' ASAD MUNIR (CHAIRMAN).--- By this single judgment, I propose to decide revision petitions titled Ahmed etc. v. Factory Manager, Nestle (Private ) Limited etc. And Muhammad Anwar etc. v. Factory Manager, Nestle (Private ) Limited etc. As both of them involve common questions of law and fact.
2. The revision petitions, filed under section 47(5) of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 ("PIRA, 2010"), call into question the Punjab Labour Court No,3's orders dated 22-11-2011, which directed the petitioners to withdraw their joint grievance petitions and instead file separate grievance petitions Against the termination of their services by the respondents. The impugned orders were passed at the preliminary hearing of the joint grievance petitions as the learned Labour Court found that each petitioner "has independent cause of action" on the ground that "dates of birth of the petitioners and dates of entry in service are different".
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order is patently illegal as it disregards section 33(10) of the PIRA, 2010, which allows that "workers having common grievance arising out of a common cause of action may make a joint application to the Labour Court".
According to the learned counsel, the petitioners have a common grievance as, despite being permanent workmen, their services were verbally terminated on 21-7-2011 when they were also not allowed to enter the factory premises. Further submits that the common grievance of the petitioners is further illustrated by the fact that a joint grievance notice was addressed to the employer by the petitioneRs, It is also submitted that the impugned order is untenable as it is based on the different dates of birth and the different dates of appointment of the petitioners which are no way relevant to resolve the question of common grievance arising out of a common cause of action.
4. ' In response, the learned counsel for the respondents has objected to the maintainability of the revision petition on the ground that it is not accompanied by an affidavit verified on solemn affirmation. Relying on Messrs Johnson and. Philips (Pakistan) Limited Karachi v. Mukhtar Ahmed and others (1993 PLC 752); he has also contended that the impugned order is unexceptionable and lawful as petitioners' joint grievance petition, being not in respect of grievances of the workers as a class or group, is not maintainable under section 33(10) of the PIRA, 2010.
5. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the available record.
6. I am unable to appreciate the merits of the argument that this revision petition is not competent for not being supported by a proper affidavit. The argument is in fact a technical objection which cannot be sustained considering that a mere irregularity cannot make the revision incompetent. In any case, under section 47(5) of the PIRA, 2010, this Tribunal, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, has wide and suo motu powers to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any order passed by a Labour Court within its jurisdiction.
7. In order to examine the legality of the impugned order, it is necessary to refer to section 33(10) of the PIRA, 2010, which provides. That "For the purposes of this section, workers having a 'common grievance arising out, of a common cause of action may make a joint application to the Labour Court". The object of the aforesaid provision is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings where a number of workers have identical or similar grievances. Such workers can maintain a joint grievance petition instead of filing separate or individual grievance petitions. Thus, the provision is designed to give an option to a plurality of workers, having a common grievance and/or cause of action, to bring a single but joint grievance petition. The learned counsel for the respondent has urged that a joint grievance petition can be filed only if workers have a common grievance as a class or group whereas the petitioners cannot be regarded as a class or group. This argument is of no help as the petitioners claim themselves to constitute a class or group because they allege to have the same grievance or the same cause of action in view of the en bloc verbal termination of their services on 21-7-2011. In any case, it seems that where several workers allege to have individual grievances of the same nature, they have the option of filing a joint grievance petition. I also find that Messrs Johnson and Philips (Pakistan) Limited Karachi v. Mukhtar Ahmed and others (1993 PLC 752), decided by the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, is not only distinguishable on its facts but is also to be read subject to the judgment passed in Pearl Continental Hotel, Karachi v. Muhammad Yasin (2006 PLC 269), wherein the honourable Sindh High Court, while elaborately discussing the principle and rationale underlying section 25-A(10) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (same as section 33(10) of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010), observed as under:--- "Subsection (10) deals with the moving of joint application before the Labour Court on the condition that the workers shall have common grievance arising out of a common cause of action. If the subsection (1) is read in isolation then the subsection (10) would become redundant or can come in direct conflict with subsection (1). The Legislature cannot be attributed such intention as such both the subsections (1) and (10) are to be read together. If they are read together then there is no ambiguity that singular word used in subsection can be read as plural. Under section 13(2) of General Clauses Act, 1897 "words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa". Thus, word "worker" used in the singular form can be used in plural form if conditions mentioned in subsection
(10) are fulfilled. Therefore the grievance petition can be filed jointly by several workers for the purpose of section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 subject to the condition that the workers shall have common grievance arising out of a common cause of action."
8. Reference may be made again to Pearl Continental Hotel, Karachi v. Muhammad Yasin, supra, (2006 PLC 269), where the services of a number of security guards were terminated on the ground of re-organisation to improve security which was handed over to an independent security agency.
Separate termination letters giving the same reasons were given to each of the security guards.
The honourable Sindh High Court, while holding that the joint grievance petition was maintainable as the security guards had a common grievance arising out of a common cause of action, observed as under:-- ' The ground of termination is also one and same. The respondents have challenged the ground of re-organization on which all the respondents have been terminated by taking the plea that the said ground is false, fictitious against provisions of law particularly Standing Order 13 of the Standing OrdeRs, Thus, the respondents have common grievance on the ground of their termination mentioned in the termination letters therefore their case falls within the scope of subsection (10) of section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969. Furthermore, common questions of facts and law are involved. If all the respondents filed separate applications then usually the Court always consolidate all such applications. It will be noticed that subsection (10) is an enabling provision of law whereby it permits joining of several persons as applicants. It is well-settled that several persons can be joined in a matter if the matter is such that if the plaintiff's rought separate suits any common question of law or fact would rise then all the persons can be joined together.
Reference is invited to Ghulam Qadir v. Member Board of Revenue 1988 SCM R 1311. Even under Civil jurisdiction a representative suit can be filed subject to fulfilment of conditions as provided under Order I, rule 8, C.P.C. It is pertinent to point out that if all the respondents had filed separate applications then they might had appeared before the Court individually. If the application is filed jointly then any one of them may appear in the Court on behalf of others which will save the workers from taking the trouble to appear before the Court individually and ultimately they will be benefited physically and financially. Thus, it is also in the interest of justice that when the conditions mentioned in subsection (10) are fulfilled then a joint application would be more beneficial to the workeRs,"
9. So far as the impugned order is concerned, I find that it has been passed pre-maturely, summarily and mechanically without any effort made at all to focus and find out as a whether the petitioners had a common grievance or cause of action as is visualized by section 33(10) of the PIRA, 2010. The impugned order for the withdrawal of the joint grievance petition and its substitution by filing of separate grievance petitions is unwarranted and unjustified as the different dates of birth of the petitioners and the different dates of their employment, on which the impugned order is based, are totally irrelevant to determine and conclude that the petitioners do not have a common grievance arising out of the same cause of action. Such reasoning, if accepted, would virtually make it impossible for the workers to bring a joint grievance petition under the provisions of section 33(10) of the PIRA, 2010, which would, thus, become redundant.
10. It would also be of benefit to refer to Nasrin Javed and 4 others v. Nadeem Electric (Pvt.) Ltd., Haripur, through Managing Director (1996 PLC 505), where a number of workers who formed a trade union and applied for its registration were proceeded against by the employer, refused entry in the factory and ultimately dismissed from service by a verbal order. A joint grievance petition, filed by the aggrieved workers, was dismissed as incompetent by the Labour Court upon a preliminary objection that the workers had no common grievance arising out of the same cause of action but the Labour Court's order was set aside by the N.-W.F.P. Labour Appellate Tribunal who observed as under:--- "It is obvious that no solid finding could be given about common grievance or common cause of action unless the above relevant facts had been established. All these can be ascertained if the parties are allowed to produce evidence and in absence of evidence no effective finding can be given about it. But it is curious to note that the Labour Court has decided all these disputed points without recording any evidence. This appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the case is remanded to the Labour Court to allow both the parties to lead evidence and on the basis of this evidence decide the factum of competency of the grievance petition afresh."
11. The circumstances of the present case appear to be similar to those in Nasrin Javed and 4 others v. Nadeem Electric (Pvt.) Ltd., Haripur, through Managing Director, supra, as the learned Labour Court has decided the disputed question of common grievance or common cause of action of the petitioners somewhat pre-maturely without establishment of facts through recording of evidence.
12. It follows that the proper course would be to await till the reply to the grievance petition is filed by the respondents whereafter the question of maintainability of the joint grievance should be decided in accordance with law as a preliminary issue after the parties are allowed to produce their respective evidence on the issue.
13. In view of the foregoing discussion, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside with the direction that the issue of maintainability of the joint grievance petition be decided afresh by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,3 in the light of the observations made above.