' SYED SAJJAD HASSAN SHAH, J.---Through the instant constitutional petition, Wahidullah Khan and others, the petitioners have impugned the judgment and order passed by Additional District Judge-III, Bannu dated 1410-2010 whereby the revision filed against the judgment and order dated 8-2-2010 of the Civil Judge-V, Bannu was dismissed.
2. The brief facts are that the petitioners filed an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. For setting aside the judgment and decree dated 304-2009 in Suit No,189/1 on the plea of misrepresentation, fraud and that the petitioners were not impleaded as party to the said suit. The application was contested. However, it was dismissed vide order dated 8-2-2010. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed revision petition which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 14-10-2010. Hence, the instant constitutional petition.
3. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the available record with their assistance.
4. The main ground on which the petitioners based their application under section 12(2) C.P.C. Is that, the suit in which the decree was passed was not maintainable being res judicata as the respondents had earlier filed a suit with respect to the same subject matter which was dismissed.
The ground mentioned above does not fall under any of the pre-requisites to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under section 12(2), C.P.C. The petitioners even failed to bring on record the judgment and copies of pleadings of the said suit in order to satisfy the requirement of section 11, C.P.C.
5. Another ground on which the petitioners sought the setting aside of the decree under the above provision of law is that respondent No,2 Umar Khan obtained the decree in his favour on 14-11984 and since then till 14-7-2009 he failed to either execute the decree or to get it registered with the Sub-Registrar, Tehsil Bannu under the Registration Act, therefore, the decree passed in Suit No,27/1 has lost its legal value by afflux of time. This ground is also alien to section 12(2), C.P.C. And cannot be agitated for setting aside the above said decree, as being the declaratory decree, legally it cannot be put to the execution. However, it can be presented to Revenue Officer for attestation of mutation to incorporate the same in the revenue record at any time after its passage. It is worthwhile to say that it can be done at any time, as no period of limitation is prescribed for the purpose of incorporating the declaratory decree in the revenue record. The Revenue Officer is duty bound to attest the mutation whenever produced before him for such purpose. In this context, reference can be made to 1972 SCM R 322 wherein it has been held that:-- "He was entitled to get the mutation effected on the basis of a decree. Simply because it has barred by time, it has not lost its utility. In our opinion, view of the High Court is correct that revenue authorities were under obligation to sanction mutation on the basis of the decree."
6. The petitioners further asserted in their application that the respondent No,2 had filed another suit on 8-6-2009 bearing No,130/1 against Attaullah and others which was withdrawn on 15-7-2009 by respondent No,2 (plaintiff). This ground also does not seem to be valid one, in order to initiate the proceedings under section 12(2), C.P.C. In this regard, another ground agitated by the petitioners is of institution of Suit No,189/1 titled Kalimullah Khan v. Umar Khan in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Bannu which was entrusted to Civil Judge-V, Bannu for its trial but knowing fully well, the respondents did not inform the Court that other suits are pending decision in the Court of Civil Judge-IV, Bannu so that this suit can also be tried by the same Court. We are afraid, this ground is also not covered under section 12(2), C.P.C.
7. To set aside the decree passed in suit No,189/1, the petitioners have agitated that the decree was obtained in their absence and with collusion and fraud by effecting compromise between themselves and 1/8 share involved in the said decree is not the ownership of respondent No,2. A perusal of the record shows that neither the petitioners have appended any document with their application in order to substantiate the allegation nor it is shown on record that respondent No,2 (plaintiff) was not the owner to the extent of 1/8 share. Moreover, the petitioners have failed to bring on record the particulars of fraud allegedly committed by the respondents during the course of proceedings. Without specifying the nature of fraud, date and time in their pleadings, their statement per se is not sufficient to declare that the decree was obtained by practicing fraud. In this respect, the provisions contained in Order VI Rule 4, C.P.C. Are worth perusal. To substantiate this aspect of the case, reliance placed on PLD 1977 SC 75 wherein it has been held that:- "In particular, rule 4 of Order VI of the Civil Procedure Code lays down that in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are in the form exemplified aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary (1) shall be stated in the pleadings. In Bal Gangadhar Tilk and others v. Shrinivas Pandi and others (AIR 1915 PC 7), it was held that in pleadings, general allegations, however, strong may be, the words in which they are stated are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice. "
' Moreover, the petitioners have failed to clearly spell out a case of fraud out of the above stated facts. The general allegations levelled in the pleadings are not sufficient to fulfil the requirements of law. Where the particulars of fraud have not been furnished, the application was liable to be rejected. Both the Courts below have well appraised the legal position and committed no jurisdictional error.
8. For the reasons mentioned above, the instant petition being without any substance is hereby dismissed.