' MUNIB AKHTAR, J.--- The petition& is a pilot who at all material times was employed with the respondent No,1, the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIAC"). It appears, as stated in the petition, that in August, 2009, while on a training course in the United Kingdom, the petitioner started to suffer from a medical condition, the symptoms of which were (or at least included) dizziness and vertigo linked to movement of the neck from left to right. The petitioner was declared temporarily unfit for flying duties on or about 4-9-2009 by the respondent No, 1 . Thereafter, he underwent several medical tests and procedures conducted by various doctors, most importantly at the Aero Medical Center of the Civil Aviation Authority. On 27-10-2010, the petitioner was declared permanently unfit by the Chief of Aviation Medicine, Civil Aviation Authority in the following terms:--- "Permanently unfit on account of significant cervical spondylosis vertibrobasillar artery insufficiency/positional vertigo."
' The result was that the petitioner permanently lost his pilot's license.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated the facts as above, and referred to an agreement dated 16-11-2011 ("Agreement") between PIAC and the Pakistan Airline Pilots Association ("PALPA"), which is also impleaded as a (pro forma) respondent. The Agreement is in relation to the pilots employed by PIAC, "to regulate working conditions of the said Pilots as contained in this Agreement". Article 10 of the Agreement relates to matters of compensation and insurance. It requires, inter alia, PIAC to obtain group insurance for the benefit of its pilots (i,e,, members of PALPA employed with it, including the petitioner). Clause 10.5, which is central to the present dispute, relates to insurance claims arising out of loss of pilots' licenses. As presently relevant, it provides as follows:--- "10.5. PILOTS' LOSS OF LICENSE INSURANCE.
10.5.1. Compensation under this insurance policy, covering of license as a result of illness or accident will be Rupees 10,000,000 (Ten Million) only and shall be paid up to the age of 57 years, subject to a reduction of Rupees 830,000 (PKR Eight Hundred and thirty Thousand) per year up-to the age of sixty (60) years. In case of death of the Grounded Pilot during the waiting period of ninety (90) days, the sum will be paid to the next of kin as declared by the employee in the nomination form.
10.5.2. The payment of the loss of License Insurance amount should be made not later than ninety
(90) days of such declaration of permanent medical unfitness by the airline. Any amount towards compensation receivable from the insurance company shall be directly received by the airline. It is clarified that in case the insurance company does not pay within 90 days, a Committee shall be constituted comprising of the following:---
(1) Director Flight Operations or his nominee
(2) Chief Financial Officer or his nominee
(3) President PALAP or his nominee.
' The said Committee will decide whether the compensation will be paid by PIAC and thereafter get the amount reimbursed from the insurance company or to negotiate with the Insurance company to finalize and receive the compensation.
10.5.3. Payment of the amount specified for Loss of License will be effective from 17th April 2009.
10.5.4. Any Pilot holding a valid flying license shall be fully covered against his/her loss of license insurance for the full amount admissible to him/her. Any waiver by the Insurance Company is to be covered by the Corporation by payment of appropriate additional premium. This is not applicable to grounded Pilots who have received compensation under the Loss of License Insurance earlier.
10.5.5. The premium for the insurance will be paid directly by the Corporation to the insurers. The compensation for Loss of License will be paid directly by the insurers to the Pilot concerned, as per rules of the contract of insurance. ...."
3. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner came within the scope of Clause 10.5 and was entitled to be compensated in terms as stated therein. The petitioner's grievance is that he is being unlawfully denied any such compensation. Learned counsel submitted that the insurance required to be maintained by PIAC is provided in terms of an insurance policy issued by the respondent No,2. It was contended that without convening the committee as required by Clause 10.5.2 PIAC instead approached the respondent No,2, which handed over the petitioner's case to its surveyors.
(It appears that when the petitioner tried to approach the respondent No,2, he was rebuffed by letter dated 23-2-2011, for the reason that the said respondent could communicate only with PIAC, since it was the latter that had taken out the policy with it.) The surveyors reported that the petitioner's case was not covered by the insurance policy. This was on the following basis, as noted in the respondent No,2's letter dated 17-10-2011 to PIAC: "In view of the above explanation, we would again suggest that the factor of Degenerative Disc Disease is not due to sudden and unforeseen "illness" and or is it due to a natural process of ageing (getting older) hence do not fall under the ambit of insurance policy cover." (Emphasis in original)
' The respondent No,2 therefore expressed its regrets, advising PIAC that the petitioner's claim did not fall within the scope of the insurance policy. On this basis, PIAC refused any compensation to the petitioner in terms of Clause 10.5, and this led to the filing of the present petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the denial of compensation was contrary to the Agreement and even otherwise unlawful. His case was that on its true construction, what Clause 10.5 required was for the compensation to be paid within a period of 90 days from the declaration of permanent medical unfitness. If payment was not so made, then the committee had to be convened. Learned counsel contended that the only mandate of the committee was as regards the mode of payment, i,e,, to consider whether PIAC was itself to pay the compensation or arrange for the same from the insurer. In any case, the pilot whose case came within the scope of Clause 10.5 was entitled to compensation. There had therefore been a breach by PIAC both of its duty to convene the committee and also to pay compensation. Quite apart from the foregoing, learned counsel also submitted that two others, Mr. Shahid Ali Muzaffar and Mr. Riazul Haq had been given compensation in circumstances not materially different from the petitioner's, and the refusal to do so in his case was therefore discriminatory. He prayed for appropriate relief.
5. Learned counsel for PIAC strongly contested the petition. He submitted that the petition was not maintainable as the relationship between the petitioner and PIAC was governed by the law of master and servant. The petitioner's alleged grievance was contractual in nature, being based on the Agreement, which was in relation to the conditions of service of PIAC pilots. The grievance was not covered by any statutory rules or provisions. The petition was therefore liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Learned counsel relied in particular on Pakistan International Airline Corporation and others v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman PLD 2010 SC 676 at 691 (para 25) and submitted that even otherwise, it was well-settled that contractual obligations could not be enforced through a petition under Article 199. Learned counsel further submitted that on the merits also, the petitioner had no case. In this regard, he submitted that even if the petitioner had any grievance (which was denied), it dated to 27-10-2010 when the latter was declared permanently unfit by the Civil Aviation Authority. Since the Agreement was entered into after that date, it did not apply to the petitioner's case. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner's case had been thoroughly scrutinized by the respondent No,2 and it had concluded that it was not covered by the policy. In such circumstances, convening the committee would be an exercise in futility. The case of the other two persons was entirely different from that of the petitioner. They were rightly granted compensation since their cases were fully covered. The petitioner, on the other hand, was not entitled to any compensation and the petition was liable to be dismissed.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent No,2, while adopting the submissions by learned counsel for PIAC, further contended that the said respondent was not at all amenable to Article 199 jurisdiction.
He submitted that the matter had been thoroughly and properly examined by the surveyors, and strongly contested any claims to the contrary. The petitioner's case was not covered by the policy and that was all that there was to it. The petition ought to be dismissed.
7. Exercising his right of reply, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Clause 10.5.3 to contend that the petitioner was fully covered by the Agreement even on PIAC's own showing. Learned counsel submitted that while ordinarily contractual obligations could not be enforced by means of a petition under Article 199, the present facts and circumstances did not come within the general rule. He submitted that PIAC was a public body, which was under a duty to act fairly and justly. The decision of the Supreme Court being relied upon was in relation to reinstatement to service. Since the present case did not fall within that category, the rule laid down therein did not apply. Learned counsel also relied on Haji Amin v. Pakistan Trading Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. And another PLD 2009 Kar. 112 (DB), S.M. Ismail v. Capital Development Authority and others 2006 CLC 131 (LHC; DB) and Government of Pakistan and another v. Shoaib Bilal Corporation and others 2004 CLC 1104 (LHC; DB).
8. We have heard learned counsel as above, examined the record with their assistance and considered the case-law relied upon. The first point that requires consideration is whether the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it relates to contractual obligations and arises in circumstances that make the rule laid down in Tanweer-urRehman's case applicable. As noted above, learned counsel for PIAC relied on para 25 of this judgment, which is as follows (pg. 691):--- "25. Thus, in view of discussion made hereinabove, we are persuaded to hold that although the appellant-Corporation is performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation but since the services of the respondent-employees are governed by the contract executed between both the parties, as is evident from the facts narrated hereinabove, and not by the statutory rules framed under section 30 of the Act, 1956 with the prior approval of the Federal Government, therefore, they will be governed by the principle of Master and Servant."
' In our view, the foregoing observations with regard to the contract between PIAC and its employees are applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Agreement on the face of it expressly states that it relates to the terms and conditions of service of pilots employed by PIAC. It is of course not relevant for present purposes that the Agreement was entered into by PALPA in a representative capacity and not by pilots separately and individually. In Tanweer-ur-Rehman's case, the terms and conditions of a service eontract between PIAC and its employees was invoked and considered. It is not the petitioner's case that the Agreement is covered by any statutory provision or rule. The case-law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is not directly applicable. No doubt there are observations therein that could be regarded as being of some assistance to the petitioner. However, the facts of those cases were different from those presently at hand. In any case, the decisions are those of the High Courts and of dates prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Tanweer-urRehman. With respect, they cannot be regarded as applying to the present case.
9. If this therefore was all that there was to it, the present petition would have to be dismissed.
However, what now requires consideration is the second ground taken by learned counsel for the petitioner, namely that of discrimination. The petitioner complains that different treatment has been meted out to him as compared with two others, the aforementioned Mr. Shahid All Muzaffar and Mr. Riazul Haq. The grievance here appears to be that there has been a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution. Two points may be noted. Firstly, the jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce fundamental rights has been expressly conferred by Article 199(1)(c). The jurisprudence with regard to the substantive application of this provision is, in our respectful view, essentially the same as that developed by the Supreme Court in relation to its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3). This is because of the express linkage between the two constitutional provisions. We note that in recent years in particular, the Supreme Court has taken an expansive and broad view of the jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights. In our view, the law has developed to the extent that it is not now of any material importance that fundamental rights are engaged as a result of contractual obligations or provisions. What is of primary concern is that fundamental rights should not be curtailed, abridged, infringed or violated. Furthermore, it is clear that directions under Article 199(1)
(c) can be made to any person, which could in appropriate circumstances include even a private person. Secondly, the Supreme Court, in the very passage from Tanweer-ur-Rehman's case that has been relied upon by learned counsel for PIAC, expressly noted that PIAC is a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of Federation. When these two points are taken together, in our view, it is open to us to consider in terms of the present petition whether or not there has been discrimination against the petitioner, and for this purpose it is immaterial that the basis of the alleged discrimination is grounded in contractual obligations, i,e,, the Agreement. We turn therefore to consider the issue of discrimination. Before doing so, we note that learned counsel for the petitioner is correct in submitting that Clause 10.5 applies in the petitioner's case. This is clear from Clause 10.5.3.
10. In order to properly consider the issue of discrimination, it will be necessary to begin by examining the relevant terms of the insurance policy issued by the respondent No,2, which the latter states does not apply to the petitioner's case and which position has been accepted by PIAC.
The first point to note is that an insurance policy is a contract and it is well-settled that the true meaning, scope and applicability of a contractual provision is in the end a question of law, to be determined by the courts. In American Life Insurance Company (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Master Agha Jan Ahmed and another 2011 CLD 350, a Division Bench of this Court considered the rules of interpretation applicable to exclusion clauses in insurance policies. A decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was referred to with approval (in para 12 at pp. 360-61) where, in the passage cited, it was inter alia observed that "coverage provisions are interpreted broadly, and exclusion clauses narrowly". In the insurance policy at hand, which was placed on the record by the respondent No,2, the cover is in respect, inter alia, of a pilot "suffer[ing] any illness whatsoever resulting at any time whether during or after the currency of this Insurance in the permanent incapacity as defined hereunder...." It cannot be in dispute that loss of license in the petitioner's case is a permanent incapacity as defined. More relevantly for presentpurposes, the policy contains certain definitions, of which the following two need to be considered: "1. Accident.
' A sudden, unexpected, unusual, specific event which occurs at an identifiable time and place during the Period of Insurance.
7. Illness ' Any sudden deterioration of health not caused by an Accident."
11. Now, it is obvious that the petitioner's case is not caused by an accident, as defined. The contesting respondents' stand clearly establishes this, since their case is that what the petitioner suffers from is but part of the normal ageing process (see Para 3 above). The question therefore is whether the petitioner's case can be regarded as "illness". In order to address this question, one has to look not at the ordinary or normal or even the medical meaning of this word, but only at the meaning ascribed to it in the insurance policy. What does "illness" mean, as defined? The determination of this question, as already noted, is a question of law. In our view, the respondent No, 2 and its surveyors (and hence PIAC by accepting their position) have misunderstood and misapplied the correct meaning of "illness". As noted in the last preceding para, coverage clauses have to be construed broadly and the specific definition of "illness", which is of course the event covered by the policy, must therefore be so interpreted and applied.. In our view, all that is required for there to be "illness" within the meaning of the policy is any "deterioration" of "health" that is "sudden". Anything else is outside the scope of the definition and hence irrelevant. The observation by the surveyors reproduced above (in para 3) that the petitioner's medical condition is not "unforeseen" is misleading. This is because the word "sudden" is not limited in meaning to something that is unforeseen. Furthermore,' the observation that the "illness" should be "sudden" is not correct. This is so because the definition itself requires a "sudden" deterioration of health; to add this word over and on top of the definition is not meaningful or necessary.
12. In our view therefore, the respondents have as a matter of law misunderstood the meaning of "illness" as defined and therefore have misdirected themselves in applying it. It is of no consequence that the medical condition is, or can be regarded, as part of or brought about by the normal ageing process. It is a matter of common experience that as persons grow older, some suffer from a gradual decline in health, others appear to be no worse off even though years may pass, and some decline visibly. The only requirement of the defined term however, is: has the covered person suffered a sudden deterioration in health? If so, then his case comes within the scope of the policy. How or why the health deteriorated is not relevant. It may be brought about by an illness (as normally, ordinarily or medically defined) or may come about for other reasons or causes. It may be that those causes or reasons cannot even be pinpointed or ascertained or may simply be part of the normal ageing process. All of this is irrelevant for the insurance policy. It should also be kept in mind that the word "sudden" must be understood and applied contextually.
Most importantly, its applicability takes color from the word "health". A deterioration of health may well be "sudden" even though it occurs over many weeks or even months. No hard and fast rule can or should be laid down in this regard. Much turns, and must inevitably turn, on the facts and circumstances of each case, including the state of health of the person concerned at the beginning of the "illness".
13. In its parawise comments, PIAC described the medical conditions of the aforementioned Mr. Shahid Ali Muzaffar and Mr. Riazul Haq as follows:-- "F/0 Shahid Ali Muzaffar was declared permanently unfit on account of severe degenerative change in vereteboral column at different levels cervical vediculopathy permanently disabled by pain."
"F/O Riazul Haq declared permanently unfit on account of Lumber Disc Compression along with B/L Foot drop, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, IHD and Hypothyroidism."
' Nothing is on the record as would indicate how the medical conditions of the aforementioned persons differed from that of the petitioner's. However, in our view, this is not relevant for present purposes. In all three cases, the legally relevant question was only this: was there a "sudden" "deterioration" in "health"? If so, then all three were covered by the policy, regardless of the actual medical condition and how or why it came about. We have put all three words in quotes to emphasize that which is legally relevant, and thereby exclude that which is legally irrelevant. In our view, simply because (as claimed by the respondents) the petitioner's condition came about for reasons that could not (or ought not) to be regarded as an illness as normally, ordinarily or medically defined, whereas that which afflicted the other two persons could (it appears) be so regarded, is not relevant. As a matter of law, all three must be regarded as similarly placed. The position of the petitioner on the one hand and the other two on the other cannot be regarded as differentiated on any reasonable basis, as would be presently relevant or applicable. Having misapplied the meaning of "illness", PIAC has not properly considered the issue of discrimination as raised by the petitioner.
14. In view of the foregoing, it appears to us that it cannot be ruled out that discriminatory treatment has been meted out to the petitioner. He may well have suffered from "illness" within the meaning of the insurance policy, as (so it seems) did the other two persons. However, they were granted relief but the petitioner was not. This matter cannot be brushed aside simply for the reason (if such be the case) that the petitioner's condition is part of the normal ageing process. Since the respondents, and in particular PIAC have misapplied the provisions of Clause 10.5 of the Agreement read with the insurance policy, it may be that the petitioner has been discriminated against contrary to what is required by Article 25 of the Constitution. Discrimination can result from a misapplication of the law on account of a misunderstanding thereof, just as much as it can from a non-application of it.
15. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the present case, we therefore dispose of this petition in terms of the following directions;---
(a) The respondent No, 1 shall convene the committee as required in terms of Clause 10.5.2 of the Agreement.
(b) The petitioner shall be entitled to appear before the committee and produce expert medical evidence on his behalf and will also be entitled to see and comment on any material or record that the committee wish to rely upon (in particular, the record in relation to the other two persons).
(c) The committee shall consider whether the petitioner suffered from "illness" within the meaning of the insurance policy in terms of and as explained in the paras herein above.
(d) If the committee concludes that the petitioner did so suffer, then in order to remove any possible discrimination, PIAC shall be obliged to make immediate payment of the appropriate compensation to the petitioner and may take up the matter further on its own with the respondent No,2 for possible reimbursement.
(e) In case the committee concludes that the petitioner did not suffer any "illness", it shall review the cases of the aforementioned Mr. Shahid Ali Muzaffar and Mr. Riazul Haq to consider whether they suffered from "illness" within the meaning of the insurance policy in terms of and as explained in the paras herein above. In case the committee 'concludes that either one or both of them did not so suffer, then it must consider why compensation should not be paid to the petitioner when, it was paid to one (or both) persons who also did not suffer any "illness", in order to remove any possible discrimination.
(f) In its deliberations and considerations, the committee shall not rely upon anything done by the respondent No,2 or any record or material produced or relied upon by. The latter nor shall the said respondent have the, right to be represented or heard by or before the committee.
(g) The committee shall give reasons for its decision, whatever it may be, and a copy of the same shall be provided to the petitioner.
(h) Nothing in the exercise to be undertaken in terms of this paragraph shall be to the prejudice of either Mr. Shahid Ali Muzaffar or Mr. Riazul Haq and in particular, shall not form part of any record relating to them nor result in any challenge to or dispute about the compensation paid to them or any recovery thereof on account of any finding recorded pursuant to the exercise to be carried out in terms of this paragraph.
(i) Whatever is stated- in this paragraph or done in terms hereof is without prejudice to the case or position of the respondent No,2, which shall not be bound by the same, but the said respondent shall of course be bound by what has been stated in the paras herein above with regard to the interpretation, application and true meaning of the provisions of the insurance policy as considered there.
(j) The entire exercise to be undertaken in terms of this paragraph must be completed within three months.
' The petition stands disposed of in the above terms, but without any order as to costs.