' ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J.---This Intra-court appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 is directed against the order dated 24-6-2013 passed by learned Single Judge in Chambers in Writ Petition No,889 of 2012.
2. Succinctly the facts leading to this Intra-court appeal are that appellant lodged an application under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace Multan seeking registration of case against Muhammad Javed Khan respondent No,3 for bouncing of cheque No,CA0010310290 dated 30-4-2010 amounting to Rs,20,00,000 'allegedly issued by respondent No,3 for repayment of finance advanced by the appellant bank. The learned Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace Multan vide order dated 9-12-2011 entertaining the petition under section 22-A of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 required the comments of SHO concerned for 19-12-2011. On the said date learned Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, Multan without awaiting the report from the SHO disposed of the said petition in the following manner:- "Sajid Hussain, the petitioner seeks registration of case against the nominated person in respect of an episode whereby a cheque allegedly issued to him with intention less than fair, which on presentation was dishonoured.
2. Let the SHO, P.S. Concerned record petitioner's statement and proceed in accordance with law.
Disposed of accordingly. File to records."
3. Respondent No,3 being aggrieved challenged the vires of above said order through Writ Petition No,889-2012 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge in Chambers vide impugned order dated 24-6-2013 in the following manner:-- "7. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 19-12-2011 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, is hereby set aside. This order, however, will not be considered a bar in the way of the respondent Bank to plead their case before the appropriate forum under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of finances) Ordinance, 2001."
4. It is argued by learned counsel for the appellant that in the event of dishonouring of the cheque issued towards repayment of finance no doubt appellant bank could file a complaint under section 20(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 but it was not debarred from getting the criminal case registered against the respondent No,3 under section 489-F, P.P.C.
Having a prerogative to get the grievance redressed through speedy remedy of his choice; that learned Single Judge in Chambers was in legal error allowing the writ petition and setting aside the lawful order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace Multan.
5. Arguments heard. Record perused.
6. At the outset it may be expedient to reproduce the provisions of section 20(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 and section 489-F of Pakistan Penal Code 1860 which read as under:-- "Section 20(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001:---Whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards repayment of a finance or fulfillment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year or with fine or with both unless he can establish for which the burden of proof shall rest on him that he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheque would be honoured and that the bank ' was at fault in not honouring the cheque.
' Section 489-F Pakistan Penal Code 1860:---Whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards repayment of a loan or fulfillment of art obligation which is dishonoured on presentation, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine, or with both, unless he can establish, for which the burden of proof shall rest on him, that he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheque would be honoured and that the bank was at fault in not honouring the cheque. "
7. Comparative appraisal of both the above quoted provisions manifests that only two words have been substituted in section 489-F, P.P.C. The word 'finance' used in section 20(4) of the Ordinance ibid is substituted with word 'loan' and punishment of 'one year' is substituted with 'three years' however the remaining provisions of both the enactments are the same. Needless to say that object in enacting the Banking Laws was to provide speedy remedy at one forum to the Banks for the recovery .Of their finances and A for the customers of the Banks to approach the same Court in case of grievance against the Banks. Section 22 of the Ordinance ibid provides provision of appeal before two Judges of this Court. It is pertinent to note that subsection (6) of section 20 of the Ordinance ibid clearly envisages that all offences under the Ordinance shall be bailable, non- cognizable and compoundable whereas the offence under section 489-F of Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is non-bailable, cognizable and compoundable. There is no cavil to the proposition that a police officer is empowered and obliged to proceed under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 only where the commission of a cognizable offence is reported. It is an established principle of interpretation of statutes that in case of a special law and a general law on the same subject which if standing alone would include the same matter and conflict with the special law, it is the special law which will prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more objectively and specifically than the general law. The intent to legislate section 20(4) of the Ordinance ibid and section 489-F, P.P.C. Being altogether different should not be intermingled. In view of the above legal position the arguments of learned counsel for appellant that Bank in its own prerogative was not debarred from getting criminal case registered under section 489-F, P.P.C. To redress its grievance through speedy remedy of his choice is devoid of any force and thus repelled.
8. It is pertinent to mention that the Superior Courts in Pakistan have travelled a long way in developing and interpreting the law of procedure vis-a-vis role and functions of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace in respect of the complaints regarding failure of the police to register a case. In this regard a well-deliberated Full Bench Judgment of this Court is the case of Khizar Hayat and others v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab Lahore and others (PLD 2005 Lahore 470). An extract from the conclusions of the above said judgment for guidance of the Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace is reproduced hereinafter for ready reference:- "35 (ix) Complaints regarding failure of the police to register a criminal case: The officer in charge of the relevant Police Station may be under a statutory obligation to register an F.I.R. Whenever information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence is provided to him but the provisions of section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. Do not make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice- of the Peace to necessarily or blindfolded issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard. An ex 'officio Justice of the Peace should exercise caution and restraint in this regard and he may call for comments of the officer in charge of the relevant Police Station in respect of complaints of this nature before taking any decision of his own in that regard so that he may be apprised of the reasons why the local police have not registered a criminal case in respect of the complainant's allegations. If the comments furnished the officer in charge of the relevant Police Station disclose no justifiable reason for not registering a criminal case on We basis of the information supplied by the complaining person then an ex-officio Justice of the Peace would be justified in issuing a direction that a criminal case be registered and investigated. It is not obligatory for the officer in charge of a Police Station or for an ex-officio Justice of the Peace to afford an opportunity of hearing to the accused party, before registration of a criminal case or before issuing a direction in that regard. In an appropriate case, depending upon the circumstances thereof, an ex-officio Justice of the Peace may refuse to issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case and may dismiss the complaint under section 22-A(6).
Cr.P.C. Reminding the complaining person of his alternate statutory remedies under sections 156(3) and 190, Cr.P.C. The impression entertained by a large section of the legal community in our country that in case of filing of a private complaint the accused person cannot be arrested and recovery cannot be affected from him is nothing but erroneous and fallacious."
9. In this case it is evident on the record that the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace issued a stereo type direction to the police for recording statement of the appellant against law and facts, without procuring the report of the SHO, without application of judicious mind and overlooking the guidance provided by this Court in Khizar Hauat and others' case (supra). In the attending circumstances learned Single Judge in Chambers has rightly set aside the order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace Multan. We do not find any cogent reason to review the impugned order dated 24-6-2013 through this I.C.A. Under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance.
10. For the above reasons, this I.C.A. Having no merit is dismissed in limine.