' The Pakistan Intetnational Airlines Corporation, Faisalabad, rented House No, 269/D -Peoples Golony, Faisalabad from respondent No, I namely, Mst. Safooran Khanum. The house is used as residence of the District Manager, P. I. A , Faisalabad.
2. Mst. Safooran Khanum filed an ejectment application in the Court of Rent Controller, Faisalabad in the year 1977 on the grounds of default in the payment of rent and personal requirement. The application was rejected by order dated the 4th of March, 1977. She did not go in appeal.
3. About a year later Mst. Safoora Khanum again applied for the ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of personal requirement giving changed circumstances as well as on the ground of default in Payment of rent. Preliminary objection was taken by the petitioner to the effect that the application was barred under section 4 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The learned Rent Controller upheld the objection and summarily rejected the application by his order dated the 14th 'January, 1977.
4. Mst. Safooran Khanum preferred an appeal in the Court of District Judge, who by his order dated the 15th September, 1977 accepted the appeal holding that the application was maintainable and remanded the case to the Court of the Rent. Controller for recording of the evidence of the parties and a decision on merits. The petitioner did not go in appeal.
5. The Rent Controller after recording the evidence of the parties accepted the application and ordered the ejectment of the petitioners
6. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order of ejectment passed by the learned Rent Controller. The learned Additional District Judge concurred with the finding of fact recorded by the learned Rent Controller, and rejected the appeal by the order dated 3rd April, 1980.
7. Against the order dated the 3rd April, 1980 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, the petitioner filed writ petition (W. P. No, 805/80) and withdrew it, according to the petitioner, in the light of the observation made by the learned Judge that a second appeal was competent.
8. The petitioner filed S. A.
0. No, 248 of 1980, which was admitted to hearing by my brother Khurshid Ahmad, J.
9. On the 19th June, 1980, second amendment to the Rent Restriction Ordinance was issued and as a result thereof S. A.
0. No, 248 of 1980 abated, hence this writ petition.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the ejectment application filed in the year 1978 being barred under section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, the impugned orders are without lawful authority and of no legal consequence. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the order of the learned Rent Controller dated the 4th January, 1979, dismissing the second petition for ejectment was passed under section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance against which no appeal lay before the District Judge and in the circumstances the appeal filed by the respondent before the learned District Judge was without jurisdiction, and finally the learned lower Courts had misappreciated or misread the evidence while arriving at a conclusion that the need of the respondent was bona fide.
11. 1 do not find any merit in either of the three submissions.
When the respondent preferred an appeal before the District Judge against the learned Rent Controller's order dated the 4th January, 1976, summarily rejecting the application under section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, the petitioner did not take an objection to the competency o the appeal and, therefore, cannot be permitted to agitate the matter a this stage. Similarly when the appeal was allowed by the District Judge and the case remanded to the learned Rent Controller for the record in of the evidence of the parties and a decision on merits, the petitioner did not challenge the order of remand by way of a second appeal and, therefore, the order of remand, which rejected the legal objection regarding the application being barred under section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, attained finality, and,. Therefore, the same cannot be permitted to' be re-agitated even in second appeal muchless to say while invoking writ jurisdiction.
12. The question whether the circumstances have changed during the course of one year or not is essentially a question of fact and the applicability of section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance is dependent upon a finding of fact on the former question and the learned Additional District Judge has applied his mind to this aspect and rightly concluded : "The learned counsel for the appellant argues that in the previous ejectment petition, the landlady had taken the ground of personal need but it was found against her. Therefore, the ground of personal requirement could not be reagitated. This argument has no force. If today a landlord does not require the possession of his house for his personal need, the need may arise tomorrow.
Therefore, the decision of the previous ejectment petition cannot operate as res judicata. Issue No. 1 is found accordingly,"
It is not only that I am in agreement with the view taken by the learned District Judge on this point but the argument has also to be rejected on the short ground that it is a trite law that when a Tribunal or a Court has a jurisdiction to decide, it has the jurisdiction to decide it rightly 0wrongly ; Muhammad Hussain Munir's case (I) and Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali's case (2). It will not be out of place to mention that the Privy Council while deciding the question of jurisdiction in a civil revision took the view : "So, it is settled law when a Court has jurisdiction to decide a question (i. e, jurisdiction-territorial, pecuniary or in regard to subject-matter), it has jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly both in fact and law. The mere fact, therefore, that the decision is erroneous is no ground for revision because it does not amount to illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. PLD 1949 P C 114.
' In fact it has been repeatedly held by the Privy Council that the High Court has no jurisdiction in revision to interfere with the decision of a subordinate Court merely en the ground that the decision was wrong in law Amir Hassan v. Shea Bakhsh (3), Balakrishna v. Vasudeva (4), Venkata Giri v. H. R.
E. Board (5), Jovchand v. Kamalaksha (6) and the Supreme Court has adhered to this principle in Muhammad Hussain v. Sikandar.
13, The question whether the landlord does or does not require certain premises for his bona fide requirement, becomes in the last analysis, one of fact (Dr. A. R. Khan v. Muhammad Ishaque (7) and the Rent Controller C as well as the Additional District Judge have concurred in the finding that the need of Mst. Safooran Khanum for her personal use is bona fide.
' The learned Rent Controller in a well-considered judgment after analysing the entire evidence led by the parties concluded : "I find that P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 who were the officials of the Telephone Department stated that the husband of the petitioner (Safooran Khanum) was Principal R. T. T. S., posted in Lahore and was occupying a house C-I in his official capacity. He was compulsorily retired from service and was ejected from the building C-1. He took shelter in the Quarter D-2 in occupation of an official of the Telephone Department. The said official died and his quarter was allotted to another official, therefore, the husband of the petitioner was written a letter by the Telephone Department to vacate {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1974 SC 139 (2) PLD 1973 SC 136
(3) 11 Cal. 6 (P C) (4) 44 I A 261
(5) PLD 1949 P C 31 (6) PLD 1949 P C 114
(7) 1972 SCMR 437 {{FOOT NOTE}} the Quarter D-2. Husband of the petitioner as P. W. 3 fully corroborated the evidence of P. W. 1 and also stated that he and his family had no house in whole of Pakistan except the house in dispute and he further deposed that the petitioner did not go for appeal against the order of dismissal of her previous application for ejectment, because when the order was made a review petition was pending in the Review Board of re-instatement of the petitioner's husband. The respondent has produced only one witness who sttaed that the petitioner does not stand in personal bona fide need of house in dispute. But in cross-examination he admitted that the petitioner's husband was retired from service and also could not deny the fact that the petitioner's husband is living in a servant quarter in Lahore. Children of the petitioner are getting education, when previous application of the petitioner for ejectment of the respondent from the property in dispute was dismissed, review petition of the petitioner's husband was pending in Review Board. He also failed to deny that the petitioner had no other house except the house in dispute for her residence and that the petitioner is in personal bona fide need. I find that it stands fully established from the petitioner's evidence that her husband had been compulsorily retired from service. Petitioner and her family has no other house except the house in dispute and that they are living in a house of the Telephone Department and that the Telephone Department is trying to eject the petitioner's family from that house.
I hold that the petitioner stands in personal bona fide need of the property in dispute for her and her family's residence."
(Underlining* is mine)
' Similarly, the learned Additional District Judge found : "From the above facts, it is evident that the landlady does not own any house except the disputed one and that she has five children. The house presently occupied by her is not 'suitable for her needs. Therefore, she requires the possession of the disputed house in good faith for her personal residence."
The order of the learned Rent Controller incorporates practically thr entire evidence led by the parties. After going through the same I am of the view that finding that the need of the respondent Mst. Safooran Khanum being bona fide is based not only on the evidence led by her, but is also supported by the cross-examination of the solitary witness produced by the petitioner. The learned District Judge after due consideration and D application of mind has concurred with the above referred finding of fact, and it is not the normal practice, even while exercising revisional jurisdiction on the civil side to interfere with a concurrent finding of fact and in this regard I would draw support from the principle enunciated in Ata Hussain Khan v. Muhammad Rafiq Khan (1).
14. I am not persuaded to admit this petition to hearing on the ground that one of my learned brothers admitted the S. A.
0. To hearing. The S. A.
0. Was admitted when it was competent to institute the same in this Cpnrt. The second appeal having abated, the matter has been moved {{FOOT NOTE}} *Mere in italics)
(I) 1979 SC MR 630 {{FOOT NOTE}} in Constitutional jurisdiction and the nature of the two jurisdictions is quit different from one another. While exercising writ jurisdiction this Court does not enter into the disputed question of fact or upset finding of fact unless they are based on no evidence or the evidence has been misunderstood or the evidence has been misread, which is not the case in hand.
15. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued for granting some time to the petitioner for vacating the premises. Apprised of the evidence which has been extensively noted in the learned Rent Controller's order, I feel that such an order will be highly unjust. It is in evidence that the respondent's husband was a Divisional Engineer and he was compulsorily retired.
The family was ejected from the bungalow in their occupation and the family, which comprised besides the couple five school/college going children took shelter in a room of the quarter of F Muhammad Arshad and the further misfortune of the respondent is that Muhammad Arshad has died. The quarter has been allotted to one Chughtai and the Telephone Department is pressing the respondent now t vacate the quarter. Granting a stay order to the petitioner will be the unkindest cut of all and will result in prolonging the humiliation and agony of the respondent's family. The balance of convenience as well as that of inconvenience is in favour of the respondent, therefore, the request for time is refused.
' There being no merit, the writ petition is, dismissed in limine.