ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J. --- This Civil Revision u/s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is directed against the order dated 1.6.2013 passed by learned District Judge Lahore whereby petitioners' transfer application under Section 24 of the Code ibid has been dismissed.
2. Succinctly facts leading to this petition are that Ws.
Karim Enterprises through Farah Ghalib/respondent lodged an ejectment petition under Section 15 of The Rented Premises Act, 2009 against the petitioners on 10.4.2012. Petitioners lodged an application under Section 22 of the Act ibid seeking leave to contest the ejectment petition alongwith reply on merits. The ejectment petition is pending adjudication before the learned Rent Tribunal Lahore. On 25.5.2013 petitioners lodged an application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the learned District Judge Lahore for transfer of the above-referred ejectment petition from the Court of Mr. Farooq Ahmad learned Rent Tribunal Lahore to some other Court of competent jurisdiction on the following grounds:-
(i) That the learned Rent Tribunal conducted the proceedings on the ejectment petition as well as a miscellaneous application in a slipshod manner and after some adjournments passed the order against the present petitioners without arguments and while exercising illegal proceedings dismissed the petitioners' applications indicating the bias in the mind of the Judge against the petitioners whereas the respondent has not attached the affidavits with the ejectment petition as required by law; That the learned Rent Tribunal is treating the petitioners in a very harsh manner and sometimes passed a structure against the petitioners in the open Court.
3. The learned District Judge Lahore vide impugned order dated 1.6.2013 dismissed the application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the following manner:- It is settled law that no proceedings how perfunctory same may cannot be made a ground for transfer of a case from one Court to another. Simultaneously, no judicial order can be agitated for transfer of case because aggrieved party can assail the same before higher forum. The allegation of harsh attitude of learned Special Judge (Rent) is also not ringing truth. The petitioners are tenant in the ejectment petition and seemingly, the instant application has been filed to delay the disposal of the Ejectment Petition.
Since petitioners have not been able to spell out any valid ground warranting transfer of ejectment petition from aforesaid Court, the instant transfer application is dismissed."
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that mind of the learned Rent Tribunal is biased as revealed through his conduct and attitude; that the learned Rent Tribunal has failed in exercising its jurisdiction in according with law; that the learned District Judge passed the impugned order without application of judicious mind; that the learned District Judge has not considered that interest of justice requires transfer of the case for the satisfaction of the petitioners to any other Court of competent jurisdiction therefore impugned order is liable to set aside.
5. Arguments heard. Record perused.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out his two miscellaneous applications dismissed by the learned Rent Tribunal vide orders dated 18.5.2013 and 22.5.2013. On account of dismissal of the said two applications petitioners have attributed bias to the learned Rent Tribunal.
Needless to say that mere fact that the learned Rent Tribunal has decided a couple of interlocutory applications against the petitioners simpliciter was not sufficient to establish that there was real likelihood of his being biased. Interim orders passed by the learned Rent Tribunal on petitioners' miscellaneous applications were amenable to revisional jurisdiction. There is nothing on the record to show that the said orders on miscellaneous applications were passed with mala fide or for some extraneous consideration. Even a wrong order passed by the Court in good faith would not furnish a ground of bias.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case titled "Miss Benazir Bhutto v. The President of Pakistan and another (1992 SCM R 140) has laid down the following principles of law in paragraphs No. 21 & 22 to determine the disqualification of a Judge from trying a case which read below:--- "21. From the above-cited cases, following principles of law can be deduced:--- That a Judge would be disqualified from trying a case if he has either directed the prosecution after consideration of the information furnished to him or caused institution, of an appeal or revision upon formation of opinion on the basis of the evidence. (Ghulam Rasul and others v.
Crown - Supra).
That in the case of Anwar and another v. The Crown (Supra), the Federal Court of Pakistan inter alia has held that "bias in a Judge is the paralysis, complete or partial of judicial faculties and, therefore, the allegation of bias against a Judge would be wholly unfounded unless, it be shown that the proceedings held by him were irregular and one- sided or the conclusions reached by him were wrong and reasons given in support thereof erroneous". However, the above view seems to have been modified in subsequent cases by this Court as a wrong or erroneous view simpliciter will not establish the factum that there is real likelihood of the Judge being biased.
(iii) That "effect of bias in the mind of a trying Judge extends to every part of proceedings conducted and recorded by him. It is impossible for any superior Court to estimate the value to be placed upon the record of evidence by such a Judge". (Muhammad Ismail Chowdhury v. Abdul Khaleque Dowdagar and another - Supra).
(iv) That "the basis of the disqualification, therefore, is "personal bias or prejudice of such a nature as would necessary render a Judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in a particular case and this must be shown as a matter of fact and not merely as a matter of opinion". (Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan, M.N.A. - Supra).
(v) That mere fact that a Judge has dealt with another matter earlier in respect of a party to the legal proceedings before him or has given certain decisions against such a party upon interlocutory applications in the proceedings before him will not render him disqualified from hearing the case. (Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan, M. N.A. - Supra).
(vi) That if a person exhibits/demonstrates hatred to a particular class of persons in public speeches and projects views to the detriment of the said class of persons publicly, he would be disqualified to act as an arbiter in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings relating to them on the ground of bias (Chairman, Federal Land Commission and another v. Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari and 37 others Supra).
(vii) That "where the whole legal order is being challenged and the Judges functioning within the 'framework of the legal order under challenge are called upon the render judgment, the question of there being a personal bias, of being a Judge in his own cause does not arise." (Muhammad Akram Shaikh v. Federation of Pakistan and others Supra).
(viii) That the view of the Court of Appeal of England seems to be somewhat different from the view of this Court on the question as to the quantum of proof for an allegation of bias. The consistent view of this Court appears to be that the bias in a Judge is to be shown as a matter of fact and not merely as a matter of opinion. A real likelihood of bias must be established, whereas in the case of Metropolitan Properties Company (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon and others (Supra), the Court of Appeal of England has 'held that the Court "does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The Court looks at the impression which would be given to other people".
(ix) That the Supreme Court does not have power to order transfer of a case from the file of a Judge of the High Court to another Judge of the High Court on the ground of bias and that the objection in this regard is to be raised before the Judge concerned who is to decide according to his conscience and the circumstances of the case. (Mr. Zulfiqar A.I Bhutto v. The State - Supra).
(x) That "mere suspicion of bias even if it is not unreasonable is not sufficient to render a decision void. A real likelihood of bias must be established" A mere apprehension in the mind of a litigant that he may not get justice, such as based on influence from circumstances is not sufficient. (Syed lkhlaque Hussain v. Pakistan - PLD 1979 SC 38)."
"22. That it may be pertinent to point out that Anwar's case and Muhammad Ismail's case (Supra) relate to the Judges of the subordinate Courts and the case of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission, does not pertain to a Judicial Officer; whereas the other judgments of this Court referred to hereinabove relate to the Judges of the Superior Courts. There seems to be judicial consensus that a Judge having pecuniary or proprietary interest or any other personal interest in the subject-matter of a case before him cannot hear the same. However, there appears to be a marked distinction in the approach on the question of bias between a case of a Judge of a Subordinate Court and a case pertaining to a Judge of a Superior Court: inasmuch as in the former case, the Superior Courts do grant transfer applications on the above ground in view of express provisions contained in Cr.P.C. And C.P.C. Empowering transfer of cases, whereas in the latter case, the Supreme Court does not grant transfer application on the above ground for want of power as has been held by this Court in the above case referred to hereinabove in sub-para (viii)."
8. There is no cavil to the proposition that right of fair trial is a fundamental right duly guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 which reads below:--- "10-A. Right to fair trial:---For the determination of his civil rights and obligations or in any criminal charge against him a person shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process."
9. Every citizen of Pakistan has a right of a fair trial by judicial minded person not functioning under an influence which might paralyse his judicial faculties as to result in absence of a fair trial.
Certainly there is no golden scale to weigh the bias of a Judge, however the question is whether a particular Judge against whom the allegation of bias is alleged is possessed of judicial conscience.
Although a litmus test in this regard is difficult however circumstances of a particular case wherein bias of a Jude is alleged can speak volume for the same. A Judge may have a bias in the subject- matter which means that he is himself a peaty or has direct connection With the litigation so as to constitute a legal interest. Pecuniary interest of a Judge in the cause is also a kind of bias. A Judge may have a personal bias towards a party. In this context, Lord Denning M.R. In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon and others (1968) 3 All ER 304) has observed as under:--- "A man may be disqualified from sitting in a judicial capacity on one of two grounds. First, a "direct pecuniary interest" in the subject-matter. Second, "bias" in favour of one side against the other."
10. In this case petitioners have not been able to substantiate any of the above(conditions to validly attribute a bias on the part of the learned Rent Tribunal. There is nothing on the record to show that well-established principles of natural justice deducible from two Latin Maxims firstly, "nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa" (no-one can be a Judge in his own cause) and secondly "audi alteram partem"(hear the other side) were violated by the learned Rent Tribunal in conducting the proceedings or passing any order against the petitioners therefore petitioners have no reason qua the learned Rent Tribunal to attribute real likelihood of prejudice.
11. It may be expedient to note that proceedings in the ejectment petition are required to be conducted expeditiously in accordance with law by combating unnecessary delay to meet the ends of justice. Petitioners' plea that learned Rent Tribunal granted short adjournments therefore is hardly any ground to attribute any bias against him. In the absence of any mala fide or extraneous consideration, bona fide expeditious proceedings in the ejectment petition could not give rise to reasonable cause of grievance to the petitioners to move for transfer of the ejectment petition.
Petitioners have miserably failed to bring-forth any material or to make out any substantial ground on the record on the basis whereof it could be said that learned Rent Tribunal was either prejudiced or biased against them which might justify transfer of the ejectment petition. Learned District Judge therefore while declining the transfer of ejectment petition passed the impugned order through lawful exercise of jurisdiction vested in him under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. I do not find any jurisdictional error, factual or legal infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order passed by learned District Judge Lahore. Petitioners therefore have no case to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
12. For the above reasons this revision petition having no merit is dismissed in limine.