' Through this appeal under section 14(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, the appellant has challenged the order dated 4-4-2013 of the learned Returning Officer NA-60, PP-20 and PP-21 whereby the appellant's nomination papers for contesting the election to the National Assembly constituency/seat NA-60, Chakwal-I, have been rejected on the basis of the objections raised by respondents Nos.2 and 3.
2. The facts relevant for adjudication of the appeal are to the effect that the appellant is a freelance journalist by occupation and is also involved in local as well as national politics. The appellant has been elected from time to time to the Provincial as well as the National Assembly.
The appellant filed his nomination paper for contesting the forthcoming election to the constituency/seat NA-60, Chakwal-I. During the process of scrutiny respondents Nos.2 and 3 raised objections against the candidature of the appellant by, inter alia, submitting that the appellant is not qualified under Article 62 and/or is disqualified under Article 63 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to be elected or chosen as a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament). The objections were raised on the basis of the appellant's columns published in the various dailies including the Urdu language daily "Jang" and the English language daily "The News".
The impugned order was passed on the basis of one particular column which was published under the appellant's name in the daily 'Jang' of 1-12-2012 in the form of an obituary on the demise of Ardeshir Cowasjee, a renowned Pakistani who belonged to the Parsi Community. Respondent No,1 on the basis of the said column held that through the column it is established that the appellant has had a taste of liquor, that being so the appellant has violated the injunctions of Islam and his candidature is hit by the provisions of Article 62 of the Constitution. As a consequence, the appellant's nomination papers were rejected.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant has written innumerable articles/columns in various newspapers/journals. The appellant writes his articles/columns in the English language and employs literary language and his articles/columns also contain metaphors and allegorical references. The column in question was an Urdu translation of one of the columns written by the appellant in the English language. Even though the appellant did not author the translation, however, he owns it as it was published under his name. Respondent No,1 has made a very narrow interpretation of the translated column. The 'offending' words used in the column are capable of many interpretations. Respondent No,1 has erred in using a subjective approach.
Respondent. No,1 has further erred in interpreting the column in the manner in which it has been done. There is no admission by the appellant of imbibing alcohol in the column but respondent No,1 has read a different meaning into the words used in the column. Assuming without conceding that the appellant has spoken of consumption of alcohol in the column then that would not amount to an admission rendering the appellant liable to being disqualified. It is settled law that an admission must be clear, unambiguous and unequivocal in order to have any effect in law. Relies on the judgment reported as Khalil (Pvt.) Limited through Authorized Officer v. In. v. WALES II and 3 others (2012 CLD 276).
4. Further submits that the words employed by the appellant were of a literary nature and are open to various interpretations/explanations. If the reasoning of respondent No,1 is to be accepted then one of the fundamental rights of the appellant which has been guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution i,e, freedom of speech and expression, would be circumscribed. Further contends that Article 62(1)(d) of the Constitution relates to a person who is commonly known as one who violates Islamic injunctions. Article 62(1)(d) clearly requires that there must be common knowledge of continuous repeated violations of Islamic injunctions by a candidate to render him disqualified.
There is nothing on the record for establishing the same.
5. Further contends that the incident being referred to took place more than 30 years back and if an offence is alleged to have been made out then an F.I.R. Should have been lodged for trial and conviction of the appellant rather than having him disqualified. Since there is no conviction of the appellant the objectors could not have had the appellant disqualified by using the backdoor.
6. The learned counsel for respondent No,2 has filed C.M.No,1-E of 2013 and C.M.No,2-E of 2013 whereby, he has prayed that his C.M.No,1-E of 2013 may be treated as a cross-objection and he may also be allowed to place on record certain documents in support of his contentions. Notices were issued in the said C.Ms which have been accepted by the learned counsel for the appellant.
7. The learned counsel for respondent No,2 submits that respondents Nos.2 and 3 had raised a number of objections against the candidature of the appellant. Respondent No,1, through the impugned order, has, however, given a finding on only one objection raised by respondents Nos.2 and 3. The candidature of the appellant is hit by the provisions of Article 62(1)(d) as also Article 63(1)(g) of the Constitution inasmuch as not only is the appellant a person who is commonly known to be one who violates Islamic injunctions but he has also called into question the ideology of Pakistan, Further submits that the appellant has also outraged the sense of morality/religion of the citizens of Pakistan. Reference in this regard has been made to various columns published in the Urdu language in the Daily 'Jang' and other publications and Verses 57 and 58 of Surah Maidah and Verse 9 of Surah Jumah of the Holy Quran. Further submits that after passing of the impugned order the appellant made certain disparaging remarks against respondent No,1 which tantamount to bringing the judiciary into ridicule. The appellant is, therefore, not qualified and/or is disqualified to contest the election for the seat in question.
8. Arguments heard. Record perused.
9. We would first of all advert to C.Ms Nos.1-E and 2-E of 2013 filed by respondent No,2. There is no provision under the Act, ibid, for .Filing of cross objections, however, since the learned counsel for the appellant has accepted notices in the C.Ms. We intend to consider the objections raised by respondent No,2 through the said C.Ms.
10. Admittedly the impugned order has been passed on the basis of only one column having been published in the Urdu language under the name of the appellant. The appellant owns the column.
The other objections raised by the learned counsel for respondent No,2 are in respect of various other colunins of the appellant by virtue of which it has been contended by the learned counsel that the appellant has run afoul of the provisions of Articles 62(1)(d) and 63(1)(g) of the Constitution.
11. One of the cardinal principles of interpretation or appreciation of a text is to look at it in totality.
Words or phrases employed therein if A looked at in isolation or out of context are always capable of being interpreted in a manner which does not convey the actual meaning of the full text or as in this case the. Articles/columns.
12. It is also universally accepted that literary works are capable of being interpreted in a number of ways. This is exemplified by the fact that literature is taught as a subject at High School, College and University level all over the world in respect of almost all the written and spoken languages of the world. Students conduct research on the works of authors/poets and as a consequence are awarded masters as well as doctoral degrees. One can, therefore, safely say that literary works do not admit of a narrow interpretation.
13. We, therefore, tend to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the writings of the appellant being in the literary, metaphorical and allegorical style cannot be narrowly interpreted. Even if it were not so, still one cannot ignore the fact that individual words have more than one dictionary meaning and are, therefore, open to interpretation. The learned counsel for respondent No,2 has referred to selective sentences and/or words in the various columns purported to have been written by the appellant. If we were to agree with the learned counsel for respondent No,2 and accept that a narrow interpretation of the said sentences/words should be made and/or those sentences and words should be considered in" isolation without reference to their context and/or their proper perspective then we would be falling into error.
14. Some of the columns referred to by the learned counsel for respondent No,2 are not from the original source and are purported reproductions of the appellant's columns. Reliance, therefore, cannot be placed on these columns.
15. No tangible proof has been brought on the record or indeed any conviction of the appellant for the offences he is accused of by respondent No,2 from any Court of competent jurisdiction to render the appellant disqualified under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. The instant proceedings are summary in nature and we cannot conduct a roving inquiry to establish if the appellant has violated the injunctions of Islam or called into question the ideology of Pakistan.
16. Even otherwise, Courts cannot assume the role of arbiter of morals.
17. As to the other contentions of the learned counsel for respondent No,2 they are mainly based on newspaper reports which are not normally relied upon by Courts.
18. We, therefore, find that respondent No,1 has erred whilst passing the impugned order. It is accordingly set aside and it is directed that the appellant's name be placed forthwith in the list of validly nominated candidates contesting the elections to the National Assembly constituency/seat NA-60, Chakwal-I.
19. Copies of the order be sent to the learned District Returning Officer and the Returning Officer for information and necessary action.