' FAISAL ARAB, J.---The petitioners are .Legal heirs of (late) Nooruddin Merchant who was tenant of the respondent No,1 which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. In 1992, eviction application was filed by the respondent No,1 on the grounds of misuse of premises, non- payment of utility charges and personal need. In the eviction application, it was stated that the tenant has failed to maintain the premises with the result that its material value and utility had diminished. It was also pleaded that rented premises is required in good faith for occupation of the respondent No,1 society. In the written statement, the tenant contested the case on all grounds. The plea of impairment in the value and utility of the premises did not find favour with the Rent Controller. However, on the ground of personal need, the Rent Controller held that since statement of the respondent No,1 on oath was consistent with the averments made in the eviction application hence eviction was ordered on 23-8-2006. The petitioners appealed. The VI-Additional District Judge, Karachi (South) dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 26-5-2010, hence this petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Dara S. Shaikh at the very outset argued that eviction proceedings were not maintainable as the respondent No,1 failed to file rent agreement' that was executed between the parties. In the very first paragraph of the eviction application it is mentioned that premises were let out under tenancy agreement dated 19-4-1976. Contents of this paragraph of eviction application have not been denied in the written statement. Then in paragraph 2 of his affidavit-in-evidence also the petitioner has admitted that tenancy was created under the agreement dated 19-4-1976. Law itself envisages that relationship of landlord and tenant can come into being even without a written tenancy agreement. This is evident from the provisions of section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 itself. In the present case, the father of petitioners had himself admitted that tenancy was created under a written agreement on 19-4- 1976. It is not an absolute obligation of the landlord to file copy of the rent agreement in rent proceedings. Occasion for doing so arises only when the relationship of landlord and tenant is either denied by the tenant or contents of the written agreement need to be examined. In case the tenant wants that the written tenancy agreement be placed before the Court then either he may file his own copy or may cause its production by obtaining an order from the Court. However, in the present case no plea has been raised in the written statement that requires examination of the tenancy agreement. In this background and on the basis of pleadings of the parties, filing of tenancy agreement would at the best have confirmed relationship of landlord and tenant which fact had already been admitted by the petitioner. Under the law an admitted fact need not to be proved. There is no lawful cause to non-suit respondent No,1 merely because it did not file copy of the written tenancy agreement with the eviction application. Hence there is no force in this argument of the petitioner's counsel.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners next argued that under section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, a registered society can neither sue nor can be sued in its own name. He contended that such society can only sue or be sued either in the name of its president or chairman or principal secretary, or the trustees who are duly authorized by the rules or regulations of the society but the respondent No,1 society filed eviction case in its own name, hence the proceedings suffered from inherent legal defect being violative of the prohibition contained in section 6 of the said Act and thus not maintainable in law. He therefore, maintained that on this count, the judgments of both the courts below be set aside and proceedings initiated by the respondent No,1 be declared as nullity. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the case of Muhammad Ali Sozar v. Yahya Ahmad Bawany reported in 1995 M LD 323 and the case of The Marriage Hall Association v. The Chairman Central Board of Revenue reported in 1998 CLC 33. These decisions proceed on the assumption that under Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 a registered Society can neither sue nor can be sued in its own name.
4. The very object of enacting the Societies Registration Act, 1860, as is evident from its preamble was to improve the legal condition of the societies that were established for certain purposes mentioned in the preamble. An unregistered society does not have a legal status of its own. It can neither sue nor it can be sued in its own name. In case such society has any grievance against anyone and the matter is to be taken to Court then all its members, who constitute its body have to be made plaintiffs in order to competently sue someone. Likewise, when anyone intents to sue an unregistered society then all members of such society have to be made a party in order to maintain a suit. This is so because an unregistered society does not enjoys status of a juristic person. It may have such number of members which run into scores. One could very well image the practical difficulties in making all of them a party to a suit. In order to improve this legal condition of an unregistered society that the Societies Registration Act, 1860 was enacted to enable such societies to get registered in order to acquire the status of a juristic person legally capable to sue or be sued. Thus under the said Act, a society upon its registration becomes a legal entity capable to sue or be sued which status it did not enjoy prior to its registration. It is improvement of this legal condition to which the preamble of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is referring to.
Once a society is registered under the said Act then it does not have to sue through all its members. Likewise a person who seeks legal remedy against a registered society does not have to sue all its members. Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act proceeds with following words "Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued." These words clearly suggest that a society as a body is legally entitled to sue for infringement of its right or be sued for any claims made against it. These words are then followed by the words "in the name of the President, Chairman or principal secretary or trustees as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society...".
These words are facilitating words. They only mean that a registered society is to sue or be sued only through certain functionaries of the society specifically described in Section 6. Thus the words in the name of President, Chairman, Principal of society or authorized trustees by no means can be read as a bar on a registered society to sue or be sued in its own name as a juristic entity. To say that a legally recognized juristic entity cannot sue in its own name is in fact contradiction in terms.
Once an entity is legally recognized then nothing can prevent it either from suing or from being sued in its own name i,e, in the registered name of the society. However, as the entity is not by itself a living person though after registration it gains the status of a juristic entity it has to be sued or be sued through any of its members who holds administrative or managerial position in the society and Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 exactly facilities this only and nothing more.
Thus by implication, the provisions of section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 bars the ordinary members of a registered society to sue on its behalf or be sued. The provisions of Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act should be read in this context only and not as if it imposes a ban on a registered society to sue or be sued in its own registered name.
5. To a great extent the provisions of section 6 of the Societies Registration Act have been interpreted in the same manner as discussed above in the cases reported in AIR 1946 Bombay 516 and AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 773. At Page 523 of the first judgment it was held as follows:-- "Even though in the speech of Lord Brampton there are observations which would go to show that the provision, which we have enacted in S.6 of the Societies Registration Act as regards suit by and against societies, is capable of being construed as the only mode in which suits by or against the societies could be brought, the observations of Lord Lindley which I have quoted above go to show that the registered name is one which may be used to denote the union as an unincorporated society in legal proceedings as well as for business and other purposes and that even though the use of the name is not compulsory it is at least permissive. I prefer to be guided by the observations of Lord Lindley which I have referred to above and hold that in spite of the provisions contained in Ss.6, .7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act as regards suits by and against societies, non-abatement of suits and enforcement of judgment against the societies, which I have already referred to above, it is competent to the society to sue or be sued in the name of the society, to be sued in its registered name, the society on its registration under the Societies Registration Act having come into existence as a legal entity apart from the members constituting the same. If it were necessary to do so, I would adopt the terminology which has been adopted in this connection by Cozens-Hardy M.R. In (1909) 1 Ch.
163. Where he describes a registered trade union as a "species of quasi corporation." (See also note
(q) in Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. VIII, p. 2, 'Registered Trade Union is not a Corporation but a legal entity governed by special rules," and also Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, p. 486, para. 776, "A registered trade union is not a corporation nor an individual nor a partnership; but it becomes by registration a legal entity distinct from an unregistered trade union. Its registered name is to be used and applied in all legal proceedings, unless there is any provision inconsistent with such use, ")
' I am of the opinion that the provisions contained in Ss.6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act are not inconsistent with the user of the registered name of the society in connection with legal proceedings. As Lord Lindley observed in (1901) AC 426. "I do not say that the use of the name is compulsory but it is at least permissive."
6. Then the second case reported in AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 773 at page 777 it was held as follows: The basic assumption made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the registration of society can be equated to the granting of a Royal Charter, does not rest on a solid foundation. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is an association of individuals which comes into existence with certain aims and objects.
' If it is not registered as a society under the Act, it would have the character of an association of all the members of the association. The registration of the Society confers on it certain advantages.
The members as well as the Governing Body of the Society are not always the same. Even though the members of the Society or the Governing Body fluctuate from time to time, the identity \of the society is sought to be made continuous by reason of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act.
' The Society continues to exist and to function as such until its dissolution under the provisions of the Act. The properties of the society continue to be vested in the trustees or in the Governing Body irrespectiiee of the fact that the members of the society for the time being are not the same as they were before; nor will be the same thereafter.
' By reason of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, once the society is registered with the Registrar, by the filing of the memorandum and certified copy of the rules and regulations and the Registrar has certified that the society is registered under the Act, it enjoys the status of a legal entity apart from the members constituting the same and is capable of swing or being sued.
7. The above discussion clearly establishes that there is no bar on a society registered under the provision of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 to sue or be sued in its own name: Thus, I humbly differ from the interpretation placed on Section 6 in the two judicial pronouncements i,e, the case of Muhammad AU Sozar v. Yahya Ahmad Bawany reported in 1995 M LD 323 and the case of The Marriage Hall Association v. The Chairman Central Board of Revenue reported in 1998 CLC 33 referred by the counsel for the petitioner. Needless to mention here that acceptance of the legal objection taken by the petitioner's counsel ,would have also rendered the present petition a nullity as the petitioner has himself chosen to sue the Society in its registered name.
8. On the ground of personal need, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the respondent No,1 is having its own office in the same building which is sufficient for its need and there is no evidence on record that additional space is required. He contended that both the courts below erred in ordering eviction of the petitioners. He also pointed out that during pendency of the case, the premises in occupation of other tenants of the respondent No,1 were vacated and re-let to several new tenants. Learned counsel for the respondent No,1 on the other hand argued that he had no personal knowledge that other premises have been re-let by the respondent No,
1. On such statement, he was called upon to consult with his client and give a definite statement that after filing of proceedings, no premises was re-let to any new tenant. For such purpose, he sought time to inform this Court within a day or two. Pursuance to such direction, counsel for the respondent No,1 has filed a statement wherein it has been admitted that some of the premises of the respondent No,1 have been let out to other tenants during pendency of rent proceedings.
Statement is placed on record.
9. It is an established legal position that a landlord who is already in occupation of accommodation of his own and if he requires additional space on the ground of insufficiency of space then he has to prove through evidence that why present space is insufficient and there is genuine need for additional space. Only establishing this would warrant eviction of a tenant. No such evidence has been brought on this aspect of the matter. The respondent No, 1 is having its own office in the same building. The respondent No,1 not only failed to prove its case on the ground of insufficiency of space but went to the extent of admitting that tenements in the same building were rented out to new tenants during the pendency of these proceedings, thus demolishing the plea of personal bona fide need. Hence the petition is allowed and impugned judgment is set aside.