MRS. IRSHAD QAISER, J.---The petitioners through the instant petition have questioned the order dated 24-12-2010 of the Customs Appellate Tribunal Peshawar Bench, whereby he dismissed the appeal of the petitioners and maintained the orders of the lower forums.
2. Brief facts of the case are that on specific information the staff of customs Anti-Smuggling Unit Mardan intercepted a non-duty paid Honda Accord Car bearing registration No, Mehman 81 Nowshera. Since on demand the petitioners were failed to produce any proof with regard to legal import or lawful possession of the said vehicle, the vehicle was seized under section 168 of the Customs Act, 1969 for violation of sections 2(s) and 16 of the Custom Act read with section 3(1) the imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950. Later on the vehicle was also examined through FSL, Peshawar, vide its report dated 2-10-2009 declaring the chassis of the vehicle to be genuine.
Consequently on adjudication of the matter, the Additional Collector-II of Customs MCC Customs House, Peshawar, confiscated the seized vehicle, vide order dated 19-11-2009. The petitioners filed appeal before the Collector Customs (Appeals) Peshawar, who dismissed the appeal of the petitioners, vide order dated 25-2-2010. The appeal of the petitioners before the Customs Appellate Tribunal Peshawar Bench, also met the same fate having been dismissed, vide order dated 24-12- 2010, hence this customs reference.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that when petitioner No,2 being a resident of College Colony Saidu Sharif Swat, shifted to Mardan in Flood Crises and entered his car as vehicle of IDPs in Police Station Nowshera, the forums below did not act in accordance with the settled principles of law by ordering its confiscation.
4. It was argued by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that where the petitioners failed to prove that they are in lawful possession of the vehicle, its confiscation by the respondents was rightly ordered and that their finding being based on proper appraisal of evidence is not open to any exception.
5. We have gone through the available record carefully and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.
6. The learned Member Appellate Tribunal while deciding the cases before him, though based on different facts and circumstances, but in essence and substance the subject matter in all cases was almost alike. We do not think, the learned Member Customs Appellate Tribunal has done anything against law. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the Provincial Government keeping in view the peculiar circumstances had allowed IDPS to bring these vehicles to the settled area till their return back to their home towns is without force because the contention is contrary to the instructions issued by the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, vide its Circular No,1.1.2009-JS (ICT) dated 15-8-2009 later on circulated by the Federal Board of Revenue vide letter C.No,1 (2) AS&C/2009 dated 24-8-2009. The Ministry in its letter mentioned above asked the Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue to exercise maximum vigilance and to curb the illegal practice of smuggling of non-customs paid vehicles which is causing a huge loss to the national exchequer. The learned Member of the Appellate Tribunal while referring to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in appeal that the Customs Act, 1969 has not been extended to Malakand Division has rightly observed that the Customs Act, 1969, has been extended to the PATA of the N.-W.F.P. (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) by virtue of Regulation III of 1975. In view of the instructions given by the, Ministry of Interior later on circulated by the Federal Board of Revenue, the finding given by the learned Appellate Tribunal being proper and in accordance with law is not open to any interference. There is also nothing in the impugned judgment as could show that the finding handing down by the learned Appellate Tribunal is in derogation of any provision of the prevailing law. Even otherwise, the petitioners despite ample opportunity could not produce anything, in black and white to prove that the vehicle in question was in their lawful possession. Once this was not done, this Court, which can interfere only on a question of law, cannot come to the rescue of the petitioners. Therefore, no question much less of law, in our view, has arisen in this Reference as could call for its answer by this Court under section 196 of the Act.
7. For the reasons discussed above, this custom reference being without substance is dismissed.