' Muhammad Yousaf, appellant,, was employed as a conductor in 1975 in Ichhra Depot, Lahore under the Punjab Road Transport Board, On 16-6-1976 while his bus was plying between Lahore and Kasur route, his bus was checked and the following two out of six irregularities were detected :-
(a) He had received fare amounting to Rs, 1.35 from two passengers but he had not issued tickets to them with the dishonest intention to misappropriate this amount.
(b) He had an excess cash of Rs, 12.60 with him.
' Form TT-40 was issued to him on the spot. He denied the allegations. A charge-sheet was issued to him on 21-6-1976. The appellant did not furnish his explanation till April, 1977. During this period as a result of an agreement between the P. U. T. C. And the P. R. T. B., the appellant alongwith many others stood transferred to P. U. T. C. On the same terms and conditions of service with effect from 1-2-1977. His explanation was found unsatisfactory and an enquiry was instituted against him. The Enquiry Officer vide enquiry report dated 13-6-1977 (Exh. D-11) found the appellant guilty. After final show cause, he was dismissed from service vide order dated 22-6-1977. After serving a grievance notice, the appellant filed a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore. He himself appeared as his own witness before the Labour Court while the Management did not produce any witness but relied upon enquiry proceedings Exhs. D-1 to D-15. The Labour Court vide impugned decision dated 7-12-1977 dismissed the petition of the appellant. Hence this appeal.
2. I have heard at length the counsel for the parties and have also perused the entire material available on the record.
3. It is vehemently contended by Mr. Muhammad Zaman Qureshi, learned counsel for the appellant, that since the alleged misconduct was committed in June, 1976, while the appellant was serving in P. R. T. B. And, therefore, his employer was also P. R. T. B. And consequently his dismissal order passed by the District Manager, P. U. T. C. On 22-6-1977 was without lawful authority. According to him, the disciplinary action could only be taken by the District Manager of Punjab Board Transport Board. In reply Mr. Shafiq-ul-lsiam, learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation, points out that factually the District Manager of the respondent-Corporation remained the same because the depot alongwith its assets and employees stood transferred to Punjab Urban Transport Corporation on the same terms and conditions. In other words, the same gentleman, who was the employer at the time when the misconduct was committed, continued as District Manager of the same Depot, but only label was changed i,e,, instead of P. R. T. B. He became under the P. U. T. C.
Moreover, legally after 1-2-1977 when this depot alongwith its assets and certain class of employees including the appellant stood transferred to the P. U. T. C. As a result of an agreement between the P. R. T. B. And the P. U. T. C., the P. R. T. B. Cannot be dragged into litigation and made liable for any such workman as the Board has already implemented in full their part of the agreement with the P. U. T. C. Further the appellant neither served any grievance notice upon the Board, which was a pre-requisite for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, nor impleaded the Board as a party either before the Labour Court or in appeal before this Tribunal. If he wanted any relief against the Board then his grievance petition would straightaway fail due to non-service of grievance notice and non-impleading the Board as a party. It is only during the arguments that the P. R. T. B. Has been introduced in this litigation and is being held to be the employer of the appellant only for taking disciplinary action against him regarding the alleged misconduct committed in June, 1976. The principle of "Audi alteram partem" (no one shall be condemned unheard) is fully attracted to the Labour cases and, therefore, no liability or responsibility of any kind, of such workmen can be imposed upon the P. R. T. B. Without first issuing notice to it or otherwise affording it an adequate opportunity in this behalf. Thus, non-issuance of grievance notice and non-impleading the P. R. T. B. As a party clearly exonerate the P. R. T. B. From any liability in this case. It is an admitted fact that no lien of the appellant was left with the P. R. T. B. Before he and others stood transferred to the P. U. T. C. On 1-2-1977 with their rights and liabilities on the same terms and conditions of service. Thus, considered from any angle, the P. R. T. B. Has nothing to do with the appellant after 1-2-1977.
4. There is another aspect which directly flows from the facts of the present case. As mentioned earlier, Muhammad Yousaf, appellant, and other employees up to grade 16, whose services stood transferred to P. U. T. C. On 1-2-1977 remained mum and did not raise any voice in any manner against their transfer from P. R. T. B. To P. U. T. C. It is not denied that the appellant had the knowledge about the agreement between the two organizations as a result of which his services stood transferred to P. U. T. C. He continued to serve under the new organization i,e, P. U. T. C. He has been getting his wages and other benefits of employment from the P. U. T. C. And not from the P. R.
T. B. He gave his grievance notice to the P. U. T. C. And not to the P. R. T. B. And impleaded only P. U. T.
C. As respondent and claimed relief from it before the Labour Court. Further at the time of his transfer to P. U. T.. C. On 1-2-1977 he did not raise any objection or protest against it. In such a situation the question of acquiescence would straightaway be attracted and would operate by way of estoppel against the appellant. Complete silence on his part for such a long time is sufficient to draw the inference that the appellant acquiesced to the new change and by his own conduct treated the P. U. T. C. And not the P. R. T. B. As his employer for all purposes. It does not lie in his mouth to say at the time of taking disciplinary action against him that the P. U. T. C. Is not his employer while already he had treated it as such by his conduct. He is, therefore, estopped now to raise any such plea at this stage, merely on the ground that he was initially recruited by the P. R. T.
B. Ignoring his transfer on 1-2-1977 to the P. U. T. C. On the same terms and conditions and without claiming any lien in the P. R. T. B. In these circumstances the appellant is estopped by his own conduct and acquiescence to raise a plea that the P. U. T. C. Is not his employer to take any disciplinary action against him or to claim that the P. R. T. B. Is his for taking disciplinary action on the basis of a misconduct committed in June, 1976.
5. The main argument advanced by Mr. Muhammad Zaman Qurtshi, on behalf of the appellant, is that since the alleged misconduct was committed by the appellant while serving in P. R. T. B. In June, 1976, the P. R. T. B. Alone would be competent to take disciplinary action against such misconduct. Reliance in this behalf is placed upon Fajjar Ali's case. With due respect I am unable to agree with this view of my learned predecessor-in-office. It is an admitted fact that as a result of an agreement between the P. R. T. C. And the P. U. T. C. Dated 1-2-1977 all L.
0. S./L.
0. S. Depots lock stock and barrel stood transferred to P. U. T. C. Including certain class of employees. That agreement has been fully implemented and acted upon by the parties since 1-2- 1977. The result is that since 1-2-1977 the P. U. T. C. is the de facto and de jure owner of the said depots alongwith their employees and conversely after 1-2-1977 P. R. T. B. Has nothing to do with such depots and their employees. It is an admitted fact that the appellant stood transferred to P. U. T. C. On 1-2-1977 on the same terms and conditions alongwith his funds like G. P. Fund, C. P. Fund and gratuity etc., and the P. U. T. C. Alone is liable for the payment of such funds etc. In brief, all his connections with P. R. T. B. Regarding his employment stood severed and the P. U. T. C. As successor of P. R. T. B. Became his employer and responsible for all intents and purposes of his employment including disciplinary action. Thus, P. U. T. C. Alone will be competent to take disciplinary action against the appellant for the alleged misconduct committed by him in June, 1976 while serving in P. R. T. B.
6. Further keeping in view the true spirit of Labour laws and the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that in labour cases it is the relationship of the employer and the employee at a particular time of the proceedings for taking disciplinary action which determines the competence of the employer to take disciplinary action and not the employer at the time when the alleged misconduct was committed. In other words, it is not the time of commission of misconduct which determines the competence of the employer to take disciplinary action, but it is the time when the proposed disciplinary action is taken, which determines the competence of the employer to take such disciplinary action. In the instant case, at the time of commission of misconduct, P. R.
T. B. Was admittedly the employer of the appellant, but at the time of taking disciplinary action against the appellant, the District Manager of P. U. T. C. Was admittedly the employer of the appellant and, therefore, he alone would be competent to take disciplinary action against him.
Conversely, the P. R. T. B. Would not be competent to take disciplinary action against the appellant as it had already ceased to be his employer on 1-2-1977 and the appellant was no longer subject to their disciplinary control. It is an established principle that disciplinary action can only be taken against a workman/employee by an employer and not by some outsider. Since the appellant at the relevant time was no more in the employment of P. R. T. B., the Board would not be in a position to take any disciplinary action against him and the result would be that against such an employee no disciplinary action would possibly be taken either by the P. R. T. B. Or P. U. T. C. Such interpretation cannot be accepted with such absurd results.
7. For the foregoing reasons it is held that after the transfer of the appellant on the same terms and conditions of service on 1-2-1977, the Corporation alone is the de facto and de jure employer for all intents and purposes including disciplinary action on the basis of a misconduct committed prior' to 1-2-1977 during his employment with P. R. T. B. Conversely, although at the time of alleged misconduct, the appellant was serving under the P. R. T. B., yet since he stood transferred to P. U. T.1 C. On the same terms and conditions of service and he did not raise any objection or protest against his transfer and the P. R. T. B., having fulfilled its part of the agreement dated 1-2-1977, the Board cannot be burdened with any rights or liabilities of the appellant or of such other employees at this stage. It is further held that the appellant by his own conduct and acquiescence is estopped to deny the P. U. T. C. As his employer for limited purposes.
8. Mr. Shafiq-ul-Islam, learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation, has also pointed out that the appellant did not serve the grievance notice upon his employer but upon the Managing Director. I have seen the grievance notice (Exh. P-1). It is addressed to the Punjab Urban Transport Corporation, 15/E-1 Gulberg-III, Lahore through its Managing Director. It is an admitted fact that the appellant was working as conductor in Ichhra Deport of Punjab Urban Transport Corporation, Lahore. He was appointed and dismissed by the District Manager of that depot. The employer of the appellant, therefore, was the District Manager of the said depot for the purposes of serving the grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Managing Director may otherwise be covered by the definition of "employer", but cannot be treated as the, employer of the appellant for the purposes of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The grievance notice, therefore, given to the Managing Director of P. U. T. C. Cannot be treated as grievance notice served upon the employer of the appellant i,e,, the District Manager, Ichhra Depot. It is not denied that service of grievance notice upon his employer was prerequisite for the appellant before invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In the circumstances, the grievance notice (Exh. P-1) given to P. U. T. C. Through its Managing Director cannot be treated as a valid grievance notice under section 25-A served upon his employer i,e, District Manager of Ichhra Depot. On this ground alone the grievance petition of the appellant was liable to be dismissed by the Labour Court.
9. Mr. Muhammad Zaman Qureshi, learned counsel for the appellant, has also tried to raise certain technical objections regarding the formation of P. U. T. C. This Tribunal is not competent to go into such an issue. Moreover, the appellant, being an ordinary conductor, cannot be allowed at such late stage to agitate such issue which may result in destroying and ruining the entire establishment and thereby creating chaos in the organization. If the workers feel that their terms and conditions in P. U. T. C. Are being adversely affected, they can tackle this issue at a higher level through their C. B. As. Or other agencies but one individual worker cannot be allowed to create such chaotic situation in the organization without any benefit to himself.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant has not seriously contested the case on merits. I have gone through the relevant material available on the record and find that the dishonesty of the appellant for not issuing tickets to two passengers after realising fare from them and having excess cash of Rs, 12.60 with him is amply proved against him. The prosecution has fully proved its case against the appellant. The appellant has not been able to point out any illegality or irregularity in the impugned decision of the Labour Court.
11. After taking into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, I have reached the conclusion that the Labour Court has rightly dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant.
The present appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. 1979 PLC 33 revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.