' The facts leading to the institution of this revision petition are that on 5-11-1978, the respondents, in execution of a decree dated 25-10-1978 passed in their favour in a pre-emption suit, obtained the possession of the land in dispute. This decree has been challenged by them, through R. F. A. No, 273 of 1978.
2. The decree was passed by Syed Riaz Hussain Shah, Civil Judge 1st Class, Multan, while on tour at Kabirwala. At the relevant time, this Presiding Officer was posted at Multan but under the orders of the High Court he visited Kabirwala for one week every month, to dispose of the first class cases there. The execution application was, however, filed before him on 5.11-1978 when he was holding the Court at Multan and the warrants for possession were issued on the same date and executed through the agency of the revenue department, on the following day.
' The learned Civil Judge's order dated 5-11-1978, has been called in question by the petitioners through this revision.
3. The contention put forth on behalf of the petitioners is that under section 38, C. P. C., a decree can be executed by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The submission is that the learned Civil Judge while discharging his judicial function at Multan, did not act as the same Court which passed the decree at Kabirwala and, therefore, he was not competent to entertain the execution application and execute the decree unless it was assigned to him by the learned District Judge, Multan. According to the learned counsel, the term Court is not synonymous with the Presiding Officer thereof. In his submission, the learned Civil Judge, in ordering the execution of the decree, acted without jurisdiction. It was also pointed out by him that the execution application was filed at 3-00 p.m. And within a couple of minutes, in an unusual haste, the entire formalities were completed and the warrants for possession issued in favour of the respondents.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. The learned Civil Judge undoubtedly was posted at Multan and under the orders of the High Court he toured Kabirwala and held the Court at that place. Under section 10 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Civil Judge is such as may be defined by the High Court and in the absence of direction to the contrary, the District to which he is posted, shall be deemed to be the local limits of his jurisdiction. Section 13 empowers the High Court to fix the place at which the Court is to be held. Under section 14 the civil Courts in the Province are subject to the general superintendence and control of the High Court. As borne out from section 15, power to distribute the civil business vests in the District Judge. As the High Court had not issued any notification curtailing the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge, it shall have to be presumed that his jurisdiction extended aver the entire District. Any direction issued by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, authorising the learned Civil Judge to hold Court at Kabirwala, could not override the provisions of section 10(2) which conferred jurisdiction on the learned Civil Judge over the entire District including Kabirwala.
5. The expression "Court" has not been defined either in the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance or the Civil Procedure Code. Disctionary meaning of the word "Court", is the place where justice is administered (Osborn's Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition). But usually, the term Judge is identified with the "Court" and the two expressions are used interchangeable. At page 98 in section 3 of the American Jurisprudence Volume 49 (2nd Edition) it has been laid down :- "Judge as distinguished from Court.-The distinction between the term "Judge" and the term 'Court' is often made and is well recognised. The words are, however, often used interchangeably, and are frequently used in statutes as synonymous and convertible terms, the word 'Judge' often being used when reference is manifestly to a Court, and vice versa. In such cases, the word 'Court' has been construed to mean 'Judge' when necessary to carry into effect the legislative intent. Another example of interchangeable use of the words is that the Judge of a Court while presiding over it is, out of courtesy, called 'the Court'. "
' A Court cannot exist without a Judge, and the Judge is thus an indispensable part of the Court, but he is only a part of it."
6. There is no gain-saying, that the terms "Court" and "Judge" should be construed in the context of the statutes in which these are used. The scheme of the Civil Courts Ordinance and the heading of section 14 amply demonstrate that the term "Court" as employed therein, is identifiable with its Presiding Officer. Thus the learned Civil Judge while holding the Court at Multan did not cease to be the Court which passed the decree and, therefore, was competent to execute the decree. It may be observed that the learned counsel for the parties cited some case-law at the bar but since I do not consider it on the point, therefore, I have not burdened this judgment with discussion thereof.
7. As regards the execution of the decree hastily, while I do appreciate the merit of speedy justice but at the same time I feel that the tendency to precipitate cannot earn the confidence of the litigants, which is the foundation of a successful judicial system. Since I have held that the learned Executing Court had jurisdiction, any error in exercise of such jurisdiction, will not furnish a valid ground for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
8. As a result of this discussion, the revision petition is found without merit and is hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs.