This writ petition, has been brought to seek quashing of FIR No, 15/2013 dated 12.03.2013 registered at Police Station Anti Corruption Establishment, Vehari under Section 409, PPC read with Section 5(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The main thrust of argument by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the dispute subject matter of the FIR, is also under trial in a civil suit pending before learned Civil Judge, Vehari and the fate of the said suit will finally determine the sanctity of allegations levelled in the FIR. The learned counsel, therefore, argued that during the pendency of the said suit, FIR cannot continue, or that proceedings in the FIR may be stayed till final outcome of the suit.
2. It is admitted position that after registration of FIR the matter is still under investigation and it is the prerogative of the Investigating Officer to probe into the matter by considering all direct as well as surrounding aspects of the case. There may be some civil litigation pending between the parties, but commission of a cognizable offence provides an independent mode and where any criminal offence is alleged to have been committed, criminal proceedings within the meaning of Section 154, Cr.P.C. can safely be launched and no legal bar can be imposed in this respect.
Reliance is placed on the case 'Muhammad Shafi versus Deputy Superintendent of Police (Malik Gul Nawaz) Narowal and 5 others" (PLD 1992 Lahore .178).
3. As regards the contention of learned counsel that result of the civil suit may have some impact on the criminal proceedings, I am afraid on this ground alone, neither the FIR can be quashed nor at the stage of investigation, its proceedings can be held in abeyance to wait for decision of the civil suit, as the pendency of civil suit or proceedings cannot take away the prerogative of the Investigating Officer to proceed with the investigation and conclude it on the basis of material, whatever is collected by him or is otherwise, brought before him, by either of the parties to arrive at just conclusion of the investigation.
4. Even otherwise, if the accused side considers that decision of the civil suit will decide the ultimate fate of the criminal proceedings launched against them, there can be two stages for them to agitate .this question before the trial Court. Firstly, when report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is submitted and cognizance is taken by the learned trial Court, at this moment the accused may bring their stance before the trial Court and if the trial Court after tentatively considering the material available before it, forms an opinion according to the plea of the accused, then it shall stop the proceedings to wait for the decision of the civil Court. A Secondly the trial Court may proceed with the trial record the statements of prosecution witnesses and at the time of recording of statement of the accused under Section 342, Cr.P.C., if in reply to question whether he will produce any evidence in defence, the accused answers in the affirmative and desires to produce copy of any judgment and decree of a civil suit in his defence, the trial Court comes to a conclusion that said judgment and decree will ultimately affect the criminal proceedings, only then the trial Court shall stop the trial proceedings. It may be observed here that if before recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the trial in the state case is stayed just to wait for the decision of the civil Court, therefore, there would always remain apprehension that in the interregnum period, the prosecution evidence may be destroyed or diminish for any reason whatsoever and ultimately irrespective of the decision by the civil Court, the trial of the FIR case may loose its significance. Therefore, it would be more appropriate for the trial Court and also in the larger interest of justice to bring the entire prosecution case on its file and then consider the defence if any taken by the accused side in their statements under Section 342, Cr.P.C. on the above question.
5. Before such stage arises it would be inappropriate to guillotine the investigation or to stop the trial, as it may otherwise, result in destruction of the prosecution evidence, as observed above. Even otherwise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case "Col. Subah Sadiq versus M. Ashiq and others" (2006 SCM R 276) has held as under:--
(b) Art. 199--Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1998), Ss. 173, 265-K. 249-A, 551, 456-A, 190 & 484-- Police Rules, 1934, R.24.7--Penal Code, Ss. 420, 468 & 471--Quashing of FIR.--Required circumstances-Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court--Scope--If, prima facie, an offence had been committed, ordinary course of trial before the Court should not be allowed to be deflected, by resorting to constitutional jurisdiction to quash the FIR by appreciation of documents produced by the parties without providing chance to cross examine or confronting the documents in question-- High Court would err in law to short circuit the normal- procedure of law as provided in Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. Party seeking the quashing of FIR had alternative remedy to raise objection at the time of framing the charge against them by the Trial Court or at the time of final disposal of the trial after recording the evidence. Said party had more than one alternative remedies before the Trial Court under Ss.265-K & 248-A, Cr.P.C. or to approach the concerned Magistrate for of the case under the provisions of Cr.P.C.--Alternative remedies available to the party enlisted-- Principles.
(d) Tracheotomy of powers which is delicately balanced in the circumstances cannot be disturbed as if grants powers to each organ to decide the matters in its allotted sphere.
6. For what has been discussed above, I see no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed in limine.