ad hoc appointment to higher post an appointee is liable to reversion without notice. Similarly, in PLD 1978 Lah. 752 it was held that where persons are accepted in respective scales on ad hoc basis, the Court cannot presume that such persons held post on regular basis and that they should not be penalised on account of inaction of the Department. In PLD 1968 Kar. 693, it was held that promotion/ appointment on ad hoc basis purely as stopgap arrangement cannot be equated with promotion/appointment on "probation".
Promotion/ appointment on "probation" is a preliminary step to permanent appointment. Ad hoc appointee/promotee cannot claim lien or right to continue in a higher post. The mere fact that persons junior to the petitioner were allowed to continue in higher posts is not sufficient reason to compel Government to let the petitioner also continue in such higher posts. In 1972 PLC (C. S. T.) 91 it was held that ad hoc appointment does not give any right to seniority nor to membership of a particular service. In 1972 PLC (C. S. T.) 31 it was held that ad hoc appointment by way of local arrangement is not an appointment to service and cannot count towards seniority.
12. The appellants have also made grievance that the Government did regularise with effect from the date of such appointments the services of Lawyer-Magistrates absorbed in P. C. S. Cadre, the Social Welfare Officers and some Additional District and Sessions Judges, namely Ameer Akbar Khan, etc. It would be sufficient to say that the Government is fully empowered to take decision according to the circumstances of each case and no exception can be taken to such decisions if these are not contrary to any fundamentals of laws or rules so laid down by itself.We have already discussed this point at length in the earlier part of or judgment where we have said that if the Government had given the appellants regularization from the date of their appointment no exception could have been taken against that decision. However, in the case of ad hoc Civil Judges this Tribunal in Mehr Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Government of Punjab and others clearly lays down that the period of ad hoc appointments would not be counted towards seniority. Unless and until the appellants could show to us that they have vested rights under the law the citation of certain precedents would not be of any avail to them. Similarly, we cannot accept the claim of the appellants that the appointment on ad hoc basis was only in name as they were duly given yearly increments and were also entitled to contribute towards G. P. F. After two years of service. This claim stands belied when we read the application of Mr. S. M. Zafar Babar, one of the appellants, addressed to the Government at a juncture when he had not received his extension order for a further period of six months on ad hoc basis in which he had shown his apprehension that due to this default on the part of the Government he was in deep trouble and prayed for his rescue by issuance of a new notification in that respect. It means that the appellants were all the time aware that they were being treated as ad hoc appointees and could be eliminated from service if the umbrella of six monthly notification was not made available to them.
13. We cannot help observing that the treatment meted out to the appellants by the Government has caused great hardship to them as they have been deprived of for years of service but we cannot help them by giving them what they cannot get under the law. Their own attitude in this case has been complacent as they accepted the appointment orders renewed after every six2 months on ad hoc basis without any demur and only chose to agitate when they found themselves secure in 1978 after being regularised into service. The result is that we do not find any force in their appeal which is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
14. Before parting with this case and in view of or earlier observation that case of the appellant was a case of hardship, we therefore recommend to Government/Governor to reconsider their prayer vis-a-vis the relief claimed by them before us. 1972 PLC (C. S. T.) 1 1977 PLC (C. S. T.) 165