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PLJ 2013 Peshawar 207

ABBAS KHAN KHATTAK vs MANAGING DIRECTOR, PASSCO and 3 others

CitationPLJ 2013 Peshawar 207
CourtPeshawar High Court
Case No.W.P. No, 612 of 2009
Date2012-10-25
Judge(s)Mian Fasih-ul-Mulk, Rooh-ul-Amin Khan
ResultPetition dismissed

Mian Fasih-ul-Mulk, J.--Petitioner, through instant writ petition, has questioned the impugned order dated 01.03.1996 of Respondent No, 1 (Managing Director, Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation) (hereinafter called as "PASSCO") whereby office order dated 02.01.1995 with regard to reinstatement of petitioner in service with all back benefits was superseded with reappointment against Grade-19 post in PASSCO without any back benefits.

2. Few facts relevant for the disposal of instant writ petition are that petitioner was initially serving Pakistan Forest Institute, Peshawar as Technical Assistant (BPS-16) but his services were requisitioned by PASSCO and posted him at Peshawar as Additional Project Director vide Notification dated 22.12.1977. The services of petitioner were terminated by the Managing Director PASSCO vide order dated 31.10.1984 under Regulation No, 14 of PASSCO Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1979. The writ petition filed by petitioner before this Court stood dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction where after petitioner filed a Review Petition before the Review Board (NIRC), which was accepted and petitioner was re-instated in service with all back benefits w,e,f, 01.11.1984. Still petitioner was not reinstated; hence he submitted an appeal before the Ombudsman, Islamabad, wherefrom too reinstatement of petitioner was recommended. However, after hectic efforts and approach to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, petitioner was reinstated in service vide order dated 01.01.1995. Petitioner then started struggle for payment of back benefits but the Management was reluctant to do so. A meeting of the Board of Directors was held on 01.03.1996 wherein it was resolved to reappoint the petitioner with no back benefits. It may be mentioned here that on 10.07.2000, services of petitioner were again terminated but on acceptance of his appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal and rejection of Corporation's appeal by the Apex Court, petitioner was re- instated .in service on 7.6.2001. Now the petitioner's claim is that he is entitled to back benefits as per order of reinstatement dated 01.01.1995 and the subsequent order passed by the Board of Directors should be declared as illegal, unjust and without lawful authority.

3. Learned counsel for respondents at the very outset raised two preliminary objections with regard to maintainability of instant writ petition i,e, lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition because Head Office of the Company is at Lahore and the impugned order was also passed at Lahore; hence this Court cannot entertain the petition, and that PASSCO being a public limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, its employees are not governed by any statutory rules, as such, petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner refuted the arguments of learned counsel for respondents and stated that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition because petitioner was serving the Corporation as Deputy General Manager at Nowshera in the Province of KPK and that PASSCO has its own rules known as Pakistan Agricultural Storage & Services Corporation (Staff) Service Regulation, 1978, therefore, PASSCO is amenable to the writ, jurisdiction of this Court. Further submitted that under Entry No, 14/30 of Rules of Business, the administrative control of PASSCO is being exercised by MANFAL, whose control is vested in the hands of Chief Executive of Pakistan, therefore, the relationship of master and servant would not attract to the case of petitioner.

5. After giving our anxious thought to the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the first objection of learned counsel for respondents is without force. The Federal Government, or for that matter any federal authority or agency, performs functions and exercises powers throughout the country and the effects of its actions may be felt in any part of the Country.

The Apex Court in the case of Asghar Hussain vs. The Election Commission of Pakistan (PLD 1968 SC 387) has held that jurisdiction of the High Court is not restricted to location or residence of the respondents within the territorial limits so ,long as the effects of the order is felt within its jurisdiction. Admittedly the Corporation has established an office in this Province and petitioner was performing his duties as Deputy General Manager at Nowshera within the territorial limits of this Court and, therefore, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the objection raised in this regard is unfounded.

6. However, the second objection raised by learned counsel for respondents is forceful in the circumstances of this case. The learned counsel for respondents relies on Article-199(a) (ii) of the Constitution where under the order of Managing Director of PASSCO cannot be said to be an act done by a `person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation' whereas the learned counsel for petitioner relies on Clause-(5) of Article-199 of the Constitution where under `person' includes any body politic or corporate, any authority of or under the control of the Federal Government. The argument of learned counsel for respondent with reference to Article- 199(5) of the Constitution is not appealable one as the respondents' company being a non- statutory body and one incorporated under the Companies Act there is neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus, nor is there any corresponding legal right in its workmen for enforcement of any such statutory or public duly and this being so such a declaration can only be issued against a person or an authority or a corporation where the impugned act is in violation of or contrary to a statute under which it is set up or governed or a public duty or responsibility imposed on such person, authority or body by such a statute. In the eyes of law, a corporation or a company is its own master and is fully answerable like any other person to the body contemplated under the Ordinance and the Articles of Association. The servants of respondent-company are appointed by the directors or any other officer duly authorized by them. They are not therefore civil servants who can claim benefit of the constitutional protection. The question whether Corporation either sole or aggregate is a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority must depend upon the facts of each case. In the absence of any statutory provision a corporation acting on its own behalf even if it is controlled wholly or partially by a Government department, will be presumed not to be a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation. In the absence of anything on record to enable this Court to go behind the legal entity of the Corporation or Company registered under the Ordinance, we do not think that it is open to us to say that the company is quite different from what it purports to be according to the provisions of governing its Constitution, functions and obligations. Here, we may refer to the observations of a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench rendered in W.P. No, 15314/1994 wherein similar question with regard to the status of employees of PASSCO was decided in the following words: "The service relationship of the employees of the Corporation is governed by the principle of "Master and Servant" which includes in its ambit principle of 'hire and fire', and, therefore, if the company wishes to reinstate its ex-employees, may be under the order of head of the Government or Chairman of the Board no other employee of the same company has any locus standi or right to object to the said action,. The Respondent No, 1 is a public limited company and has not been created by a statute and prayer for issuance of writ of quo-warranto being premature and misconceived, remedy of judicial review, as prayed for is not available to the petitioner."

7. For what has been discussed above, we are of the view that the second objection of learned counsel for respondents would prevail, as the respondent company is a Public Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, having its own Memorandum and Articles of Association as well as Service Regulations framed thereunder, therefore, petitioner is not governed by any statutory rules and, as such, he cannot invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

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