' M. TABASSUM AFTAB ALVI, J.---The captioned writ petition has been directed under section 44 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974, whereby following relief has been solicited by the petitioner:-- "In view of above, it is, very humbly prayed that by accepting this writ petition the respondents may kindly be restrained to submit supplementary challan before Magistrate 1st Class, Mirpur. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case may also be granted."
2. Precise facts giving rise to the instant writ petition are that the petitioner was distributor of different LPG gases in city Mirpur. It is alleged that due to personal rivalry, respondent No,3 in connivance with the district administration got registered a concocted case against the petitioner at City Police Station Mirpur under sections 419/420, A.P.C. Vide F.I.R. No,269 of 2011 dated 14-11-2011. It is stated that the petitioner was arrested, later on stood released and then exonerated by the Police under section 169, Cr.P.C. It is alleged that respondent No,1 has directed to respondent No,2 to submit a supplementary challan against the petitioner vide order dated 29-3-2012, hence, the instant writ petition.
3. The respondents were directed to file parawise comments upon the petition vide order dated 18- 4-2012, however, despite availing several opportunities they failed to do the needful.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the grounds taken in the petition and submitted -that due to personal rivalry, respondent No,3 in connivance with the other respondents got registered a baseless and concocted F.I.R. Against his client. The learned counsel pressed into service that after investigation the petitioner was found innocent, therefore, stood exonerated by the concerned police under section 169, Cr.P.C. The learned counsel further submitted that after completing investigation SSP-respondent has directed SHO, Mirpur to submit a supplementary challan against the petitioner before the concerned Court vide impugned order dated 29-3-2012 which order is contrary to law, hence, may be quashed.
5. The learned Additional Advocate-General opposed the admission of writ petition and submitted that supplementary challan can be filed by the police at latter stage.
6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length, I have perused the contents of writ petition along with appended documents with my utmost care.
7. The dispute pertains to F.I.R. Bearing No,296 of 2011 dated 14-11-2011. The above-mentioned F.I.R.
Was lodged against the petitioner by respondent No,3 as Special District Price Controller Mirpur regarding sale of cylinders in lower weights of LPG Gases as a distributor. The claim of the petitioner is that he was exonerated by the Police while exercising powers under section 169, Cr.P.C. And thereafter challan was also submitted against the concerned culprits on 6-1-2012, hence, neither re-investigation can be made by the police nor supplementary challan on the basis of order of Senior Superintendent Police, Mirpur dated 29-3-2012 can be filed against the petitioner.
(i) The questions, are that whether the Police is debarred from reinvestigation for having submitted the final report under section 173, Cr.P.C. And;
(ii) Whether a supplementary challan can be filed against an accused person after submitting challan under section 173 Cr.P.C. Against certain persons.
8. The above two questions may be taken up together for its resolution. Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains provisions relating to the investigation of offences by the police.
Section 154, which is the first section in this Chapter, directs that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction. The next 14 sections outline the procedure to be followed by the police officer in carrying out the investigation, recording statements, and conducting searches. Section 169 then lays down that the police officer concerned may release the accused person on bail, if upon investigation he finds that sufficient evidence is not forthcoming.
Section 170 prescribes the procedure to be followed by the police officer in cases where sufficient evidence is available against the accused person. It directs that the accused- person shall be forwarded in custody to a Magistrate empowered take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit him for trial, or if the offence is bailable and the accused is able to give security, the police officer shall flake security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate. Then comes section 173 which enjoins that every investigation under this chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station, shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the prescribed form, subsection (3) of this section contemplates that-- "Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such, bond or otherwise as he thinks fit."
From the preceding summary of the relevant .Provisions of the Code 'it would be seen that police investigation in a cognizable offence culminates in the report prescribed under section 173. There is no statutory prohibition in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the police not to embark on a fresh investigation of the case after the conclusion of the first and the submission of the final report, whatever the defects in the first investigation or the flaws in the final report given in the wake of it, that might subsequently be detected. The first investigation may be utterly unsatisfactory for many reasons. It may be due to non-availability of the ,evidence, or the successful induction of false evidence during the investigation, or the reason may be the corrupt behaviour of the police officers concerned. To say that the same police officers or their superiors on receipt of further information or on the availability of better evidence cannot revive the investigation already done, leading to a contrary or a varied result, would virtually amount to putting a seal on human errors and frailties once committed, whether by design or by inadvertence, with no opportunity to make amends, although it be possible to do so. The police, as an agency of the State should, be as much interested as any A other agency concerned in the administration of justice, to find out the truth in respect of a crime and lay the whole facts bare for determination by the competent tribunals as honestly and correctly as possible. The statutory functions of the police and the Courts in this respect are complementary to each other and do not overlap. The fact that the previous investigation had yielded certain results should not act as a hurdle or a deterrent for the police in reaching the truth if additional facts and additional circumstances brought to light help in its discovery. The Magistrate himself does not have legal powers to direct a further investigation by the police after he himself has taken cognizance of the case and has himself launched an inquiry or trial; but there is no bar for the police to pursue its own investigations and submit their results to the Court to find the guilt or innocence of the accused persons before it becomes too late. There is no bar to the investigation by the police after the submission of a final report under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, nor is the police not competent to file, if it is so disposed, a second report as a result if its subsequent investigation into the case.
' The identical point also came under consideration before the apex Court in case titled Farrukh Ahmad Chughtai v. Muhammad Imtiaz and 6 others [PLJ(sic) SC (AJ&K) 1]. At page 3 of the report it was held by their lordships as under:-- "After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and careful perusal of the record made available we are of the opinion that there is no quarrel with the proposition that the police has ample powers to re-investigate a matter and to submit supplementary challan in the reinvestigation. As a matter of fact this controversy was resolved through the previous order of this Court dated 13-11-1993. What needs to be emphasised is that merely on the basis of filing of supplementary challan the accused are not absolved or exonerated of the offences with which they are charged unless the material collected clearly speaks so."
' The same point came under consideration before Lahore High Court, Lahore in case titled Suleman v. Fateh Naseeb and others (1995 PCr.LJ 1543). It was held at page 1546 of the report as under:-- "Considering the case from all angles, I am of the view that there is no statutory prohibition or bar in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the police to the investigation by the police nor any bar can be imposed upon the police to investigate a case as many times as they choose even has ample power to withdraw the challan and submit a fresh challan".
' The point was also considered in case of Muhammad Khan v. Inspector-General of Police, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Lahore and 2 others. (PLD 1978 Lah. 731). At page 735 of the precedent case it was observed as under:-- "There is no doubt with regard to the proposition of law that further investigation can he undertaken by the police even after having submitted the final report under section 173 and the same position obtains irrespective of the fact whether cognizance has or has not been taken by an overt judicial act and whether the evidence has commenced after the cognizance of the case has been taken. There is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which prevents the police from embarking upon further investigation. It is also true that such an investigation does not and cannot be allowed to, stand in the way of the trial".
9. As the point raised and argued by the learned, counsel for the petitioner has already been resolved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Lahore High Court in the precedent cases, ibid, therefore, admission of the writ petition would be futile exercise.
' For the reasons enlisted above finding no substance in the instant writ petition it is hereby dismissed in limine.