AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, J. --- Through this writ petition, the petitioner has impugned the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Yazman, whereby the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 was accepted and the judgment and decree dated 26,4.2010 passed by the Judge Family Court, Yazman, dismissing the suit for dower filed by respondent No. 3 was set aside.
2. The facts in brief as leading to this petition are that respondent No. 3-plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of dower 3 acres of land or in the alternate Rs. 9,00,000/- (nine lacs). In the suit maintenance allowance was also claimed but in this writ petition, the decree to the extent of dower only has been challenged.
The defendant appeared and filed written statement. - From the divergent pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed issues and invited the parties to produce their respective evidence. Both the parties adduced their oral as . Well as documentary evidence in support of their versions. Vide judgment and decree dated 26.4.2010 the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. Feeling aggrieved by the said decree, plaintiff preferred an appeal before the first Appellate Court, which was accepted vide judgment and decree dated 26.10.2010 and decree of Trial Court was set aside and decreed the suit. Hence, this writ petition.
3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant that in column No. 13, only Rs.
500/-was fixed as dower which was paid according to column No. 14 of Nikahnama; that in column No. 16 the entry of 3 acres land situated in Chak No. 87/DB valuing Rs. 3,00,000/- per acre has been mentioned, so this entry is contradictory to the entry to column No. 13. Further states that the first Appellate Court fell in error while setting aside the dismissal decree passed by the Judge Family Court and has wrongly accepted the appeal and decreed the suit. Lastly prayed that respondent No. 3 never accompanied the petitioner, therefore, at the most she is entitled to half of Haq-ul- Mehr.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 3-plaintiff states that she remained in the house of petitioner for six months; that if there was any ambiguity in the entry of Nikahnama, the petitioner was required to challenge the same before the Civil Court Further states that it was in the knowledge of Shaukat A.I, who has admitted as D.W-1 that this 3 acres land was in lieu of Nikah written in Nikahnama and he has also admitted his signatures on it. It has been further contended that now the petitioner has contracted third marriage; that no case for interference while exercising Constitutional jurisdiction has been made out by the petitioner.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at full length and also gone through the record with their able assistance.
6. I have observed that the Judge Family Court has refused to grant decree on the ground that it is a deferred dower and also found that the suit is premature. The only question before the first Appellate Court and this Court is that whether the entries of dower in Nikahnama were to be treated as prompt or deferred dower? The first Appellate Court has rightly found in the light of Section 10 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Section 10 is reproduced as under for ready reference:- "Dower. - Where no details about, the mode of payment of the dower are specified in the Nikahnama or the marriage contract, the entire amount of the dower shall be presumed to be payable on demand."
When the mode of payment of dower is not mentioned, it shall be presumed to be payable on demand. Therefore, it is declared prompt dower. The findings recorded by the Judge Family Court with regard to the fixation of dower were not challenged by the petitioner before the first Appellate Court, as only respondent No. 3 has filed the appeal before the first Appellate Court. In this view of the matter, the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the findings with regard to fixation of dower and the entries in column Nos. 13, 14 and 16 of Nikahnama.
7. In the light of what has been discussed above, learned counsel for the petitioner failed to show any defect in the findings and judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate. Court. Therefore, no case for interference while exercising the jurisdiction vested in this Court by Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, has been made out. Resultantly, this writ petition having no substance is dismissed. .