MR. CHIEF JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY.-(1). Listed petitions for leave to appeal have been filed against the judgment dated 27.6.2011 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore In ICAs No. 266, 268, 279, 296, 312, 313, 314, 315 and 316 of 2011 respectively, whereby the Intra Court Appeals filed by the petitioners were dismissed.
2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the case are that on 29th June, 2007 SRO No. 655(I)/07 dated 29th June, 2007 was issued by the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, Statics and Revenue (Revenue Division), Islamabad, in pursuance whereof Special Excise Duty @ 1% was levied. The said notification was issued in exercise of powers conferred under section 3A of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 2005"], incorporated by means of the Finance Act, 2007, which was passed by National Assembly on 22nd June, 2007 and got assent of the President on 30th June, 2007.
3. Learned counsel contended that before insertion of section 3A of the Act, 2005 the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance had no jurisdiction to issue SRO No. 655(I)/2007 dated 29th June, 2009 because till then it had no support of any legislation, as such on the basis of same, the recovery of Special Excise Duty was not permissible.
4. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondent admitted that SRO referred to hereinabove was issued on 29th June, 2007 and amendment in the Act, 2005 was made through the Finance Act, 2007, however, same was made applicable w.e.f, 1st July, 2007.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the relevant provisions of law.
6. It would be beneficial to note that learned High Court in writ petitions filed by the respondents, declined to agree with the contention of the respondents as a result whereof the same were dismissed. Against the said order, ICAs were preferred by the petitioners before a Division Bench of the High Court, which were also dismissed. Relevant Paras therefrom are reproduced herein below:- "4. Under our Constitution, a Money Bill has a unique position under Article 73(1 A) of the Constitution. After being passed by the National Assembly, a Money Bill must be presented to the President for his assent. When so presented, the President must assent the same within 10 days in terms of the duty imposed by Article 75(l)(b) of the Constitution read with Article 75(1 )(a) thereof.
Consequently, a duly passed Money Bill is legislation that can be deemed under Article 75(2) of the Constitution to have been assented by the President. Therefore, on the day a Money Bill is passed, it is a validly made law but one that comes into force not later than ten days from the date of its presentation for the Presidential assent. In terms of proviso to Article 73(1) of the Constitution, a Finance Bill is a Money Bill that contains the Annual Budget statement for that year. For the foregoing reasons the duly passed Finance Bill 2007 is valid legislation which can be analogized with a 'passed' Act for the purposes of Section 22 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Accordingly the challenge made by the appellants has no force.
5. However, even from the point of view of date of enforcement of the impugned notification and with reference to the provision of Article 77 of the Constitution, Special Excise Duty under Section 3A of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 became leviable on 01.07.2007 in terms of the impugned notification.
The Finance Act, 2007 had come into force on that date and therefore, the impugned notification was duly supported by enabling legislation in order to be valid in terms of Article 77 of the Constitution. Accordingly, any cavil to the validity and vires of the impugned levy on and after 01.07.2007 is illusory and without substance."
7. In our opinion the reasons assigned by the High Court are plausible, however, we inquired from the learned counsel for the petitioners as to whether demand has been made in respect of the payment of Additional Excise Duty before passing/enforcement of the Finance Act, 2007, he candidly conceded that it was after 1st July, 2007. We have also drawn attention of the learned counsel towards para-2 of the impugned judgment, wherein this aspect has been highlighted.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that no prejudice or injustice has been caused to the petitioners.
Besides, the High Court having examined the notification at the touchstone of section 22 of General Clauses Act, 1897, has rightly concluded that if such notification has been issued prior to issuance of Finance Act, it shall be deemed to have been issued in terms of the said Act.
8. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, petitions are dismissed and leave to appeal declined.