Muhammad Khalid Mehmood Khan, J.--Through this single judgment, we propose to decide Intra Court Appeals No. 158/2000, 354/2000 & Constitutional Petitions No. 5896/2000, 5897/2000, 9050/2000, 3793/08, 1602/10, 13413/10, 1924/10, 9252/10, 324/2011 and 1054/2011 as same question of law and fact is involved in both appeals and Petitions. In the judgment, the respondents of (appeals) and petitioners of (Writ Petitions) will be jointly referred to as respondents.
2. The respondents were allotted un-commanded (Banjar Qadeem) waste land, under Livestock Breeding Scheme 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'SCHEME), detailed in writ petitions, the lease in the first instance was for a period of 20 years ending on Kharif 1980. The respondents before expiry of lease, applied to appellant for its renewal. The lease was extended for further 10 years upto 1990.
Government of Punjab announced Policy No. 319-90/2019-CLV on 27.4.1990 (hereinafter referred to as POLICY'), for regulating the leases, under Live Stock Breeding Scheme, 1960.
The respondents assert that they have developed Banjar land by investing man power, and finances, and have, thus acquired a vested right for grant of proprietary rights of leased land. It is further asserted that in 1981, the appellant resumed land illegally, malafidely, and respondents were constrained to file a civil suit, challenging the order of resumption dated 6.8.1981. The suit was decreed on 21.4.1985. The appeal there against was dismissed on 9.6.1985, the revision also failed and as such their right quo the leased land become absolute. It is also asserted that appellant under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 launched different schemes in the province of Punjab, granted proprietary rights to the lessees of these schemes except Live stocks breeding scheme 1960. As the respondents are in continuous possession of suit land and as such they are legitimately expecting for the grant of proprietary rights of leased land, like the lessees of other schemes. The respondents thus have prayed as under; "In view of above it is prayed that the adequate writ may graciously be issued to Respondent No. 1 or 2 directing it to confer proprietary rights in respect of disputed land to the petitioner. Any other order/direction which in the estimate of the case will meet the ends of justice may further be passed/issued."
3. The appellant resisted the petition, however, learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 29.3.2000 allowed writ petition in the following terms:-- "Mr. Anwar Aziz petitioner is entitled to transfer of disputed land in his name subject to payment of its price at the rate of Rs.500/- per produce index unit. The price of proprietary rights shall be recovered in 5 years by 10 half yearly installments with interest per annum and annual interest as provided with respect to conferment of proprietary rights under ejected scheme. The first installment shall become due on 1.7.2000. The petitioner shall be at liberty to pay the whole or balance price in lump sum regarding the property in dispute. After payment of sale price the proprietary deed shall be issued in favour of writ petitioner within 2 months by the respondents and necessary entry shall be made in the revenue record by the Revenue Officer. "
4. The appellant has assailed the two judgments dated 27.1.2000 and 29.3.2000 of learned Single Judge through present appeals.
5. Mr. Muhammad Iftikhar-ur-Rashid, learned Assistant Advocate General (Punjab) submits that Livestock Breeding Scheme of 1960 does not find mention any provision for conferment of proprietary rights to its lessees. Learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate this aspect of the case and wrongly equated the respondents claim with the other state schemes. He submits that appellant never made any promise express or implied with respondents for grant of proprietary rights to them at any stage hence no question of any alleged legitimate expectancy arose. He submits that writ petition was itself not maintainable as no guaranteed rights of respondents were at stake. The respondents case could not be equated with the other schemes announced from time to time by the appellant for specific purpose. He submits that no proposal was ever approved for conferment of proprietary rights to respondents. No doubt the Commissioner Sargodha Division recommended respondents case for conferment of proprietary rights but these recommendations were never matured in to a final order, further the said recommendations were against the policy regulating the lease under Live Stocks Breeding Scheme, 1960. He submits that learned Single Judge has not considered the fact that impugned judgment will force the appellant/Government to sell its property on the price of respondents and it will be great financial loss to Government Exchequer. He adds that mere recommendation, that, too, by an unauthorized Official could not be termed as a binding and enforceable order.
6. Learned counsels for respondents submit that it has been the continuous domain of appellant to grant proprietary rights to the .allottees of state schemes as the land allotted under the schemes was a waste `Banjar Qadeem' and lessee after investing huge amount and labour brought the land for useful purpose, the continuous, possession as well as, the development by the respondents made to believe them, that ultimately proprietary rights of land will be granted to them. He further submits that appellant had granted proprietary rights to the allottees of Bar Reclamation Scheme, Co-operative Farming Scheme, Ejected Tenant Scheme, Grow More Scheme, Mule Breed Scheme, Temporary Cultivation Scheme, Sheep Breeding Scheme, Well Sinking/Tube well Scheme, Sinking Grant Scheme, Grant of State West land by TDA, Well Sinking Scheme and State West land of temporary cultivation by Tube well Scheme and the same policy should have been applicable to respondent case. The respondents being legitimate expectants have filed an application on 28.12.1994 to Board of Revenue through Deputy Commissioner Sargodha Division for grant of proprietary rights. The Commissioner Sargodha Division recommended their application, and as such, their right for conferment of proprietary rights become absolute, the subsequent denial of appellant is the violation of Article 25 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The respondents could not be discriminated, as all citizens of Pakistan, are equal before law. The appellants are frequently changing their stance, in their report and parawise comments, they have admitted, that respondents case, for grant of proprietary rights, is pending with the competent authority, but now they are denying the respondents valuable rights illegally.
Learned Counsel submits that Appeal No. 354/2010, is barred by time by 26 days and the averments of application u/S. 5 of the Limitation Act are not plausible and as such appeal is liable to be thrown out on this score alone. Learned counsels add that appeals are not maintainable under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. They have riled on Robertson v. Defra (2005 EWCA Civ 138), Govt. of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon (PLD 1993 SC 341), Miss. Shazia Batool v.
Govt. of Pakistan (2007 SCMR 410), Persson Manufacturing Ltd. v. Petroleum & Natural Resources (1995 MLD 15) Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2010 SC 265), Dr. Tariq Nawaz v. Gout. of Punjab (2000 SCMR 1956), (PLD 2003 Pesh. 14), Fida Hussain v. State (PLD 2002 SC 46), Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Jalil Khan (PLD 1970 Dacca 718), Rab Nawaz Qureshi v. Govt. of West Pakistan (PLJ 1973 Lah. 286), Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sial v. Government of Pakistan (PLJ 1973 Lah. 290), Ghulam Muhammad v. The Collector Montgomery (PLD 1973 Lah 528), Karim Dad v.
Arif Ali (PLD 1987 Lah. 679), Muhammad Ayub v. Muhammad Yaqub (PLD 1975 Lah. 445), Mst. Karim Bibi and others V. Hussain Bakash and others (PLD 1984 SC 344), Hafiz Muhammad Khan v. Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue Punjab Lahore (1984 Law Notes (SC) 1122), District Council Faisalabad v. Ch. Muhammad Yaseen (2006 YLR 440).
7. Heard, record perused.
From the pleadings of parties the questions require for resolution are that:
(i) Whether the respondents are entitled for grant of proprietary rights under the Live stocks breeding Scheme 1960, like other state schemes launched by the Government of Punjab from time to time ?
(ii)Whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation is applicable in the respondents case ?
(iii)Whether the respondents were discriminated with reference to the other state schemes?
(iv)Whether Appeal No. 354/2000 is barred by time.
(v)Whether the appeals are not maintainable ?
8. It is an admitted fact, that appellant while submitting report and parawise comments admitted, that Commissioner Sargodha Division recommended the respondents case for grant of proprietary rights, their case remained in process with the Board of Revenue Punjab. Learned single judge has heavily relied on the said recommendations while delivering the impugned judgments.
9. It is not denied by the appellant that respondents have developed the land from their own resources and till today they are in its possession. It is also an admitted fact that appellant has granted proprietary rights to the lessees/tenants of other state schemes, likewise it is also an admitted fact, that no provision is available in Livestock breeding scheme 1960 for conferment of proprietary rights, to its lessees at any stage.
10.The Commissioner Sargodha Division has recommended to Board of Revenue for conferment of proprietary rights to respondents and the matter remained pending With the Board of Revenue unapproved and finally the Commissioner recommendations were declined.
11.In the above admitted facts, It has to be seen whether mere recommendation of Commissioner, create any right in favour of respondents or not ?
It is an admitted fact that initial lease in favour of respondents was for 20 years, on expiry of 20 years the appellant resumed the land on 6.8.1981. The respondents challenged the resumption action through civil suit. The suit was decreed. Appeal against decree was dismissed and resumption action was finally set aside, the decree shows, that respondents have challenged, the resumption action only, and no decree for grant of proprietary rights was prayed, thus the effect of said decree will remain effective to the extent of resumption action.
The appellant after decree extended lease for further period of 10 years in favour of respondents.
On 24.7.1990, the Govt. of Punjab promulgated a policy for extension of leases under the Live Stocks Breeding Scheme, 1960 for the whole of Punjab as under; "No. 319-90/2019-CLV. Lahore, dated 24th July, 1990 GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, COLONIES DEPARTMENT From.
The Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Colonies Department.
The Deputy Commissioner, Jhang, Sargodha, Faisalabad, Okara, Sahiwal, Khanewal, Vehari and Bahawalpur.
Subject:--Grant of extension for 20 years after the expiry of 20 years lease period under the Livestock Breeding Scheme, 1960.
Memorandum.
Continuation Colonies Department Memorandum No. 282- 82/607-CLV, dated the 9th February, 1982 on the above subject.
2. The Government of the Punjab is please to decide that extension in lease period may be granted from Kharif/Rabi 1980 for 10 years as per Condition No. 8 of the above scheme.
3. It has also been decided as a special case to allow the lessees who are still in possession of the land on `Sapurdari' as allowed in this Department circular memorandum cited above as fresh lease for 10 years from Kharif, 1990 on the following conditions:-
(i) The above persons shall clear previous arrears of rent at Rs.5/- per acre per annum and undertake to pay from Kharif, 1990 onwards at Rs.100/- per acre per annum. The arrears can be paid if so requested by the above persons in installments to be fixed by the Board subject to payment of interest on balance payable etc.
(ii) The fresh tenancy shall expire in Rabi, 2000 i.e. on 30.6.2000 and it shall be surrendered to Government without any hesitation. It is a one term lease and carries no commitment for further extension or grant of proprietary rights. (underline is mine)
(iii)Other conditions for this lease are being adopted from the Notification No. Co1.7/1-1/58 dated 3.5.1960.
You are requested to proceed further and obtain agreement of the above persons failing which the existing lease expiring in Rabi, 1990, the land should be resumed immediately. Sd/- UNDER SECRETARY, for Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Colonies Department. "
The respondents accepted the terms and conditions of the Policy dated 27.4.1990, consequently lease was renewed for further 10 years.
12. The Policy dated 24.7.1990 clearly shows that extension of lease was with a specific condition, that on expiry of agreed period of 10 years ending on 30.6.2000, the lease holder will surrender the possession of land and said extension did not carry any commitment for further extension or grant of proprietary rights. There is no denial of fact that Policy dated 24.7.1990 for Live Stock Breeding Scheme, 1960 was promulgated for whole of Punjab. In terms of policy it has to be seen whether the respondents case is covered under the doctrine of LEGITIMATE EXPECTANCE or not ? and the policy is violative of law.
13.The Doctrine of legitimate expectancy was considered by the House of Lord Council of Civil Services Unions & Ors v. Minister for the Civil Service (1948) All ER 953), Lord Diplock Opined as under; "For a legitimate expectation to arise, the discretion of the administrative authority must Lffect such power either (a) by altering right or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private Law or (b) by depriving him same benefit advantage which either (i) he has in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to so until some rational ground for withdrawing it has been committed to him and he has been given opportunity to comment there on or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker that they will not be withdrawn without first giving him an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should be withdrawn.
14.In another case Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu (1983) All ER 346 Lord Fraser opined as under:-- "When a Public Authority has promised to follow on certain procedure, it is in the interest of good administration that it should act fairly and should implement its proviso so long as the implementation does not interfere with its statutory duty."
15.The Doctrine of Legitimate expectation and its impact has been considered by the Supreme Court of India in National Buildings Construction Corporation Vs. S. Raghunthan and others (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 66) and it was held:-- "The doctrine of legitimate expectation has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice.
It was in this context that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. But claims based on legitimate expectation have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel. Unfairness in the purported exercise of power can amount to an abuse or excess of power. Thus the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" has been developed, both in the context of reasonableness and in the context of natural justice. The State actions have to be in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution, of which non-arbitrariness is a significant fact. There is no unfettered discretion in public law. A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. Through the doctrine of legitimate expectation is essentially procedural in character and assures fair play in administrative action, it may, in a given situation, be enforced as a sustentative right.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked if the decision which is challenged in the Court has some person aggrieved either (a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law; or (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which after (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given as opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that it will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that it should not be withdrawn. Indian scenario in the field of legitimate expectation is not different."
16.It is now well established proposition of law that he who basis his claim on the concept of legitimate expectation, he has to rely on the representation of public authority, and their denial, is the infringement of his right, and then Court will interfere only, if the decision of denial is arbitrary, unreasonable, abuse of powers and is against the principal of natural justice and decision is not taken in public interest.
17.In the respondents case, the appellant while, extending lease in favour of respondents, had made clear that they will not apply for any further extension, and the present extension does not carry any commitment, for grant of proprietary rights, and as such it was in the knowledge of respondents that they have to surrender the possession of land on expiry of their extended period, and the policy does not provide any right for grant of proprietary rights.
18.It is not the case of respondents that appellant has illegally imposed the two condition while promulgated policy dated 27.4.1990, rather respondents knowingly accepted the terms of policy without any objection, hence, after accepting the terms of Policy dated 27.4.1990, the matter become clear and any alleged expectation came to an end. If the respondents have developed the land, the said development was for their own benefit as they are the sole beneficiary of its income and other proceeds. It is not the case of respondents that they have challenged the policy dated 27.4.1990, hence there is no need to 'discuss this aspect of the case.
19.The second argument of learned counsel for respondents is that, their case was recommended by Commissioner Sargodha for grant of proprietary rights, and as such, they are entitled for the conferment of proprietary rights of land. It is an admitted fact that Commissioner Sargodha was not the final Authority, his recommendation will have to mature after approval of Board of Revenue, the only competent authority. The status of recommendation of Commissioner Sargodha is his opinion only, the recommendations culminate only into an enforceable order, conferring right to beneficiary when, these recommendations are accepted by the final decision making authority and that final order is communicated to its beneficiary. The recommendations of Commissioner Sargodha is just a correspondence between an Official and a decision making authority, the decision making authority is surely not bound to accept the recommendation of a functionary who is not decision making authority, it is the prerogative of the decision making authority to accept or reject the recommendations. It seems that Commissioner while recommending respondents case has not examined the Policy dated 27.4.1990, through some bona fide mistake or he intentionally ignored the same for providing illegal benefit to respondents, admittedly the recommendations are in violation of the policy dated 27.4.1990. We also note that Policy ibid has also skipped from the attention of Learned Single Judge.
20.Learned counsel for respondents has tried to argue their case with comparison to other schemes, launched by state for utilization of State land, the case of respondents is distinguishable with the case of other schemes, for the two reasons;
1. The lessees of respective scheme were granted proprietary rights of the land under the Policy framed for these schemes separately and independently. last extension of lease dated 27.4.1990 was allowed to respondents with specific condition that lessees will not request for further extension and this extension will not be treated any commitment for grant of proprietary rights.
21.The respondents never claimed that they accepted the extension of lease under compelling circumstances, nor they have challenged the legality of the policy and as such after accepting the Policy ibid the respondents could not be allowed to wriggle out from their own commitment.
22.In an Indian jurisdiction, in a case Federal Minister passed an order on a case file, but his order was not communicated to its beneficiary, the beneficiary however claimed that as the Minister has accepted his right and as such his right become absolute, the Court held as under:-- Bachiiltar Singh al. The State of Punjab (1962 Sapp 3 SCR 713).
"The business of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through the agency of large number of officials and authorities. Before an action in taken by the authority concerned in the name of Rajpramukh, which formality is a constitutional necessity, nothing done would amount to an order creating rights or casting liabilities to third parties. It is possible observed the Court that after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage or Minister or the Council of Minister may express quite a different opinion which may be opposed to be earlier opinion. In such cases, which of two opinions, can be regarded as the "order" of the State Government? It was held that opinion become a decision of the Government only when it is communicated to the person concerned."
23.In the light of above discussion in our humble opinion enforceable right only comes into existence under an order of a competent authority when it is communicated to its claimant, hence, the recommendation of commissioner Sargodha was only an official noting and does not create any enforceable right in favour of respondents.
24. As far as the question of discrimination is concerned. It is an established principal of law that principal of equality is subject to reasonable classification and is based on intelligible differentia.
The object of every state scheme has different parameters, the policies framed for the other schemes are to develop the land by the lessee for the benefit of state and the state granted land equal to subsistence holding to the land less developer, whereas the respondents are not claiming themselves that they have worked for the benefit of state, it is an admitted fact that respondents have not shared the benefits of land with the state. It is also not the case of respondents that they are landless persons and their claim is restricted to the extent of subsisting holding. The respondents may claim any equality if they have been discriminated within the scheme. It is not the grievance of respondents that some of the lessees of Live Stocks Breeding Scheme have been granted proprietary rights in their exclusion, hence the respondents case did not fall within the ambit of Article 25 of the constitution of Pakistan. It is also not the case of respondents that they have established the live stocks and dairy products which are contributing toward the betterment of the national economy, rather the respondents intends to purchase state land on a negligible price on the basis of their expired possession, the respondents are retaining the possession of state land from the last 11 years without payment of a single penny to the Govt. Exchequer. It is an established principal of law that equality should be between persons placed in the same set of circumstances. The appellant policy for each and every scheme is different according to the circumstances, every set of land was leased out to the land less citizens as per different parameters and understandings.
The argument of Learned Counsel is that lease in their favour is through registered document and no adverse action could be taken against them without providing and opportunity of hearing, the right of hearing has been denied while deciding to sell the land through public auction.
The said argument is not available to respondents as after 24.7.1990 they are in possession of land under policy dated 24.7.1990 which is clear and unambiguous, the respondents after expiry of the extended /renewed period are bound to surrender the possession of land to appellant, the fact to surrender the land is known to them from 24.7.1990 the respondents are unable to explain in which capacity they are retaining the possession of land without payment of any lease money, in these circumstances after the expiry of extended period the respondents have lost the legal cover against their possession and as such the respondents could not challenge the right of appellant to deal with their own land according to their own choice in public interest.
25.Learned counsel for respondents vehemently argued that I.C.A. No. 354/1999 is barred by time of 26 days. He submits that impugned judgment was passed on 29.3.2000, the appellant filed appeal on 14.4.2000, but the office returned the appeal with three objections, the appellant re-filed the appeal on 12.5.2000, hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed on this score as a valuable right has been accrued in their favour. They relied on Naheed Ahmed Vs. Asif Riaz and 3 others (PLJ 1996 Lahore 1261), Manzoor Hussain and others Vs. Sajawal and others (1983 SCMR 465), District Council Faisalabad v. Ch. Muhammad Yaseen (2000 YLR 440).
26.Admittedly appeal was filed within time, the office raised following objections on 17.4.2000:--
3. The Court fee is insufficient to the extent of Rs.5.00 on CM.
24.Writ petition is not arranged to the office order/Index.
25.Certificate to be given to the effect that I.C.A. is competent.
26. Photo copy of National Identity Card of the parties (s) to be filed.
27.The office allowed 3 days' time for removing the objections. The objection sheet shows that appeal file remain with the office and learned counsel for appellants removed the objections on 11.5.2000. The appellant, filed application u/S. 5 of Limitation Act, asserting that appellant counsel filed appeal on 14.4.2000 and he was under the impression that 'appeal will be fixed for hearing after deposit of printing charges and on receipt of printing charges, their counsel visited the office for depositing the same, the file was not traceable, and on 11.5.2000 file was located, then counsel came to know about the office objections. Their counsel collected file on 11.5.2000 and after removing the objections re-filed it on 12.5.2000. The appellant has specifically averred in the application in para 4:-- "That already a completely identical ICA No. 158/2000 stand admitted to regular hearing and on this score alone the appeal deserves to be heard on merits after condoning the delay as explained."
28.The assertion of said para was not denied and respondents replied asunder:-- "This is not good ground for condonation of delay and each case has to be decided on its own merits and for that matter the appellant is not entitled to hearing on merits and further-more it is a case of unprecedented mala fide approach towards its own subject and discrimination for the reason best known to appellant expressing the will through authorities tracked by rules and not under the law."
29.The averments of petition and its reply show that ICA No. 158/2000 on the identical point of Law was admitted for regular hearing by this Court before filing the present appeal, it is proven fact on record that same question of law and fact was involved in Appeal No. 158/2000, hence on this score the limitation is condonable in the present case.
30.The above issue came up for hearing before Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan Noon Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Market Committee, etc. (PLD 1989 S.C. 449) and it was held, where the question of public importance is involved even in extreme cases limitation can be condoned.
31.Again the issue where one appeal is filed with in time and other is barred by time whether limitation can be condoned Or not? Came up before Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan Syed Imran Raw Zaidi, Superintending Engineer, Public Health Engineering Circle-I, Gujranwala Vs. Government of the Punjab through Services, General Administration and Information Department, Punjab Secretariat, Lahore and 2 others (1996 SCMR 645), it was held as under:-- "However, since the order of the Service Tribunal impugned in this appeal also forms the subject- matter of the connected appeal (C.A.742/94) which undoubtedly was within time and the leave has been granted in both the cases to consider an identical question coupled with the fact that respondent did not press the objection now being raised, at the time of grant of leave although he was duly represented by a counsel who was very much present in Court, we do not find it fit and proper to dismiss this appeal on the ground of limitation. Needless to observe that in similar situations, the delay. has been condoned by this Court Refer PLD 1969 S.C.449. We, therefore, condoned the delay in this appeal in the interest of justice."
32.The other aspect of the appeal is that, office has not informed the appellant about the objections, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has resolved this issue in Mst. Sahiran Bi Vs. Ahmed Khan (2000 SCMR 847). Even otherwise if we consider the office objection that too are of clerical nature, the appeal was filed by the Province of Punjab and as such NIC was not necessary. The second objection "writ petition is not properly arranged". The record of writ petition was with the office and it was the duty of office to attach the record of writ petition with ICA, the third objection that stamp of Rs.5/- has not been affixed on CM. is concerned, the maximum effect of said insufficiency is that CM. will not be treated proper CM. or the appeal will be heard, without CM, the appeal was thus filed and was within time.
33.The last objection of learned counsel for respondents is that appeal is not maintainable under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The averments of petition and its payer shows that order of Revenue Board was not impugned, the respondents, prayed for a declaration for granting of proprietary rights of suit land in the light of memo. dated 16.1.1995 and 27.3.1995, hence the appeal is maintainable against the judgment of Learned Single Judge.
34.The upshot of above discussion is that both the appeals are allowed and impugned judgments dated 27.1.2000 and 29.3.2000 are set aside and all the above writ petitions are dismissed.
There is no order as to costs.