' SARMAD JALAL OSMANY, J.---The facts in both these Appeals are common and so also the impugned Order. Hence they are being disposed of through the same judgment.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the matter are that the appellants are air hostesses employed in the respondent Corporation and have to their credit long years of service. Not being residents of Karachi, they were allotted rooms/accommodation in the Respondent Corporation's Trainee Hostel for Air Hostesses. They claimed that they are entitled to stay in the hostel in accordance with para 2.01.01 of the Personnel Policies Manual issued by the Corporation on 15-9-2008 which provided that:--- "All, Air Hostesses/Air Hostesses (Trainees) appointed/recruited from stations Inside Karachi when based or undergoing training in. Karachi shall be eligible for accommodation/boarding facilities at Air Hostesses Hostel, Karachi, subject to availability of necessary accommodation at charges/rule as may be prescribed by the Management from time to time.
' However contradictory to the same the appellants were issued a letter on 19-10-2009 asking them to vacate the hostel on the ground that same was meant for trainees only and not for the permanent staff of the Corporation.
3. Mr. Abdul Qadir Khan, Learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the appellants in C.A.
No,207-K of 2010 has submitted that the appellants do not belong to Karachi and consequently they would put to great discomfort if evicted from the hostel since they have no families in this city..
According to him curtailing the appellants' right to stay in the hostel is violative of Article 9 of the Constitution which guarantees the right to life of citizens, as a decent abode certainly flows from this right. In support of his submission learned Advocate Supreme Court has referred to the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. And another (1994 SCMR-2232). Learned Advocate Supreme Court next submission is that even though the respondent Corporation does not have any statutory rules but yet as it was performing functions relatable to the State therefore it was still amenable to the Constitutional Jurisdiction of the High Court since this was not a case whereby the appellants had been terminated. Consequently the relationship of master and servant would not come the way of the appellant as has been held in the case of Pakistan International Airline Corporation and others v. Tanweerur-Rehman and others (PLD 2010 SC 676). In this respect he has also referred to the case of Abdul Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum, Islamabad and 3 others (2010 PLC (C.S.) 691).
4. Mr. Muhammad Ikram Siddiqui, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the appellants in C.A. No,26-K of 2010 has fully supported the arguments of Mr. Abdul Qadir Khan.
5. Mr. Shafquat Ali Shah Masoomi, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the respondent Corporation in both Appeals has submitted that the case of Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others (Supra) is on all fours with the present case since there too, in some of the Appeals, the dispute was regarding promotion to a next higher grade of PIA employees and this Court held that since.
PIA did not have any statutory rules, although it was performing functions of the State, yet, the relationship between PIA and its employees was that of master and servant and consequently they could not approach the High Court in writ jurisdiction.
6. We have heard both the learned ASCs and perused the record with their assistance.
7. In our opinion in the case of Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others (Supra) it was h&c that as PIA was performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, it was amenable to the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. However it was also held in. No uncertain terms that since PIA did not have any ,statutory rules therefore whenever an issue arose as to the violation of the terms and conditions of its A employees then the same would not be open to interference by the. Learned High Court in its Constitutional Jurisdiction as the relationship of its employees with PIA is that of master and servant. No distinction was made by this Court in such relationship vis-a- vis disputes of serving employees and those who had been compulsorily retired etc. The pronouncement in Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others (Supra) was affirmed by this Court in the case of Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. Through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others (PLD 2011 SC 132) wherein again it was held that though the Corporation was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court as the majority of its shares were held by the Government however, in absence of statutory rules the principle of master and servant was applicable and the employees of the Corporation have to seek their remedy elsewhere on the allegation of violation of terms and conditions of service.
8. In the present case also, the facts would denote that indeed there 'is a dispute between the appellants and PIA as to the terms and conditions of service in which event the principle of master and servant would squarely apply and consequently the learned High Court correctly declined to interfere in writ jurisdiction. Insofar as the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman (Supra) is concerned it was held therein that though there was no statutory rules in PIA and the relationship of its employees was that of master and servant yet the principle of natural justice would apply. Consequently it was affirmed that at least an employee has the right to a fair hearing before being dismissed from service or reverted to a lower grade. These are not the facts in the present matter as no allegation has been made by the appellants that they were never given a fair hearing by PIA. So also in our opinion the case of Abdul Rehman (Supra) is also distinguishable as in such case the issue was whether a retired employee of a statutory Corporation not having statutory rules would be entitled to medical benefits prevalent on his date of retirement. The Learned High Court answered the question in the positive distinguishing Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others (Supra) on the ground that the dispute did not involve the terms and conditions of service of serving employees.
9. For all the foregoing reasons we do not find any occasion to interfere in the impugned judgment and hence these appeals are dismissed.