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PLJ 2012 SC (AJ&K) 149

SAFDAR ALI KHAN vs AZAD GOVERNMENT OF STATE OF JK through Chief

CitationPLJ 2012 SC (AJ&K) 149
CourtSupreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Case No.C.R. Petition No, 23 of 2010
Date2012-02-10
Judge(s)Chaudhary Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, Mohammad Azam Khan
ResultPetition dismissed

ORDER

Muhammad Azam Khan, C.J.--Through the instant review petition the petitioner assails the judgment of this Court delivered on 23rd April, 2011, whereby Civil Appeal No, 11/2009 has been dismissed.

2. Necessary facts for the disposal of instant review petition are that the petitioner filed a suit against the respondents on 25.11.2000 for recovery of an amount of Rs,2,99,85,874/- in the Court of District Judge Muzaffarabad. The respondents submitted their written statements, however, during the proceedings of the suit, the parties agreed for appointment of an Arbitrator. The trial Court vide its order dated 15.10.2002, appointed Ch. Muhammad Zaman, Chief Engineer PWD, as Arbitrator and formulated five points as terms of reference. The Arbitrator submitted his first report on 30.9.2003 in presence of counsel, for the parties. On hearing the parties, the trial Court arrived at the conclusion that the report was incomplete and the Arbitrator has left fifth point of reference unattended. With the agreement of the parties, the trial Court vide its order dated 8.3.2004, again referred the matter to the Arbitrator for submitting complete report on all points formulated in the reference. The Arbitrator submitted his report in presence of counsel for the parties, but none of them filed objections. However on 15.12.2004, objections on behalf of plaintiff-petitioner were filed with the prayer for rejection of Arbitrator's award. The learned District Judge after hearing the counsel for the parties recorded findings that neither the objections were filed within the prescribed period of thirty days nor any legal ground was brought on record for rejection of award. The Court passed judgment and decree in terms of award and dismissed the suit on 29.12.2004. However, the verdict was given that an amount of Rs,38,34,645/- is recoverable from the plaintiff.

3. Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the petitioner filed an appeal in the High Court on 23.2.2005. The learned High Court modified the judgment and decree of the trial Court to the extent of finding regarding overpayment to plaintiff-petitioner Rs,38,34,645/-, however, the rest of the judgment and decree was upheld. The appeal filed by the petitioner herein before this Court was dismissed. Hence this review petition.

4. Mr. Tallin Aziz, the learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that there is an error apparent on the face of record in the judgment under review. Under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, notice is mandatory to the parties. The Court failed to issue notices to the parties. Had the Court issued notices to the parties, the petitioner would have filed objections on the award within the period of limitation. While relying upon Articles 158 and 178 of the Limitation Act, he argued that the period for filing objections shall be calculated from the date of receipt of notice. Since no notice was issued, the objections filed beyond the period of thirty days were valid. He referred to the following authorities:- AIR 1961 Gujarat 51, AIR 1962 Maysoor 135 and PLD 1993 Lahore 11.

The case titled Ramnath Agarwal vs. G. S. lyer, Collector of Customs, Kandla and another [AIR 1961 Gujarat 51] relates to laches in writ jurisdiction against a demand notice issued by the Sea Customs, In particular facts of the case, the Court decided the question of laches.

The case titled Ratnawa vs. Gurushiddappa Gurushantappa Magavi and others [AIR 1962 Maysoor 135] deals with the proposition for notice under Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, which has to be issued by a party and not a notice by the Court under Section 14(2). The authority is not relevant for the purpose.

In Col. (Rtd.) Muhammad Aslam vs. Haji Muhammad Shafi and another [PLD 1993 Lahore 11] while dealing with Section 14 of the Arbitration Act it was observed that starting point of limitation for objector to award would be date of service of notice of filing of award. No notice of filing of award having been served upon the petitioner, objections filed beyond the period of thirty days from his knowledge on the date fixed by the Court would be deemed to be within time.

5. While controverting the arguments, Mr. Abdul 'Waheed Durrani, the learned counsel for the respondents, argued that the arbitration proceedings were conducted and Arbitrator filed award- on 9th October, 2004 in presence of counsel for the parties. The petitioner filed objections beyond the period of thirty days, which cannot be considered. He argued that there is no error apparent on the face of record. The petitioner wants to reopen the whole case as he has filed an appeal against the judgment of this Court which is not permissible in review jurisdiction. He further argued that the petitioner has raised new questions in the review petition which were not taken up in the memo of appeal or concise statement or argued before the Court at the time of hearing of appeal. He requested for dismissal of review petition with costs. He referred to the following authorities:-- 2007 SCR 406, 2003 SCR 423, 2010 SCR 375 and PLD 1981 Karachi 730.

In Rashida Awan vs. District Education Officer and 8 others [2007 SCR 406] it was held by this Court that it is consistent practice of law and this Court that a point which has not been argued, discussed and decided in appeal shall not be open to review. It was further observed that if the review is sought on the ground that a different view is equally possible as against the one adopted by the Court in the light of law and rules, that cannot be considered sufficient ground for review.

In Azad Government vs. Muhammad Suleman and 6 others [2003 SCR 423] it was observed that a point whether resolved rightly or wrongly, review petition on this point cannot be held to be maintainable.

The case titled Mst. Nasreen Gulab vs. Mst. Tasleem Akhtar and 4 others [2010 SCR 375] lays down that the Court may review its judgment or order in civil proceedings on the grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of C.P.C., which postulates that if there is an error apparent on the face of record or there is a clerical or arithmetical mistake in the order or judgment, the Court may review the same. Re-appraisal of facts and different conclusion cannot be a ground for review.

The case titled M/s. Shaft Corporation Ltd. Karachi vs. Government of Pakistan through Director General of Defence Purchase [PLD 1981 Karachi 730] lays down the law that if an award is filed in absence of parties in the Court, then notice is mandatory so that they may file objections within time. A notice contemplated under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act may even be oral or constructive and starting point of limitation against a party for filing objections to award shall be the date on which the party acquired knowledge of filing of the award.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The record reveals that the Arbitrator filed award on 9th October, 2004 in presence of counsel for the parties. None of the parties filed objections on the award within the stipulated period. Later on, on 15th December, 2004, the petitioner herein filed objections and prayed for setting aside the award. The Court rejected the objections for having been filed beyond the period of limitation and passed decree in terms of award. On appeal, the High Court modified the judgment and decree of the trial Court to the extent of finding regarding over payment to plaintiff-petitioner to the tune of Rs,38,34,645/-.

7. The interim order dated 9th August, 2004 reveals that the Arbitrator submitted his report on 9th October, 2004 in presence of counsel for the parties. None of the parties filed objections within the stipulated period of 30 days as provided under Article 158 of the Limitation Act. Under the said provision of law the limitation for filing objections for setting aside an award is thirty days from the date of service of notice of filing of award. We agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that notice under Section 14(2) is mandatory, but the form of notice whether it shall have to be in writing or it may be oral is a question to be considered. There may be different eventualities. If an award is filed in a' Court by Arbitrator in absence of parties, then it is mandatory that a written notice under Section 14(2) be issued to the parties, but if the award is submitted in the Court in presence of the parties, then no written notice is required. In a case titled M/s. Shafi Corporation Ltd. Karachi vs. Government of Pakistan through Director General of Defence Purchase [PLD 1981 Karachi 730] Mr. Justice Saeeduz-Zaman Siddiqui, J., as he then was, while dealing with the question of notice under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act observed as under:-- "After considering all the cases noted above I have reached the conclusion that all the. Courts are unanimous on the point that the provision with regard to service of notice in Section 14(2) of the Act, is mandatory and notice has to be given to the parties of the filing of the award in Court. I am further of the view that Section 14(2) of the Act, contemplates a situation where the award is filed by the arbitrator or the umpire in the Court in the absence of parties and therefore notice is necessary to the parties to inform them of the filing of the award in Court so that they may file objection to the award, if any. There however appears to be difference of opinion between the various High Courts in India on the point whether the notice contemplated under Section 14(2) of the Act should be a formal notice in writing and served in the prescribed manner or it could be an oral informal and constructive notice. In order to appreciate the true import requirement of notice under Section 14(2) of the Act, I will reproduce here Section 14 itself:--

14. Award to be signed and filed.--(1) When the arbitrators or umpires have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award.

(2)The arbitrators or umpires shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.

(3)Where the arbitrators, or umpires state a special case under clause (b) of Section 13, the Court, after giving notice to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce its opinion thereon and such opinion shall be added to, and shall form part of the award.' '

A reading of the above provision in the Act will show that whereas the notice required to be given under Section 14(1) of the Act by the arbitrator or the umpire to a party of the making and signing of the award and the fee and charges payable in respect thereto has to be a written notice; there is no such requirement in sub-clause (2) of Section 14 of the Act for the notice .to be issued to a party by the Court after filing of the award in Court. There appears to be a deliberate omission by the Legislature of the expression "in writing" from sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. There is, therefore, no warrant on the plain language of the section to interpret the expression "give notice to the parties" to mean only a formal written notice served upon a party in the prescribed manner and exclude a constructive, oral or an informal notice. In its ordinary dictionary meaning the expression "give notice" will also mean an oral and informal notice by the Court which could be constructive as well It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that words in a statute are primarily to be given their ordinary dictionary meaning. I have not been able to discover anything either in the scheme or in the language of the Act to justify a departure from this basic rule of interpretation while interpreting Section 14(2) of the Act. I am therefore in no doubt that the notice contemplated under Section 14(2) of the Act can be an oral notice to a party and compliance of this provision of law will be satisfied if the party or a counsel appearing for him duly authorized in this behalf, is informed by the Court either in writing or orally about the filing of the award in Court and such a notice could also be constructive notice. Whether or not a party had such a notice will undoubtedly be a question of fact to be decided in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case.

A further question will also arise in such circumstances that from what date the limitation shall start running against a party who it is alleged have the notice of filing of award in Court in a constructive or informal manner. Article 158 of the Limitation Act provides that the period of 30 days shall commence against a party from the date of "service of notice". As I have already reached the conclusion that the notice under Section 14(2) of the Act could be an oral and informal notice as well the starting point of limitation against a party in such a case will be the date on which the information of filing of the award is received by him."

The Arbitrator filed report in the Court in presence of counsel for the parties. It is now well settled law that knowledge of counsel is knowledge of party. Written notice was not requirement of law when the report was submitted in presence of counsel for the parties.

8. The petitioner wants a different interpretation of Section 14(2) from the one made by the Court at the time of appeal. This Court can review its judgment under Order XLVI of Supreme Court Rules on the grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII of the C.P.C., which postulates that the review is permissible on the ground of error apparent on the face of record, on discovery of some new evidence or fact, but the review is not permissible if a party argues that a different interpretation of law is possible.

9. The petitioner failed to point out any error apparent on the face of record in the judgment under review. No case for review is made out. The review petition is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.

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