' EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.---This petition for leave to appeal has arisen out of the judgment dated 12-10- 2009 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi whereby C.M.A. No,489 of 2007 for restoration of Civil Revision No,87-D of 1998 and C.M.A. No,490 of 2007 for condonation of delay in filing that were dismissed.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that when proceeding through a revision petition is a proceeding between the Court and Court, it cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution after being admitted for regular hearing. If at all, the learned counsel submitted, a revision petition is dismissed for non-prosecution, it could be restored under inherent powers of the Court, which are not controlled by any law of limitation including Article 181 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel next contended that though an application seeking restoration of a revision petition is of a different specie yet it being moved under inherent powers of the Court has to be treated at par with the latter if and when dismissed for non-prosecution, therefore, it would not be regulated by any provision of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel to support his contentions placed reliance on the cases of "Dhondiba Appasaheb and another v. Wasudeo Anant Sherlekar and another" (AIR 1957 NAGPUR 83), "Allah Bachai and others v. Fida Hussain and others" (2004 SCM R 615), and "Muhammad Yousaf and others v. Mst. Najma Bibi and others" (PLD 2006 SC 512).
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that a revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution could be restored under the inherent powers of the Court irrespective of the provisions of the Limitation Act but not the application seeking restoration of the revision petition, if dismissed for non-prosecution. Dismissal, the learned counsel maintained, of a revision petition and that of an application for its restoration, cannot be treated alike under any interpretation of law and procedure. The learned counsel next contended that where the petitioners resorted to forgery by filing a petition on behalf of dead persons, grant of leave to appeal in such cases, cannot be asked for as of right. The learned counsel to support his contention placed reliance on the cases of "Allah Diwaya v. The State" (PLD 1969 SC 98). The learned counsel by referring to the case of "Hari Narain v. Badri Das" (AIR 1963 SC 1558), contended that even grant of leave can be revoked if at hearing of the appeal, the Supreme Court is satisfied that the statement made by the appellant in his application for special leave is inaccurate or misleading. The learned counsel by referring to the case of "Muhammad Islam 'v. Inspector- General of Police, Islamabad and others" (2011 SCM R 8) contended that the question of limitation cannot be considered technicality simpliciter, as it has its own significance and would thus have substantial bearing on the merits of the case.
4. We have gone through the entire record carefully and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.
5. It is true that petition for leave to appeal has been filed on behalf of dead persons but this appears to be an offshoot of inadvertence as nothing can be said to have been gained by the petitioners out of this situation. We, therefore, would not put the weight of this misstatement, if it has any, in the scales of justice to refuse leave to appeal when the point urged appears to be arguable on the face of it.
6. The formulations emerging from the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties may be summed up as under:-
(i) whether a revision petition could be dismissed for non-prosecution once it has been admitted for regular hearing?
(ii) whether a revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution could be restored by invoking inherent powers of the Court?
(iii) whether exercise of inherent powers of the Court could be circumscribed by the provisions of the Limitation Act?
(iv) whether an application seeking restoration of a revision petition would also be regulated by inherent powers of the Court and not Article 181 of the Limitation Act, if and when is dismissed for non-prosecution?
(v) whether dismissal of a revision petition and that of an application for its restoration can be treated alike under any interpretation of law and procedure?
(yi) whether limitation in such cases can be considered as a technicality of mere form?
7. The formulations listed above raise substantial question of law calling for an authoritative pronouncement especially when this Court has dealt with these questions differently at different times as is evident from the judgments cited above.
8. We, therefore, grant leave to appeal to consider the questions listed above. The C.M.As. In view of the order mentioned above stand disposed of. As a short point is involved in this case, the office is directed to prepare the appeal on the same record with the liberty to the parties to file additional documents if necessary. Let the appeal be fixed within a period of three months.