' TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILLANI, J.---Through this petition leave is sought against the judgment dated 10-12-2012 vide which the Constitution petition filed by the petitioner Muhammad Zaman against the order dated 17-2-2010 passed by the Member (Judicial) Board of Revenue was dismissed.
2. Facts in brief are that on the death of Noor Zaman, lumberdar of Chak No,9/DB Tehsil Piplan District Mianwali, Muhammad Sharif respondent was appointed as lumberdar. This was challenged in appeal before the Executive District Officer (Revenue) Mianwali, which was partly allowed, and the case was remanded to the District Officer Revenue. The said order of remand was challenged before the Board of Revenue in a revision petition which was dismissed and the order of remand was upheld. The District Officer Revenue after hearing all concerned once again appointed Muhammad Sharif as lumberdar which was challenged by the petitioner before the EDO(R)
Mianwali and the some was dismissed on 16-1-2003. The said order was upheld by the Member (Judicial-I) Board of Revenue on 17-2-2010. The learned High Court vide the impugned judgment did not interfere with the order of the Board of Revenue and dismissed petitioner's Constitution petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave on the ground that the Member, Board of Revenue has not considered the law laid down by this Court in Noorwar Jan v. Senior Member B.R. N.-W.F.P.
(PLD 1991 SC 531 at 538), Muhammad Rafique v. Nasir Ahmed (2007 SCM R 287) and Muhammad Saeed v. Ghulam Sarwar (2008 SCM R 1586). He maintained that petitioner has better credentials as he is more educated i,e, he is F.A. Whereas respondent Muhammad Sharif is a middle pass; he has been working as sarbrah lumberdar for quite some time and he has rendered various services to the Government at the local level.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent who was on watching brief defended the impugned judgment by submitting that the appointment of lumberdar is primarily the function of the competent authority in the revenue hierarchy; that the DOR vide the order dated 16-11-2001having considered the comparative merit of the competing candidates had appointed the respondent and since then he is working as such to the entire satisfaction of the Government and the public at large; that he is not a defaulter; that he is a middle pass and in terms of Rule 17 of the Land Revenue Rules the revenue officer has to consider various factors while appointing a lumberdar; that if all those factors are kept in view, respondent Muhammad Sharif had better credentials and that the concurrent orders passed by the revenue officers in this regard cannot be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In support of the submissions made, learned counsel relied on the judgments of this Court reported at Fateh Masih v. Member, Board of Revenue (1996 SCM R 377), Bashir Ahmed v. Member (Judicial-III) Board of Revenue (2002 SCM R 1371).
5. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have considered the precedent case-law quoted at the bar.
6. There is no cavil to the proposition that the learned High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction can interfere with the order passed by a Tribunal of competent jurisdiction. However, the said exercise has A to be confined to examine whether the order passed was in accordance with law; whether it was a case of no evidence; whether the authority acted in bad faith or there was failure to follow the procedure prescribed in law. In Noorwar Jan v. Senior Member B.R. N.W.F.P. (PLD 1991 SC 531), this Court had occasioned to examine the scope of writ jurisdiction against the order of the Board of Revenue. The Court held as follows:-- "19. The Board of Revenue as the apex of the Revenue hierarchy is charged with the statutory duty of interpreting the law, of applying, it'to individual cases coming up before it and laying down the law for the subordinates in the hierarchy to follow. Any error on its part in understanding the law, in applying it or in laying down the law can and must be corrected in the constitutional jurisdiction. If it is left uncorrected, it will result in subverting the rule of law. It is in this context that Ammon Rubinstein in Chapter V of his book 'Jurisdiction and Illegality' under the heading "Supervision over the Observance of the Law in the Course of the Exercise of Jurisdiction" observes as hereunder:- "Certiorari is a writ which 'extends to the whole of the record'. As long as it is supportable by the record, any defect, irregularity, or error which, in the opinion of the supervisory Court is substantial, will enable the Court to issue certiorari. Where the error is not substantial, the Courts may feel less inclined to intervene. Their reluctance can. Be expressed either by invoking the discretionary nature of the remedy, by treating an error of law, as an error of fact or by limiting the meaning of 'record'.
These same expedients may be resorted to where the decision sought to be quashed is appealable under statutory provisions. Nevertheless, where the Court wills it, . It has authority to correct all irregularities in the proceedings of inferior tribunals. In exercising this authority the Court is only circumscribed by the existence and contents of a record.
' What is generally meant by recurring assertions that certiorari cannot serve as means of appellate proceedings is that the supervisory Court cannot
(i) go behind the record;
(ii) vary or alter the decision impugned (it can only affirm or quash it);
(iii) admit extrinsic evidence or hear any further evidence unless relating to a jurisdictional matter;
(iv) weigh the evidence or otherwise interfere with findings of fact."
7. In Rahim Shah v. The Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and others (PLD 1973 SC 24), this Court while examining the scope of writ jurisdiction, observed as follows:- "It may be further observed that although the conditions for grant of certiorari which obtain in English Courts do not apply to High Courts in Pakistan at the same time the extent of this constitutional jurisdiction cannot be enlarged to an appeal on facts or questions of law. An appeal is a creation of statute and if no appeal is provided by the Legislature the determination of a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction is final. The scope of interference in the High Court is therefore limited to the inquiry whether the tribunal has in doing the act or undertaking the proceedings acted in accordance with law. If the answer be in the affirmative the High Court will stay its hands and will not substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the tribunal."
8. In Muhammad Rafique v. Nazar Ahmed (2007 SCM R 287), the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the learned High Court as it was of the view that the learned High Court had travelled beyond its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution by interfering with the order passed by the BOR though neither the said order suffered from any jurisdictional defect or illegality and that the Board of Revenue had merely concurred with the opinion of the District Collector with regard to the appointment of luinberdar. The Court observed as follows:-- "4. There was nothing on record which could be pointed out to indicate any reason, which could have disqualified Rafique petitioner from his appointment as a LUMBERDAR. Nor could the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court be ever used to substitute its own preferences with the preferences of the competent fora unless it could be shown that the decision made by the competent authorities suffered from any jurisdictional defect or any illegality. It could not be said that the Board of Revenue did not have the jurisdiction to pass the order that it had passed nor could be said that the discretion exercised by the Board of Revenue in concurring with the selection of the LUMBERDAR as done by the District Collector was based on any reasons or considerations which were illegal or extraneous to law. In the circumstances, no reasons existed which could have authorized the learned High Court to declare the order, passed by the Board of Revenue, as being without jurisdiction or having been passed without lawful authority. Needless to add that the learned High Court while exercising powers vesting in it under Article 199 of the Constitution does not sit in appeal over the decisions or judgments questioned through the said jurisdiction."
9. In Muhammad Saeed v. Ghulanr Sarwar (2008 SCM R 1586), this Court did not interfere with the judgment of the High Court though the said learned court had reversed the order of the Board of Revenue with regard to the appointment of lumberdar. The ground which found favour with this court not to interfere with the order of the High Court was that in reversing the order of the District Officer Revenue the BOR neither discussed the reasons advanced by the appointing authority
(DOR) nor it considered the point that lumberdar was to be appointed in accordance with the criteria given in the Land Revenue Rules.
10. In the instant case, however, the Board of Revenue has not only concurred with the order of the District Officer Revenue with regard to the appointment of Muhammad Sharif as lumberdar but has given reasons for doing so. The learned High Court rightly did not interfere with the concurrent orders passed in revenue hierarchy. Even otherwise, we find that the competent authorities in revenue hierarchy had duly considered the comparative merits of the petitioner and respondent Muhammad Sharif and no illegality or jurisdictional defect has been pointed out by learned counsel, which could persuade us to interfere with the orders passed. In the face of these concurrent findings in the revenue hierarchy any interference in Constitutional jurisdiction without their being a valid ground would have amounted to substitution of those orders by the High Court, which would not have been tenable in law.
11. In the afore-referred circumstances, we do not find any merit in this petition, which is dismissed and leave refused.