' IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, J.---Through this single judgment we intend to dispose of the instant petition for leave to Appeal No,1167 of 2012 and C.P.L.A. No,1168 of 2012 having commonality of facts and law, filed by Independent Newspaper Corporation (Pvt.) Limited seeking leave to appeal against the common judgment dated 3-5-2012 passed by a learned Single Judge in Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi in Writ Petitions Nos.169 and 170 of 2011, whereby both the writ petitions filed by the petitioner were dismissed upholding the judgments dated 26-3-2009 and 19-8-2010 passed by the learned Punjab Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal respectively.
2. Briefly the facts, forming background of these petitions for leave to appeal, are that the respondents in both the petitions were appointed calligraphists by the petitioner Corporation but on having introduced computerized composing the calligraphists became surplus and the petitioner terminated their services vide letters dated 7-11-2001 in lieu of notice and payment of three months' salary to them. After receiving termination letters the respondents filed petition for their reinstatement before the NIRC. During pendency of the case before the NIRC, a settlement was arrived at between the parties and the respondents withdrew their petitions on 31-1-2002. However, after serving the petitioner establishment with grievance notices and finding no response filed on 11-3-2002 grievance petitions under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. After contest the said petitions were dismissed by the Punjab Labour Court, Rawalpindi vide judgment dated 7-4-2004 against which the respondents filed appeals before the learned Lahore High Court.
The appeals stood disposed of through common judgment dated 7-4-2008 whereby the learned Lahore High Court by allowing the appeals filed by the respondents set aside the judgment dated 7-4-2004 and held that the grievance petitions filed by the respondents shall be deemed to be pending before the. Punjab Labour Court at Rawalpindi which shall decide the same afresh on merits after hearing the parties. The said judgment of the learned Lahore High Court was assailed by the petitioner before this Court by filing C.P.L.As. Nos.1246 to 1258 of 2008 which were dismissed vide order dated 6-1-2009 with direction to the learned Punjab Labour Court, Rawalpindi to dispose of the grievance petitions filed by the respondents as early as possible, preferably within 1-1/2 months. Thereafter the grievance petitions filed by the respondents were allowed by the learned Punjab Labour Court, Rawalpindi vide order dated 26-3-2009, termination orders dated 7-11-2001 of all the respondents were set aside and Ghulam Abbas, Muhammad Arshad Javaid, Ghulam Mustafa Butt, Qazi Nazir ul Haq, Arshad, Rehmari and Muhammad Fayyaz, respondents were ordered: to be , reinstated with back benefits to the :extent of 50 % as they have already received their dues, grievance petition filed by Muhammad ljaz was dismissed as having become infructuous on his death during, the pendency of the grievance petition,, Muhammad Nooh, Muhammad Hussain, Altaf Hussain and Muhammad Iqbal were declared entitled to 50% of their salary from the date of their termination till the date of their superannuation and the legal heirs of deceased Abdul Hafeez and Muhammad Ishfaq were directed to approach the concerned forum.
The said order was challenged by the petitioner by filing appeals before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore who vide judgment dated 19-8-2010 dismissed all the appeals. The vires of the said order dated 19-8-2010 were further challenged by the petitioner before the learned Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi through Writ Petitions Nos.169 and 170 of 2011 but the fortune did not smile upon the petitioner as the said writ petitions stood dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 3-5-2012. Hence the present petitions under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned judgments rendered by all the fora below are against law and facts of the case; that the findings of the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court that the petitioner had admitted that the respondents had been re-deputed as Articulars and Editors is against the record and is contradicted by Exh.R/7; that it is an admitted fact that the posts of the respondents were abolished due to modernization of the computer technology and any agreement regarding absorption of the respondents against any other job did not constitute an industrial dispute, as such, such an agreement was not at all enforceable under section 25A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and that the grievance petitions were not at all maintainable; that the respondents after having accepted the dues, knowing it fully well that the posts for which they were employed having special skill had been abolished due to modernization of the technology, were estopped to file the grievance petitions as after the acceptance of dues they had discontinued their relations with the petitioner and such severance of relationship of employer and employee had ceased to exist; that the General Secretary of the CBA as well as the respondents voluntarily moved an application to the management of the petitioner stating therein that they had accepted their termination and would file an application for withdrawal of their cases for reinstatement which fact fully established that they had severed their connection with the petitioner, as such, the learned courts below were not justified at all to order for reinstatement of the respondents; that there is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner had employed any other person in place of the respondent, as such, the findings of the learned courts below are contrary to the record; that although if it is admitted for the sake of arguments that the termination of an employee was illegal, yet, after his death he could not have been reinstated and since he could not have been reinstated into service, therefore, there is no question of payment of back benefits to the legal heirs of the deceased worker and that in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned courts below were not justified in passing the impugned orders, as such, the same are liable to be set aside.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned judgment and contended that the respondents being the permanent workmen, the petitioner was duty bound to impart them necessary training instead of terminating their services snatching butter and bread from them and their families; that the withdrawal of the petition from the NIRC did not at all attract principle of estoppel as they were not preclude& from filing the grievance petitions under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 against their illegal termination of services and receipt of dues and that their termination or retrenchment was illegal because after their termination certain employees were recruited on contract basis to fill up the posts vacated by the respondents, as such, the impugned orders having been passed by the courts of competent jurisdiction are not open to challenge before this Court. Learned counsel for the respondents placing reliance upon General Manager, N.R.T.C. v. Muhammad Aslam (1992 SCMR 2169) contended that mere acceptance of legal dues by an employee would not amount to waiver so as to estop him from challenging the order of his termination.
5. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgments and have also gone through the relevant case-law.
6. The pivotal question to be looked into by this Court in these petitions for leave to appeal is that after termination and having received the requisite dues, were the respondents still justified in maintaining their grievance 'petitions before the learned Punjab Labour Court and in such circumstances were the learned courts below justified in accepting their grievance petitions.
7.The respondents were working as calligraphists in the establishment of the petitioner when on account of introduction of computerized composing, the art of calligraphy was not required and owing to that reason their services were terminated by the petitioner-establishment, having become surplus. Feeling aggrieved by the said termination orders the respondents individually as well as their CBA filed petitions under section 22-A (8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the National Industrial Relations Commission. It has come on record that during pendency of the case before the NIRC, a settlement was made between the parties and a letter (Exh.R-7) was written to Dr. Zia-ud-Din Ahmad Aiz, Group Director Human Resources Development, Jang Group of companies on 30-1-2002 by the General Secretary, Daily Jang and Press Workers Union CBA duly signed by all the respondents whereby the respondents admitted that since the calligraphy section has been closed, they have accepted their termination, they have no complaint of whatsoever nature against the establishment and that they will withdraw the case from the National Industrial Relations Coinmission by filing an application. Scanned copy of the said letter (Exh.R-7) is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-- In view of the aforesaid letter/settlement all the respondents received their dues like gratuity and salary etc., and duly issued receipts in respect thereof. In their receipts all the respondents besides acknowledging the receipt of their respective amount in full and final settlement have made admissions in the following terms: "I HAVE SEVERED ALL MY CONNECTION WITH MESSRS DAILY JANG RAWALPINDI PURSUANT TO MY REGISTRATION TERMINATION LETTER DATED 8-11-2001, PURSUANT TO THE FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT, I HAVE NO FURTHER CLAIM, DUES, LIEN, OR ANY GRIEVANCE OF WHATSOEVER NATURE."
' Record shows that after this settlement a joint request was made on 31-1-2002 before the NIRC for early hearing of the case, as such, the matter was ordered to be fixed on the same day and following order was passed:-- "0 R D E R: 31-1-2002 All the petitioners in person except petitioner No, 2 Sardar Khalid Mahmood, Human Resources Manager along with Mr. Mushtaq Hussain Bhatti, Advocate for the respondent.
' Mr. Mushtaq Hussain Bhatti Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has filed his Vakalatnama. The petitioners Nos.1 and 3 to 14 have filed an application to seek permission of this Court to withdraw the instant petition. The petitioners and the respondents have also submitted a letter dated 30-1-2002 of the petitioners addressed to the respondent No,2 stating therein that since they have received all their dues, therefore, they are no more interested to pursue the instant case and they will file an application to withdraw the same. Sardar Khalid Mahmood appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that they have got no objection to the withdrawal of the instant petition. All the petitioners were identified by the President and General Secretary of Daily Jang Press Workers Union and have re-signed the application before the Court.
2.In view of the statement of the petitioners and letter dated 30-1-2002 of the petitioners addressed to the respondent management and no objection of the respondents, the instant petition is disposed of as withdrawn to the extent of the petitioners Nos.1 and 3 to 14."
' However, as the respondent No,2 was not present before the Court on the said date, to his extent the matter was re-fixed on 2-2-2002 when the following order was passed:- "Petitioner No,2, Muhammad Arshad Javed has filed an application to seek permission of this Court to withdraw the instant petition. Sardar Khalid Mahmood, Human Resources Manager of the respondents identifies Muhammad Arshad Javed and also submits that the respondents have got no objection if the petition is disposed of as withdrawn.
' In view of the application and statement of Mr. Muhammad Arshad Javed, petitioner No,2, and the representative of the respondents, the instant petition is disposed of as withdrawn. File be consigned to record."
A Perusal of the above settlement, admission of the respondents and orders indicate that the respondents have accepted their termination and received their emoluments in full and final settlement without any coercion or duress, as such the relationship of employees and employer stood discontinued as they have severed themselves from the establishment. As such they are estopped under the law to put up any claim of whatsoever nature against the petitioner - Corporation in respect of their reinstatement or monetary gains. Under somewhat similar circumstances, in the case of Wali-ur-Rehman and others v. State Life Insurance Corporation and others (2006 SCMR 1079), this Court has already held as under:-- "(5). We have heard petitioner's counsel in the case of Wali-urRehman, and the remaining petitioners who appeared in person and have also gone through the judgment wherein an undertaking has been given by the petitioners at the time of accepting extra pensionary benefits.
A perusal whereof indicates that they are estopped under the law to put up any claim of whatsoever nature against the respondent-Corporation in respect of monetary gains in view of the revised pay scales. The petitioners, after having voluntarily accepting the premature retirement cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate on the ground that after severing connection with the Corporation, it has granted further monetary benefits to its employees. As far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel pertaining to State Bank's employees cases Is concerned, It would not render any assistance to them because In the said case no binding undertaking was given by the employees, therefore, being distinguishable on facts and law, discussed therein, its ratio decidendi cannot he applied on the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. In addition to it, it is also to be borne in mind that after having severed their connection with the respondent-Corporation, the petitioners legitimately cannot claim monitory benefits which respondent-Corporation is extending to its employees from time to time, depending upon the changed circumstances, by the efflux of time and if the proposition put forward by the petitioners is accepted, then there would be no end to litigation. Therefore, we are of the opinion that petitioners are estopped by their conduct to claim the benefit of revised pay scales in view of the binding undertaking, which they have furnished at the time of accepting extra benefits on their remature retirement. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we see. No merit in these petitions, as such same are dismissed and leave declined."
' The same view was also taken by the learned Judges of the High Courts in their respective judgments. In the case of Maqbool-ur-Rehman and others v. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance and others (2006 PLC (C.S.) 512), learned Division Bench of the High Court of Balochistan has observed as under:-- "Suffice to observe that after having accepted the amount, the petitioners Nos.6 to 54 could not be termed as aggrieved persons and petition on their behalf is equally not competent. They are estopped under law to claim the enhancement, as mentioned herein above."
' Learned Judges of the High Court of Sindh in the case of Qari Allah Bux and others v. Federation of Pakistan and anodic, ':1.011 PLC (C.S.) 488) have also dealt. With the proposition in hand in the following words:-- "7. We are persuaded to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that once the petitioners having voluntarily opted for the Golden Hand Shake Scheme introduced in the year 1998 shall be governed by the terms and conditions of such scheme in its entirety and cannot be allowed to wriggle out from such option which was availed voluntary without any objection or reservations in this regard. We are of the view that the petitioners are stopped from challenging a particular portion of Golden Hand Shake Scheme and such claim is hit by the principle of laches. Introduction- of voluntary Golden Hand Shake Scheme by respondent No,2, and the petitioners having been opted for such scheme voluntarily without any objection has created a contractual obligation upon parties hence either party cannot be allowed to wriggle out of such contractual obligation."
' As far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents pertaining to the case of General Manager, National Radio Telecommunication Corporation, Haripur, District Abbottabad v. Muhammad Aslam and others (1992 SCMR 2169) is concerned, it would not render any assistance to them because in the said case neither any settlement between the parties was made nor any binding undertaking was given by the employees, therefore, being distinguishable on facts and law, discussed therein, its ratio decidendi cannot be applied on the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. In such circumstances, when there was no relationship between the respondents and their employer, grievance petitions under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordipance, 1969 were not at all maintainable.
8. So tar as the findings of the learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court that the petitioner had admitted that the respondents had been re-deputed as Articulars and Editors is against the record and is contradicted by Exh.R/7 rather it is an admitted fact, as per own showing of the respondents, that their posts were abolished due to introduction of modern computer technology and any agreement regarding absorption of the respondents against any other job did not constitute an industrial dispute, as such, such an agreement was not at all enforceable under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and that the grievance petitions were, not at all maintainable.
9. Viewing from another angle, the grievance petitions were barred by law enunciated in Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code wherein it has clearly been mentioned that in case of withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (2) he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim.
The respondents had withdrawn their claims from the court on account of having been satisfied themselves on receipt of their dues in full and final settlement of their claims.
10. In the light of above discussion we find that the learned courts below have erred in passing the impugned orders, therefore, these petitions are converted into appeal and allowed. Resultantly, the judgments of the fora below are set aside and the grievance petitions of the respondents are dismissed being not maintainable.