Petitioners through this Civil Revision under Section 115, C.P.C. have called in question the order dated 25.1.2011, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Pindi Bhattian, Distt. Hafizabad whereby the respondent's application for determination of probable value of suit property under Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 has been accepted.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the respondent claiming his superior right instituted a suit for possession of the suit property through pre-emption. It is maintained in the plaint that the petitioners/defendants purchased the suit property from Mst. Safia Bibi daughter of Khan Muhammad vide Mutation No, 485 dated 27.9.2010. Alongwith the plaint, the respondent also filed an application under Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 stating therein that in the sale mutation No, 485 dated 27.9.2010, a fictitious sale price of Rs, 12,600,000/- has been mentioned, whereas the value of the suit property is not more than Rs,4,000,000/-. In support of the above application, the respondent produced copy of different mutations exhibiting the sale of properties adjacent to the suit property and also "Aust bay Yaksala". Learned trial Court after appreciating the above said documents, accepted the application and directed the respondent to deposit 1/3rd of probable sale value i,e, Rs, 4,000,000/- within 30 days. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners/defendants have filed the instant petition.
3. In support of the instant petition, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned trial Court could not determine probable value of the property because sale price was mentioned in the sale deed or mutation. In support of this contention learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the case "Abdul Wahid, etc vs. Sardar Ali, etc (2000 Law Notes (Lahore) 99 = PLD 2000 Lahore 190). Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent/plainliff under Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 could challenge the sale price recorded in the mutation or sale deed and make a request for determination of probable value of the suit property for payment of 1/3rd of sale price. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondent places reliance on the case "Perveen Akhtar and another vs. Muhammad Sattar (PLD 2006 Lahore 410).
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The sole point which requires determination is whether the learned trial Court was justified in determining the probable value of the suit property in presence of price mentioned in the mutation. Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 contemplates that in a suit for pre- emption the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price in Court within a period of 30 days of the filing of the suit. Second proviso to Section 24 of the said Act needs special attention in the circumstances of the present case. As per second proviso to Section 24 of the said Act, the probable value of the property can be determined by the Court when: (i) no sale price is mentioned in the sale deed or mutation; or (ii) the price mentioned in the sale deed or the mutation appears to be inflated. In each of the eventuality the Court is mandatorily required to determine the probable value of the suit property. According to my view in every case where there is an allegation that the price mentioned in the mutation or sale deed is inflated, the Court is under obligation to examine the plaint and the documents appended therewith, and after said examination and upon being satisfied that the price appears to be inflated, the Court is bound by law to determine by approximation the probable value and then to direct the plaintiff to deposit 1/3rd thereof. My view finds support from the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of 'Muhammad Din, etc vs. Jamal Din and others (PLJ 2008 SC 95) wherein it has been held that the Court while entertaining suits under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 ought to examine the plaint and any material accompanying it while passing orders for deposit of 1/3rd of the amount payable and direct the plaintiff to deposit the said amount in order to avoid complication later on. In view of above, it is clear that the learned trial Court has the jurisdiction to determine the probable value in summary/preliminary inquiry on the basis of the material placed before it by the plaintiff and also to provisionally opine that the sale price as stipulated in sale deed or mutation was prima facie inflated. Nepdless to observe here that for the determination of the probable value the Trial Court is not required, under second proviso to Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, to hold a detailed inquiry and to hear the defendants after a notice as a notice to the defendants for hearing in this preliminary inquiry would cause delay in the determination process and the order of deposit of Zare-Some beyond the statutory period of 30 days. In the instant case, the respondent placed before the learned trial Court copy of different mutations showing the sale of properties adjacent to the suit property and yearly average sale index (Aust Bay Yaksala) and on the basis thereof the learned trial Court has rightly determined the probable value of the suit property as Rs,4,000,000/- and directed the respondent to deposit 1/3rd thereof within a period of 30 days.
6. Reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the case of "Abdul Wahid, etc vs. Sardar Ali, etc (2000 Law Notes (Lahore) 99; PLD 2000 Lahore 190) is inapt. In the case of Abdul Wahid, (supra) reliance was placed on the case of 'Awwal Noor vs.. District Judge Kharak" (1992 SCMR 746) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan interpreted Section 24 of the N-WFP Pre-emption Act, 1987.
There are marked differences between the provisions of Section 24 of N-WFP Pre-emption Act, 1987 and Section 24 of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The differences between the above said two Acts have been highlighted by this Court in the case of "Gulzar Ahmad vs. Sardar Aslam and others"
(2001 CLC 1693) and on the basis thereof the case of Abdul Wahid (supra) is distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of instance case. Again, the case of Abdul Wahid (supra) was considered in the case of "Perveen Akhtar and others vs. Muhammad Sattar" (PLD 2006 Lahore 410) but was not followed for the similar reasons which have been recorded in the case of Gulzar Ahmad (supra).
7. In view of above, this petition lacks merits and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.