' ASAD MUNIR (CHAIRMAN).--- The appellant, Anwar-ulHaq, joined the Muslim Commercial Bank Limited as a messenger on 1-8-1970 whereafter on 15-4-1990 he was promoted as a cashier. The appellant was arrested on 19-10-2001 when an. F.I.R. Under section 302, P.P.C. Was registered against him and his son, Muhammad Zahid, at the Police Station Noor Kot, Shakargharh District Narowal. Whilst in jail, the appellant sent an application to the Regional Manager, MCB Regional Office, Sialkot, respondent No,2, for indefinite leave on the ground that he had to defend himself and undergo the trial. This leave application was neither accepted nor rejected by respondent No,2.
Record shows that vide judgment dated 19th February, 2003, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shakargarh, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to five (5) years' imprisonment while his son was convicted and sentenced to death. Upon coming to know about the appellant's conviction, respondent No,2 vide letter dated 4-12-2003 terminated the services of the appellant on the ground that his post could not be left vacant for five yeaRs, This letter of termination was, admittedly, received by the appellant in jail. However, the appellant was acquitted while his son's death sentence was converted into 25 years rigorous imprisonment by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court Lahore vide its judgment dated 21-11-2008. Thereafter, the appellant was released from jail on 10-5-2009 whereafter it is on 2-10-2009 that the appellant served a grievance notice on respondent No,1 and requested for his reinstatement on the basis of his record of 25 years' service to MCB along with the plea that the termination of his services was void as his services had been terminated without issuing any show cause notice and/or conducting any inquiry. The respondents refused to redress his grievance whereupon the appellant on 30-10-2009 filed before the Punjab Labour Court No,7, Gujranwala, a grievance petition, under section 41 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, to seek his re-instatement in service with back benefits. Along with his grievance petition, the appellant filed an application for extension of time. The grievance petition along with the application for extension of time has been dismissed by the learned Presiding Officer, the Punjab Labour Court No,7, Gujranwala, vide judgment dated 14-11-2009 on the ground of delay of four months in filing the grievance petition.
2. Assailing the vires of the Punjab Labour Court No,7, Gujranwala's judgment dated 14-11-2009, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the question of limitation, being a mixed question of law and fact, was summarily and unlawfully decided by the learned Presiding Officer without recording any evidence. In support, the learned counsel refers to Messrs Pakistan Papersack Corporation Ltd. v. Chairman, Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 75 others (2000 PLC 430). Also relies on Abdul Jamil v. Messrs Pakistan Machine Tool Factory (1991 PLC 369) and Mukhtar Ali v.
Punjab Urban Transport Corporation, Rawalpindi (1980 PLC 800) to contend that the cause of action arose sometime after his release from jail when his request for reinstatement were turned down. Relying on Jaliroo Masih v. Tehsil Nazim, Town Committee Chunian, District Kasur and 3 others (2003 PLC 73), it is also contended that technicalities cannot come in the way of providing substantial justice in labour matters where a void order has been passed without holding any inquiry. In response, the learned counsel for the Respondent-Bank has supported the impugned judgment and while doing so, has placed reliance on Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore and another (2007 PLC 64), Muhammad Azhar Khan v. Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Toba Tek Singh and others (2006 SCMR 778) and Izzat Baig Awan v. Habib Bank Limited (2003 PLC (C.S.) 938).
3.After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the first question that needs to be addressed is as to whether the order for the termination of the petitioner's services` vide letter dated 4-12-2003 is illegal for having been passed without holding any inquiry. In this regard, it is to be noted that the petitioner become unavailable to the respondent-Bank for over two years after he was arrested on 19-10-2001 but the respondent-Bank acted in a reasonable manner and did not terminate the services of the petitioner as it hoped that he would be acquitted and be able to resume his duties. However, this did not happen and the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to five years' imprisonment vide judgment dated 19th February, 2003, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shakargarh. Realizing that the petitioner would be unavailable for another 5 years, the respondent-Bank had no option but to terminate his services as it could not let the seat of the petitioner remain vacant for another five yeaRs, No inquiry was necessary as the petitioner was never proceeded against for misconduct nor was he dismissed from service. Nor was there any dispute about the long absence of the petitioner as well as the cause of such absence which was his long imprisonment from 19-10-2001 till 10-5-2009. As such, the conviction of the petitioner provided the respondent-Bank with sufficient reason to terminate the services of the petitioner in terms of Standing Order 12(1) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, which dispenses with inquiry when a workman's services are terminated.
For a reason other than misconduct. I may here refer to Izzat Baig Awan v. Habib Bank Limited (2003 PLC (C.S.) 938, wherein the honourable Supreme Court has held that that the absence whether avoidable or unavoidable is the sole headache of the workman but so far as the bank is concerned it cannot afford the luxury of the absence of the workman. It may be stated here that the ultimate acquittal of the petitioner by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court Lahore's judgment dated 21-11-2008 cannot help the petitioner as his services were terminated about five years earlier on 4- 12-2003 nor can the said acquittal undo the long absence from duty of the petitioner from 19-10- 2001 till 10-5-2009 or at least from 19-2-2003 till 10-5-2009.
4. Obviously, the grievance notice, served on 2-10-2009, was time-barred as it was filed by the petitioner in respect of the termination of his services affected on 4-12-2003. Under section 41(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, a grievance notice must be filed within three months of the date a grievance arises. In the present case, even if the limitation is counted not from the date of termination of petitioner's services on 4-12-2003 but from the date of his release from jail on 10-5- 2009, the grievance notice, having been filed on 2-10-2009, was time-barred by nearly two months.
No grievance petition is maintainable unless the condition precedent of service of grievance nbtice within three months from the accrual of the grievance has been fulfilled. In the present case, the grievance notice was not maintainable as the grievance notice was not served within the prescribed period of three months with the result that the mandatory condition for exercise of jurisdiction wasnot fulfilled. However, no reason has been given for condoning the delay except that it is a mixed question of law and fact which required B evidence but has been summarily decided by the learned Labour Court. I agree with the learned Labour Court in the peculiar circumstances of this case the exercise of recording evidence was quite unnecessary as the relevant facts are undisputed. One can take a liberal view to exclude the period the petitioner remained in jail but there is no explanation as to why the petitioner delayed the filing the grievance notice and grievance petition once he was released from jail on 10-5-2009. The objection that the grievance petition was time-barred is sound and cannot brushed aside as a mere technicality. I also find that the case-law quoted by the petitioner's counsel is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. However, reference may be made to Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore and another (2007 PLC 64) wherein it was held that the question of limitation has to be rigidly construed on the well-known maxim that no party was allowed to circumvent the provisions of statute of limitation. I may also refer to Muhammad Azhar Khan v. Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Toba Tek Singh and others (2006 SCMR 778) which lays down that a party seeking condonation has to explain each day's delay. In the light of the cited precedents, no case is made out to condone the appellant's delay in filing the grievance notice.
5. For the reason reasons stated above, the impugned order is not open to any exception.
Resultantly, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed without any,order as to costs.