DECISION ' The services of the appellant, who was employed as a Clerk in the respondent-Bank, were terminated on 16-7-1971. The appellant preferred an ' appeal to the General Manager of the respondent-Bank but his appeal was rejected. He, accordingly, preferred a grievance application under section 25-A, I. R. O., before the appropriate Junior Labour Court, which ordered his re-instatement in service. Against the said decision the respondent-Bank preferred- an appeal before the Labour Court which allowed the same on 13-7- 1974 on the ground that the requisite grievance notice was not served by the appellant on the respondent Bank. The appellant, thereafter, approached the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. The High Court has held that service of grievance notice under section 25-A, I. R.
0. Is mandatory and lack of service of such notice upon the employer vitiate the proceedings.
However, another point was raised by the appellant before the High Court, namely, whether the appeal of the respondent-Bank before the Labour Court was barred by limitation. The High Court took the view that this was a mixed question of law and fact and could only be properly decided on the basis of evidence but since no evidence on the issue had been led it remanded the case to the Labour Court with the direction to consider the issue of limitation after giving opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the issue. On remand, the Labour Court, by its decision, dated 10-1- 1980, has held that the respondent-Bank's appeal was filed within time and it has accordingly re- affirmed the decision of its predecessor and rejected the appellant's grievance petition. Against this decision the appellant has come up in what is purported to be an appeal under section 36-D, I.
R.
0.
2. I have heard Mr. A. Majeed for the appellant and Mr. M. A. Shaikh for the respondent-Bank. Their arguments were mainly concerned with the question whether the respondent-Bank's appeal before the learned Labour Court was within the period of limitation prescribed in section 36-D, I. R.
0. An all important question, however, that falls to be considered is whether this Tribunal had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal against the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court. As already pointed out, that decision has been given by the learned Labour Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. There was no provision in the I. R. O., at the time section 36-D was on the statute book or at any time subsequently, for a second appeal against the appellate jurisdiction of the Labour Courts. The appellate jurisdiction of this Tribunal is restricted to decisions given under section 25-A or section 34 or a sentence passed under clause (e) of subsection (5) of section 35.
At the best, this Tribunal can exercise via motu powers of revision under subsection (3-a) of section 38 against non-appealable orders or decisions of the Labour Courts but the exercise of such powers are under different conditions from the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. A similar issue was examined by this Tribunal in the case of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v.
Muhammad Zaffarullah Sheikh, decided on 2-12-1979, and it was held that no appeal lies to this Tribunal against the appellate decisions of the Labour Courts given under section 36-D.
3. It may also be pertinent to consider whether the learned Labour Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal on remand by the High Court in view of the fact that section 36-D had been repealed by the Labour Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. The said Act contains the following saving clause in section 4 thereof :- "4. Saving.--Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to require the transfer to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of any appeal from a decision of a Junior Labour Court pending before a Labour Court immediately before the commencement of this Act and every such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by the Labour Court as if this Act had not come into force."
' Although in terms the said saving clause applies to appeals pending on the date when the aforesaid Act came into force, I take the view that on remand the position reverted to that prevailing before the decision by the first Labour Court. In other words, by the order of remand the appeal became a pending appeal as on the day when the aforesaid Act came into force. As such, I am of the view that the learned VIth Labour Court had jurisdiction, both under law as well as by the direction of the High Court to hear and decide the appeal.