' This appeal is directed against the decision dated 28th February, 1981 delivered by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 6, Rawalpindi, where by the petition of the appellant for his re-instatement in service as dismissed.
2. The appellant was employed as Assistant on 30th September, 1974. In January, 1979 the appellant applied for leave but it was not sanctioned. Thereupon, he felt forced to resign. The resignation was not accepted and instead the appellant was proceeded against for absence without leave. The charge-sheet was given to him and after making an enquiry and observing other legal formalities, the appellant was on 16th January, 1980. Dismissed from service, He brought a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The charge-sheet was not received by the appellant, nor he participated in the enq airy. The plea taken for leave was that he had to construct a house and, thereafter, he fell ill. The case of the respondent was that the appellant had joined service with Haider Finance Corporation and for this reason had firstly absented himself and then tendered a resignation voluntarily. The dismissal order which is Exh. P-I0 shows that the appellant was dismissed on account of absence since 15th January, 1979, which extended to few months and for joining service with Haider Finance Corporation. However in the charge-sheet Exh. R-1 the allegation that the appellant had joined service with Haider Finance Corporation was not included as a charge. The charge reads as under :- "It has been reported against you that you are absent from your duties since 16th January, 1979 without any leave/information for more than ten days. You are directed to explain within three, days of the receipt of this charge-sheet as to why you should not be dismissed from the Bank's service."
' This is evident that there was no charge that the appellant had joined service with Haider Finance Corporation. It is thus clear that the dismissing authority brought under consideration extraneous matter and included a reason for dismissing the appellant for which he had not been charge- sheeted. It has been observed in NLR 1981 Labour 1 by the asp Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court :- "We think that it is clear that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on matters which were not included in the original charge must have influenced the mind of the administrator in awarding the punishment of dismissal to the respondent.
' It was further observed :- "The contention that at least one item of misconduct found against the respondent by the Enquiry Officer was included in the charge-sheet, and this could have sufficed for the respondent's dismissal is fallacious as it is possible that the administrator may not have dismissed the respondent if the only charge proved against him was that he held Union meeting during working hours without prior permission. From the order of dismissal recorded by the administrator it is manifest that he was influenced by the seriousness of the other matters relating to the conduct of the respondent. To this extent, therefore, the order of dismissal clearly stood vitiated as it proceeded on matters extraneous to the charge framed against the respondent who did not have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in that behalf."
' In the present case also the position is the same. As has been remarked above the dismissing authority dismissed the appellant not only on the charge of absence for more than ten days, but also for the reason that it had been proved that the appellant had joined service with Haider Finance Corporation. The latter act definitely influenced the mind of the dismissing authority who prescribed the extreme penalty of dismissal. This is noteworthy that the charge of absence without leave for more than ten days was not so serious so as to attract the extreme penalty and the possibility cannot be excluded that the extreme penalty was imposed because it was considered that the appellant had made false applications for medical leave and the purpose of obtaining leave was that he had joined service with another employer in the subsistence of his employment with the respondent-Bank. The order of dismissal, therefore, stands vitiated.
3. As a result of what has been observed above, I accept the appeal and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court direct the re-instatement of the appellant in service from the date he was dismissed. However, as the appellant has succeeded on purely technical ground, he shall not be entitled to back benefits.