' On 15-4-1980 the Workers' Union of Pars Textile Mills Limited, Samma Satta, Bahawalpur, submitted an application for registration of their Trade Union under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to the Registrar of Trade Unions. Bahawalpur Region, Bahawalpur, who claims to have received the same on 20-4-1980. The Registrar on 24-4-1980 marked the said application to the Assistant Labour Officer, Bahawalpur for enquiry. The Assistant Labour Officer (Enquiry Officer) made enquiries at the premises of the Mills and submitted his report on 30-4-1980 containing certain deficiencies and objections. The Registrar on the same day i,e, 30-4-1980 communicated the said deficiencies and objections to the respondent-Union. According to the version of the Registrar, the reply to the said deficiencies and objections from the respondent-Union was received on 9-5-1980 but the same were not found satisfactory and consequently vide order dated 10-5-1980 the application of the respondent-Union for registration was rejected and an intimation to this effect was sent to the respondent-Union. On the other hand, the version of the respondent-Union is that they received the objections on 7-5-1980 and the same were duly replied and sent to the Registrar vide letter dated 8-5-1980. This was received by the Registrar on 11-5-1980. Since he had already rejected the application of the respondent-Union earlier on 10-5-1980, no further action was required on this reply. Feeling aggrieved with the refusal to register the Trade Union, the respondent-Union filed an appeal under section 8(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before Punjab Labour Court No, 8, Bahawalpur. This appeal was opposed by the Registrar. The Labour Court vide impugned judgment dated 20-7-1980 accepted the appeal and directed the Registrar to allow Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Bhatti, President and Mr. Pervaz Chaudhry, General Secretary to make necessary corrections in the list of members in his presence on a specified date and time conveyed through a registered letter to them with reference to entry of Muhammad Nawaz, appearing at Serial No, 12 and, thereafter, to register the Union according to law and to issue a certificate of registration within three days thereafter. Feeling aggrieved with the impugned judgment, the Registrar of Trade Unions, Bahawalpur has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Tribunal under section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
2. I have heard at length the Registrar in person and Mr. Aqa Asaf Jaffary, counsel for the respondent-Union. I have also perused the entire material available on the record and the relevant provisions of the statute.
3. A legal objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent-Union regarding the competence of the present revision petition under section 38(3-a) of the Ordinance. According to the learned counsel for the respondent-Union, revision petition under section 38(3-a) lies only against 'order" passed by a Labour Court and the impugned "judgment" of the Labour Court is not the type of an "order" covered by section 38(3-a). Sections 8(3), 8(7), 37(3) and 38(3-a) are reproduced below :- 8.-(3) In case the application has been rejected or the Registrar has delayed disposal of the application beyond the period of fifteen days provided in subsection (1) or has not issued a certificate of registration within a period of three days as provided in subsection (2), as the case may be, the Trade Union may appeal to the Labour Court who for reasons to be stated in its judgment, may pass an order directing the Registrar to register the Trade Union and to issue a certificate of registration or may dismiss the appeal.
8.-(7) In case there is a dispute in relation to the change of officers of a Trade Union, or any Trade Union is aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar under subsection (5), any officer or member of the Trade Union may appeal to the Labour Court, who shall within seven days of receipt of the application or appeal, as the case may be, pass as order either directing the Registrar to register the change or alteration in the Constitution or in the officers of the Trade Union or may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the Registrar to hold fresh election of the Union under his supervision.
37.-(3) Any party aggrieved by an award given under subsection (1) or a decision given under section 25-A or section 34 or a sentence passed under clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 35, may prefer an appeal to Labour Appellate Tribunal within 30 days of the delivery or passing thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such appeal shall be final.
38.-(3-a) The Tribunal may, on its on motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order, and may pass such order, in relation thereto as it thinks fit : ' Provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed revising or modifying any order adversely affecting any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
4. A perusal of the various provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 shows that three types of words have been used in it namely, "decision", "judgment" and "order". It is an admitted fact that the word "judgment" has been used only once in subsection (3) of section 8 of the Ordinance, while the words "decision" and "orders' have been used in several sections of the Ordinance. Under section 37 only "award", "decision' and "sentence" are made appealable before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Under section 38(3-a) the Tribunal is conferred suo mow revisional jurisdiction only against "order" of a Labour Court. Thus, the scheme of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 seems to be that appeals are provided under section 37(3) against "decisions", "awards" and "sentence", while orders are made revisable under section 38(3-a). No provision of appeal or revision has been made against the word "judgment" used in section 8(3). The intention of the Legislature in this behalf seems to be that the "judgment" of a Labour Court, while disposing of an appeal filed by a Trade Union against the order passed by a Registrar of Trade Unions rejecting its application for registration or delaying the disposal of the application beyon the period of fifteen days or not issuing the certificate of registration within a period of three days, has not been made either appealable under section 37(3 or revisable under section 38(3-a). If their intention had been to make such judgment under section 8(3) as revisable under section 38(3-a), they should have used the word "order" instead of the word "judgment." The significance of the word "judgment" becomes clear by looking at the preamble of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which Ordinance relates to the formation of Trade Unions, the regulations of relations between the employers and the workmen and the avoidence and settlement of any differences or disputes arising between them. A perusal of the preamble shows that the Legislature has given priority to the formation of the Trade Unions over other objects of the Ordinance. It is not merely because the expression "formation of the Trade Unions" is used in the beginning but even otherwise under the Labour Laws the object is more important than others. The formation of Trade Unions is the first and basic right of the workers/employees. Keeping in view the importance of formation of Tradel Unions, the Legislature thought it proper to use different terminology in section 8(3) so as to provide protection to section 8(2) so as to provide protection to such judgments and not to make them appealable or revisable. This is the only plausible explanation why throughout the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the Legislature has used the expression "judgment" in subsection (3) of section 8, while in subsection (7) of the same section, the word used is "order". If the intention of the Legislature had been as suggested by the Registrar that the words "judgment" and "order" are synonymous, they could easily use the word "order" in subsection (3) of section 8 also or they, could add the word "judgment" in section 38(3-a), but they have deliberately and consciously used different terms in subsections (3) and (7) of section 8 and some other sections. Even otherwise the word "judgment" stands on a higher footing and, therefore, cannot be treated as "order". In section 8(3) the Labour Court, while disposing of such appeal, is required to give its "judgment" which in the ordinary sense shall contain a statement of grounds of the decision. It is a judicial determination of an issue by a Judge. After giving my anxious considerations to this aspect of the case, I am clearly of the view that by using different terminology i,e,, "judgment" in section 8(3) the intention of the Legislature was to exclude such "judgment" from the scrutiny by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in appeal or revision. In other words, the Legislature wants to give protection to such "judgment" of the Labour Courts passed under section 8(3) of the Ordinance.
5. In view of the above, it can, therefore, safely be held that the impugned judgment of the Labour Court passed under section 8(3) or is not an order and, therefore, not revisable under section 38(3- a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, this revision is not competent and the same is hereby dismissed as such.