' The facts giving rise to this civil revision are that on 15th May, 1975 the petitioner, Ms/. Nawab Bibi, got certain land on mortgage for a period of eighteen years. Subsequently, the said land was also transferred to her by means of a sale. The sale in her favour was pre-empted by the respondent, Muhammad Din, by filing a suit which was decreed on 10th November, 1976.
2. Now, the question which has cropped up for determination is whether the respondent can immediately get possession of the disputed land in pursuance of the pre-emption decree passed in his favour and will not have to wait till the period of mortgage expires. This question was affirmatively answered by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court and, therefore, the petitioner has come up in revision to this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the mortgage of the disputed land, in favour of the petitioner, for a fixed period, was a distinct and separate transaction as compared to the sale of the said land in her favour and, therefore, she could not be obliged to part with possession of the said land, in execution of the pre-emption decree, obtained by the respondent, before running out of the period of mortgage. He, however, did not cite any authority to support his contention.
4. 1 am unable to agree with the learned counsel. On the sale of the disputed property in favour of the petitioner, she became a fullfledged owner thereof and ceased to be its mortgagee. A mortgage subists so long as there are two persons having different interests in one and the same property-one as a mortgagor having the equity of redemption and the other as a mortgagee having mortgagee rights. When the person owning the land passes on the equity of redemption also to the mortgagee the former completely severs his connection with the property which then vests entirely in the mortgagee. In other words, on the taking place of the said development, the mortgagee ceases to be so inasmuch as he then acquires the status of owner qua the property earlier held by him as a mortgagee. This is exactly what had happened in the case in hand on the sale of the disputed land in favour of the petitioner who was its mortgagee at the time of its sale.
There is nothing on the record to show that on the sale of disputed property it was demonstrated by the parties by words of mouth or otherwise that even after the sale, the mortgage would remain alive as a separate transaction. I., therefore, agree with the two Courts below that the petitioner's right as a mortgagee had come to an end on her having purchased the land which was previously mortgaged with her. In this view of the matter, the unanimous verdict of the learned lower Courts that the mortgage in her favour had merged in the sale is unexceptionable.
5. This civil revision, accordingly, fails. It is dismissed in limine.