' SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J.--- This appeal is directed against the order dated 17-5-2011 (reasons recorded on 9-6-2011) passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Whereby the applications bearing C.M..As. Nos.110, 138 and 139 of 2011 moved by judgment-debtors in Execution No.53 of 2004 were rejected on the ground that the objections raised were not tenable.
2. In a nutshell, relevant facts of the case are that the respondents Nos.1 and 2 are the owners of Commercial Plots Nos.LS-2, LS-3, LS-4, LS-8, LS-9, LS-11 and LS-12 total measuring 405.2 sq. Yards situated at Block No.5, Clifton, Karachi near British High Commission. The respondents Nos.1 and 2 after approval of NOC and Building Plan started construction but the Karachi Building Control Authority respondent No.4 in collusion with official respondents demolished the construction and took away the material without any valid order or lawful authority. The respondents Nos.1. And 2 filed Suit Nos.523 and 524 of 1999 in this Court for declaration, mandatory injunction, compensation and damages, against the British High Commission and other official respondents. As per averments of the plaint the British High Commissioner had opposed the construction on the ground of disturbance of privacy and security and the high officials without any legal authority stopped the construction.
3. The, learned Single Judge after examining the averments made in the plaint and after hearing at length, decreed the saits and allowed the plaintiff to raise construction strictly based on the approved building plan and according to the KBCA Rules. Any violation of the plan or rules by the plaintiff, regulatory authority was given rights to take action as provided under the law. After passing of the decree, the respondents Nos.1 and 2 were not allowed to raise construction as per approved building plan. The respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed Execution Nos.53 and 54 of 2004, which were allowed vide order dated 3-5-2006 with the following observations:- ' ... It appears that there is no opposition on the part of the public authority and the Regulatory Authorities including KBCA. Therefore, the execution is allowed. The decree-holder may raise construction but however, strictly in accordance with the judgment and decree...."
4. Thereafter the respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed contempt of Court application. On 11-3-2009 this Court observed that either the government may acquire the plot in question at market value or provide alternate plot in the vicinity and later on the appellant was directed to pay Rs,8,10,40,000/- to the respondents Nos.1 and 2 within 30 days vide order dated 8-10-2009. The said order was assailed in HCA No.285 of 2009, which was failed by order dated 4-2-2010. Thereafter, proceedings under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were initiated and the property was acquired on the basis of an award passed by Land Acquisition Officer,on 30-3-2010 whereby compensation for the acquisition was allowed to be paid to the decree-holder. According to the award, the decree-holder was entitled to the compensation in.The following manner:---
1. Commercial land compensation of 405.2 Sq. yards comes in front of British High Commission at Rs,2,00,000/- per Square yardsRs,8,10,40,000/-
2. 15% Urgency Clause Charges Rs,1,21,56.000/- 3 6% Interest per annum . Over land Compensation only.Rs, 48,62,400/- Total amount of Rs,9,80,58,400/- ' On 12-4-2010 the appellants handed over Cheque No.0561824 dated 7-4-2011 for Rs,81 million to the respondent No. 1./decree-holder in Court and the Court dismissed the execution application along with listed application. The relevant portion of the order is reproduced "The above order is passed subject to clearance in cheques Government in favour of decree- holder. However, it is open for the decree-holder if there is any shortfall towards his claim, he may make application in this execution application."
6. Subsequently, respondents moved Application bearing C.M.A. No.962 of 2010 claiming therein to pay the balance amount of Rs,1,70,58,400/- with .Mark-up as awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer by award dated 30-3-2010. The said application was allowed on 30-2-2011. Thereafter the appellants moved three applications .For modification of the award, condonation of delay and recalling of order dated 30-2-2011, which were dismissed by short order dated 17-5-2011 by the learned Executing Court with direction to the appellants/ judgment-debtors to pay the remaining amount of the award to the decree-holder/respondents within ten days from the date of the order.
Detail reasons were recorded on 9-6-2011.
7. We have heard Mr. Sarwar Khan, learned Additional Advocate-General, Sindh along with Mr. Saifullah, A.A.-G. And Messrs Abrar Hassan and Syed Masroor Alvi, Advocates for the respondents Nos.1 and 2, Mr. Taha Ali Zai, learned counsel for the respondent No.3, Mr. Shahzad Qureshi, learned counsel for the respondent No.4 and perused the material available on record.
8. Mr. Sarwar Khan, learned Additional Advocate-General, Sindh has contended that the decree- holder had received a cheque of Rs,81 million on 12-4-2010 in Court in presence of his counsel, which was paid in total satisfaction of decretal amount and nothing is due against the appellants.
He urged that the decree-holder malafidely after receiving the aforesaid amount, filed C.M.A.
No.962 of 2010 relying upon the letter of award and letter of EDO (Revenue); Karachi addressed to the Secretary, Board of Revenue Sindh, which was nothing but a manipulation because after payment of entire decreetal amount by the Provincial Government and completing of Land Acquisition formalities, the EDO (Revenue) had no authority or jurisdiction to issue such unwarranted and uncalled for letter specially when the Execution Application had already been disposed of in presence of counsel for the parties. He also contended that the letter attached by the decree-holder with his miscellaneous application regarding payment of remaining amount was never endorsed to the decree-holder, which clearly shows that such application was submitted in connivance with the EDO (Revenue) with intention to cheat the provincial exchequer.
He urged that appellant at no stage has conceded the claim of the respondents, but the respondents in order to pressurize the officers of the appellant used to file contempt of Court applications time and again and the government officers with a view to save themselves from contempt of Court proceedings have made different statements regarding payment of amount claimed by the respondent without knowing factual and legal position, which statements are not binding upon the appellant. He also urged that it is a case of acquisition proceedings initiated on the orders of Executing Court and that is why Executing Court was authorized to decide issue of validity or correction of award. He further urged that the Executing. Court is Civil Court and contempt could not be initiated by Civil Court but ought to be referred to High Court as award was violative of law, as such the application of Land Acquisition Officer for correction/ modification was maintainable.
9. Learned A.A.-G. Also filed a statement along with. Copy of Ordinance bearing No.XV through which the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 2007 was promulgated thereby omitted section 28-A as if it had never been enacted. He, therefore, urged that the award is bad for payment of interest under section 28 when the compensation paid to the decree-holder. As regards the point of limitation is concerned, the learned A.A.-G. Submitted that question of limitation would not apply to the orders passed under inherent jurisdiction of the Court. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the case of MUHAMMAD SADIQ AND OTHERS v. ALI ASGHAR KHAN and OTHERS (1995 CLC 1529). He submitted that the conclusion recorded by the learned Executing Court ordering rejection of applications filed by the appellant is based on entirely wrong premises, therefore it is liable to be set aside.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Abrar Hassan learned counsel for the respondents Nos.1 and 2 has strongly supported the impugned order. At the very outset he submitted that the appeal is hopelessly time-barred as the appeal instituted by the appellants was governed by Article 156 of the Limitation Act which provides 20 days period of limitation for filing of such appeal, which is to be computed from the date of the order/judgment. For this purpose, he drew our attention to the short order dated 17-5-2011 and submitted that even if the time is computed from the date of reasons recorded by the learned Executing Court i,e, 9-6-2011 the appeal is hopelessly time-barred as the appellants moved application for obtaining certified copy on 30-6-2011. He, therefore, submitted that the appeal is IIable to be dismissed on this score alone.
11. As regards the main objection raised by the appellant that 15% charges were granted by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, which stand omitted therefore the learned Single Judge illegally allowed the 15% charges, as such the impugned order is void, he submitted that the appellant's counsel tried to misguide this Court that 15% charges were allowed by Land Acquisition Officer under section 28-A is totally incorrect as the said 15% charges were allowed under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, which is evident from the award. He submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer has rightly awarded 15% charges under section 23(2) and 6% interest per annum under section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. He further drew our attention to the orders passed by this Court on 20-1-2011, 23-3-2011 and 2-6-2011 and submitted that the learned A.A.-G. And other Senior Officers of the appellant time and again appeared before this Court and gave undertaking that they will pay the amount claimed by the respondents i,e, Rs,1,70,58,400/-, but the appellant instead of compliance of the orders and undertaking given before this Court has filed this appeal for setting aside the order impugned in this appeal. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the cases of GOVERNMENT OF SINDH AND 2 OTHERS V. SYED SHAKIR ALI JAFRI AND 6 OTHERS (1996 SCM R 1361), PETROSIN CORPORATION PVT. LTD. v. OGDC PLD 2011 SC 235), ABDUL RASHID v. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, POST OFFICES, ISLAMABD AND OTHERS (2009 SCM R 1435) and FARZANA RASOOL AND 3 OTHERS v. DR. MUHAMMAD BASHIR AND OTHERS (2011 SCM R 1361).
12. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and perused the case record, which shows that in the plaint, the respondents have unfolded all the relevant details of their claim against the appellant and have also placed on record relevant correspondence forming basis of their claim against them. The submissions made on behalf of the appellant, as noted above, have no force inasmuch as the Land Acquisition Officer has passed the award under section 23(2) and no under section 28-A, which stand omitted through Sindh Amendment Ordinance XV of 2007. Therefore, the omission of section 28-A has no relevance to the present case. However, the law always favours the masses and its effect is prospective and not retrospective. For ready reference, subsection (2) of section 23 reads:--- "(2) In addition to the market value of the land as above provided the Court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition."
13. As regards the objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appeal is hopelessly time-barred is concerned, it may be observed that section 156 of the Limitation Act clearly provides 20 days time for filing appeal against interlocutory orders passed by learned Single Judge. It appears from the record that short order was passed on 17-5-2011 and its reasons were recorded on 9-6-2011 and the appellants applied for obtaining certified copy of the order on 30-6-2011 and filed this appeal on 1-7-2011. It is the settled proposition of law that law favours the diligent litigant and not the negligent. Further, it is the duty and obligation of the aggrieved person to pursue his legal remedy with diligence and satisfy conscious of the Court or quasi-judicial authority for approaching respective forums beyond prescribed limitation coupled with the fact that in case the aggrieved person has not availed remedy within the prescribed period then the vested right had accrued to the other side which cannot be taken away lightly even if objections to that effect were not raised by the opposite party. Not only this, it is also settled proposition of law that it is the duty and obligation of the aggrieved person seeking condonation of delay must have to justify each day's delay. Appellant in his application for condonation of delay did not raise any plausible reasons/ground for condonation of delay. Which is condonation precedent for condoning the delay as law laid down by :his Court as well as apex Court in number of cases. It has been the consistent view of the apex Court that the short order even not elucidating the reasons when has been signed and it finally disposes of the matter and thus the Court does not retain any control over the lis, for all intents and purposes is the final judgment/order of the Court; the party aggrieved of such order/judgment intending to assail the same in appeal or review must avail its remedy within the prescribed period of limitation from the date of short order etc., rather than waiting for the detailed reasons and allowing the limitation to pass by however, in such a situation a right can be reserved to add to the ground of attack as and when the reasoned judgment is made available.
14. The learned Single Judge in his impugned order has carefully examined and discussed all these aspects step-by-step and making reference to the provisions of Civil Procedure Code and Land Acquisition Act, has recorded his conclusion that ample power and jurisdiction confer on the acquiring authority to make an award of 15%. And also to award 6% interest to the person whose land is being acquired. We are also of the view that if the appellants have any grievance against- the award and wish to assail the same, the remedy lies under the Land Acquisition Act itself by filing reference before the competent forum. Additionally, while disposing of " the Execution , Application the Court in unequivocal terms recorded that it is open for ' the decree-holder if there is any shortfall towards his claim, he may make applicant in this execution application. The record shows that award was given by the Land Acquisition Officer on 30-3-2010 and Execution was disposed of on 12-4-2010. It is apparent from the record that passing of award was not in the knowledge of the decree-holder as neither notice of award nor its copy was endorsed to the decree-holder and if the same was in the knowledge of decree-holder the situation might be different, as at the time of disposal of execution the fact of passing of award was not brought to the notice of the Court, may be intentionally or lack of awareness.
15. Before parting with this judgment, it is regret to note that the learned Additional Advocate- General, Sindh made statement that the government officers with a view to save themselves from contempt of ' Court proceedings, have made different statements/undertaking regarding payment of amount claimed by the respondent without knowing factual and legal position, which statements are not binding upon the appellant. It may be observed that any statement/undertaking given by party in the Court of law has to be given sanctity, because on the one hand there is a legal estoppel, and on the other moral and ethical against it. Retraction from such undertaking cannot be allowed, because the same would result in distrust of the public litigants in the judiciary and would tarnish the sacred image of the Judicial Officers before whom once a consent is given by making a statement/undertaking and later on withdrawn, therefore, it would become a mockery of law and facts. If such practice, is allowed to prevail and is ignored by the Courts, it cannot add to the trust of public litigants in the judiciary and judicial system, but would reflect on lack of trust in the judiciary, which cannot be permitted, because sanctity to the judicial proceedings has to be preserved at any cost. In the case in .Hand, the undertaking given by high profile government officers before the Court and not by a. Lower formation officials or private litigants and now they retract from their undertaking, what we can expect from general litigant. We refrain to comment further upon it, but direct the government officials to be more careful in future while making statement and/or giving undertaking before the Court so that the like situation may not occur.
16. In view of what has been discussed above, we do not find any substance in this appeal and the same is dismissed along with listed applications.