The petitioner, a cameraman, in the Pakistan Television Corporation, was appointed as a cameraman in the Group-5 in Pay Scale No, 750-50-1500 vide letter dated 23rd July, 1977 (Annexure A). This appointment was to be effective from 1st July, 1977. He was to be initially, on probation for a period of six months. Prior to that he was under training as an apprentice with the said Corporation with effect from 1st October, 1976. His terms and conditions were, however, modified by the appointing authority on 21st February, 1978 (Annexure C). The petitioner was confirmed in his post as a cameraman on 31st January, 1978. The said order was to be effective from 1st January, 1978. Throughout this period, the petitioner has been working as a cameraman with the respondent-Corporation. There was no complaint whatever about his work rather he was allowed an annual increment by order dated 1st July, 1978 (Annexure-D). All of a sudden, the petitioner was removed from service by order dated 2nd December, 1978 passed by respondent No. 1. This order is purported to have been passed under section 3 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance XIII of 1978. The said section reads as follows: "Certain persons to be liable to removal or reversion.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in the terms and conditions of service, a person in corporation service appointed or promoted during the period from the first day of January, 1972, to the fifth day of July, 1977, may be removed from service, or reverted to his lower post or grade, as the case may be, without notice, by the President, or a person authorised by him in this behalf, on such date as the President, or as the case may be, the person so authorised may, in the public interest, direct."
2. There is no dispute between the parties with regard to this factual and legal position.
3. The petitioner has assailed the aforesaid order of removal from service on the ground that the case of the petitioner does not fall within the ambit of section 3 of the said Ordinance. According to learned counsel for the petitioner only persons in Corporation Service appointed or promoted during the period from 1st of January, 1972 to the fifth day of July, 1977 could be removed from service or reverted to a lower post or grade. The petitioner, on the other hand, was appointed on 23rd July, 1977 (Annexure `A'). Therefore he cannot be removed from service by means of the impugned order under the said Ordinance. The impugned order, according to learned counsel, is void ab initio and without lawful authority.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the petitioner joined the Pakistan Television Corporation as an apprentice cameraman on 1st of October, 1976 and that although he was appointed on 23rd July, 1977, this appointment was effective from 1st July, 1977. Therefore, his case was covered by section 3 of the said Ordinance. Secondly, it was submitted that the petitioner should have filed a representation to the President as provided by section 4 of the said Ordinance and as this has not been done, this Writ Petition should be dismissed. Thirdly, it was argued that a writ cannot be issued to Television Corporation as it is a limited Company registered under the Companies Act. Fourthly, it was argued that the petitioner should have moved the Services Tribunal constituted under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Finally it was submitted that the remedy was also available to the petition by way of appeal before the National Industrial Relations Commission by virtue of rule 15 of the Television Services Rules published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, dated 25th May, 1978 and that the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance were not applicable in the instant case.
5. No doubt the petitioner could file a representation to the President of Pakistan under section 4 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978, but this was a remedy in the nature of a mercy petition. No right of hearing was available to him, it conferred no legal right on the petitioner as such. In any case if the impugned neat was void ab initio the petitioner was not under any legal obligation to file a petition/representation in terms of section 4 of the said Ordinance. As regards the objection to the competency of this Court to issue a writ to the Pakistan Television Corporation, two earlier decisions of this Court reported as Muhammad Aslam Sleemi V. Pakistan Television Corporation and Ghulam Mustafa v. Ulfat Hussain Qureshi offer a complete answer. It was held in the first case, which was decided by a Full Bench of this Court : "We have given or anxious thought to the matter and have carefully considered all the above- noted contentions. We feel that the learned Deputy Attorney-General was justified in omitting to assert that the two Corporations are "persons performing function in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a Local Authority', because respondent No, 2 is clearly a Statutory Corporation, which is fully controlled by the Government, Similarly, although respondent No, I, i,e, the Pakistan Television Corporation is incorporated as a Limited Company, under the Companies Act, 1913, yet the Government has the controlling shares in it from its very inception and it is fully controlled and run by it. In support of the fact that the two Corporations are controlled by the Government it may be mentioned that no Radio or Television Station can be installed without the prior permission of the Government as required by section 3 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, it is the Government which appoints the General Manager or the Managing Director, respectively, of these two Corporations and their salaries are paid from public exchequer. Moreover, the Government levies fees for issuing licences for keeping radio and television sets and also has the power to make rules under section 10 of the above-mentioned Act of 1933. These rules have actually been made. The rules relating to television are known as the Television Receiving Apparatus (Possession and Licensing) Rules, 1970. In these rules the Government has provided for levying of fees for issuance of licences for the possession of television sets on the payment of a1 2 specified fee. The contravention of the said provision (rule No, 3) has been made punishable under rule 15 of these Rules.
Moreover, in a Government Publication titled. "The Budget, 1976-77", it is stated at pages 194 and 351 respectively, that a demand of Rs, 5,75,00,000 was made and sanctioned in favour of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and a demand of Rs, 63,83,000 was sanctioned for "Investment in Pakistan Television Corporation for repatriation of foreign equity". Although the actual repatriation of the foreign capital has not yet been effected but the intention to do so is quite evident from the provision of the funds for that purpose, in the annual budget. It is also noteworthy that clause (f) section 10 (1) Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation Act (XXXII of 1973) and Article 111(3) of the Memorandum of Association of the Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd., read with the provisions of Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 show beyond doubt that both the Corporations are being controlled and run under the directions of the Government. In this connection it is also pertinent to refer to Article 159 of the Constitution. This Article, read with Items Nos. 7 and 31 of the Federal Legislative List, provides that broadcasting and telecasting are Federal Subjects. Article 253 (1) of the Constitution provides that the Government can take over and run any such Corporation. The respondent-Corporations are clearly public services and as shown above, they are being controlled and administered by the Government. As a result, we feel that the learned Deputy Attorney-General was justified in not pressing that the respondent-Corporations are not performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province of Local Authority.
At page 446 (para. 53 it was observed) : "The present Corporation squarely fulfils the aforesaid requirement and, looked at from whatever angle, it is manifestly a public utilit Corporation or to be exact a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation within the meaning ci this concept and amenable to writ jurisdiction as contemplated I Article 199 of the Constitution."
Accordingly, I hold that the Pakistan Television Corporation is amenable, to the jurisdiction of this Court. The objection has no force and is repelled.
6. Under rule 15.10 of the Pakistan Television Corporation Rules published in the Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary) May, 25, 1978, it is provided that an employee aggrieved by the order of the Managing Director may lodge a petition before the Chairman, National Industrial Relations Commission (the specified authority under section 6 of the Pakistan Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1952) for the redress of the individual grievance. The impugned order in this case, however, has been passed by the Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan. No appeal/remedy was thus available to the petitioner under the said rule in the instant case.
7. Section 3 of the Ordinance lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in terms of the conditions of service, a person in Corporation service appointed or promoted during the period from 1st January, 1972 to 5th July, 1977 may be removed from-service or reverted to a lower grade without notice by the President, or a person authorised by him in this behalf, on such date as the President, or as the case may be, the person so authorised may, in the public interest, direct. In the present case the petitioner was appointed on 23rd July, 1977 by means of the order Annexure A. His appointment was to be effective from 1st July, 1977 but that would not make any difference. He was, in fact, appointed by letter dated 23rd July, 1977. He is not a person appointed or promoted during the period from 1st January, 1972 to 5th July, 1977. In my view, the impugned order is capable of no other interpretation. In any case even if the words are capable of two interpretations, the interpretation favouring the right of citizens would be accepted by the Court. In Postmaster General, Eastern Circle (E.P.), Dacca and another v.
Muhammad Hashim it was observed:3 "If the Rules are capable of bearing a reasonable interpretation favourable to the employee then that interpretation should be preferred."
Besides the said power under section 3 of the Ordinance can only be exercised in the public interest. No material has been placed on the record to show that the impugned order had been passed in public interest. The text of the impugned order does not refer to the "public interest" at all nor has this Court been informed anything about the kind of public interest involved in this case.
Accordingly I hold that the case of the petitioner does not come within the ambit of section 3 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978. The impugned order in so for as it relates to the petitioner is declared to be illegal and without lawful authority.
As the impugned order has been found by me to be void ab initio and without lawful authority and suffered from illegality on the facel of the record a writ of certiorari could be granted even though right e of statutory appeal had not been availed of. In the circumstances' the objection of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner should have first gone to the Service Tribunal is of no substance, For the foregoing reasons the impugned order, in so far it relates to the petitioner, is hereby set aside and the writ petition is accepted with costs. PLD 1977 Lab. 852 1979 PLC 446 PLD 1978 SC 61