' QAISER RASHID KHAN, J.-The petitioners through the iqstant petition under section 561-A, Cr.P.C, seek the quashment of FIR No, 176, dateji 24.7.2011 of police station Paroa, District D.I.Khan registered against them under section 188, PPC. ,
2. Brief facts of the case are that Mir Alam Khan, complainant/respondent No, 2, had moved aiv application to the DPO D.I.Khan for registration of case under section 188, PPC against the petitioners and another, namely, Ahmed son of Ali, on the ground that they had violated the order of DCO D.I.Khan passed under section 144, Cr.P.C. The application was marked to the SHO police station Paroa for necessary legal action and report. The SHO marked the said application to the AS1 for doing the needful, who vide his final report dated 16.7.2011 field the petitioners responsible to have violated the order of DCO passed under section 144, Cr.P.C, and thus registration of case was recommended against them under section 188, PPC which was accordingly registered vide FIR ibid, while Ahmad son of Ali was reported to be dead. Hence this petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners vociferously argued that the complainant was not competent to lodge the FIR in question because he was not a public servant within the meanings of section 195Cr.P.C. He argued that the order of DCO under section 144, Cr.P.C, was passed against the tenants while the petitioners were not so as is evident from the revenue record. He contended that the mala of the complainant was proved from the fact that though he had charged Ahmad son of Ali as an accused in the case, but he was found to have died much earlier than the lodging of the instant FIR which is duly mentioned in the final report of the Investigating Officer. The learned counsel submitted that there is an unexplained and inordinate delay in making the complaint because the order of DCO under section 144, Cr.P.C, was effective from 23.4.2011 upto 23.5.2001 while the complaint in hand was filed on 18.6.2011 and thus the registration of FIR was unjustified.
4. Conversely, the learned Deputy Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State assisted by the learned counsel for the complainant opposed this petition on the grounds that the petitioners were found guilty of the offence under section 188, PPC in a detailed inquiry conducted by a responsible police officer and thus the FIR in question was rightly registered against them. It was argued " that the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners relate to the merits of the case which can at best be adjudged during trial.
5. Arguments heard and record perused.
6. Admittedly, the complainant was not a public servant but a private individual and thus he was not competent to file the complaint in hand. The provisions of section 188, PPC can be pressed into service only when compliance to section 195, Cr.P.C., is proved. For ready' reference, section 195(l)
(a), Cr.P.C, is reproduced below:-- "No Court shall take cognizance (a) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188, PPC, except on the written request of the public servant concerned, or of some other servant to whom he is subordinate".
7. It, therefore, follows that neither the complainant was himself a public servant nor subordinate to anyone and thus he was not competent to have lodged the present complaint in view of the express embargo placed on a private g person to approach the police for registration of the case under section 188, PPC.
8. As a result, the registration of FIR was not justified which is liable to be quashed.
9. As a corollary to what is discussed above, this/ petition is accepted and the FIR in question is quashed.