' KH. SHAHAD AHMED, The appellant, with the leave of the Court, through this appeal has partially challenged the propriety of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 4-3-2010 and prayed for recalling the paragraphs 13 and 17(ii) of the impugned judgment. She has further prayed for issuance of order for retrospective promotion as Additional District and Sessions Judge w,e,f, 11-11- 2000.
2. The precise summary of the facts giving rise to this appeal is that the appellant and respondents Nos.2 to 5 are civil servants, Judicial Officers. Due to some dispute regarding the seniority and promotion, the appellant challenged numerous Departmental Orders before the Service Tribunal in different appeals. Ultimately the learned Service Tribunal has disposed of four appeals through the impugned consolidated judgment.
3. The appellant has been given proper position in the seniority list and also declared entitled for retrospective promotion as Additional District and Sessions Judge w,e,f, 16-1-2002. The appellant still feels aggrieved and claims that she is entitled for retrospective promotion A w,e,f, 11-11-2000 and 31-5-2001, the date on which respondents Nos.2 to 4, who are junior to her, have been promoted as Additional District and Sessions Judge. Respondents Nos.2 and 3 have already been retired, therefore, they are no more contestants, however, only respondent No,4, who is in service, is the contestant party. The appellant claims that before permanent induction as Judge Family Court, she served as ad-hoc Civil Judge for more than 17 years without any break, thus according to law, her ad-hoc service should be counted for length of service required for promotion as Additional District and Sessions Judge in B-19. Thus, by computing her ad-hoc service, she fulfils the length of service and has been illegally deprived from promotion.
4. Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant, argued the case at some length and while summarizing his submission, argued that the appellant has served as ad hoc Sub-Judge for 17 years and thereafter without any break, on recommendations of Public Service Commission has been inducted permanently as Judge Family Court. According to the law and rules on the subject the ad-hoc service is computable for length of service for the purpose of promotion. He placed reliance on 2006 SCR 376. Thus he prayed that the appellant is entitled for retrospective promotion as Additional District and. Sessions Judge w . e . f. 11-11-2000.
5. Conversely, Raja Gul Majeed Khan, Advocate-General and Mushtaq Ahmed Janjua, the learned counsel for the respondents, forcefully defended the impugned judgment and argued that only permanent regular service can be computed for length of service for promotion in grade B-19. They further contended that the appellant although served as an ad-hoc Sub-Judge in grade B-17 but she has not been regularly appointed in the same grade and post rather fresh appointment as Family Judge is made in different grade and different post. Thus, the appellant cannot be benefited from the principle of law enunciated by the superior Courts. The Service Tribunal has not committed any illegality and has already granted the maximum relief permissible under the principle of law and justice, thus this appeal merits no consideration and is liable to be dismissed.
6. We have dispassionately paid our attention to the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and also minutely perused the record. The Service Tribunal has already declared the appellant senior to the contesting respondents, thus the matter of seniority has been settled.
Moreover, the Service Tribunal has also computed the ad-hoc service of the appellant as Family Judge and by extending the maximum benefit declared the appellant entitled for notional promotion w,e,f, 16-1-2002. The authorities referred by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable. In Ghulam Rasool's case 2006 SCR 376, it has been held:-- "When ad-hoc appointment is followed by a regular appointment, it does confer a right for counting ad-hoc service towards the length of service prescribed for promotion in the next higher scale and ultimately pensionary benefits."
' The phraseology of the dictum "when ad-hoc appointment is followed by a regular appointment" clearly conveys that the ad-hoc appointment if followed by a regular appointment in the same grade and post can be counted, but not, if the fresh appointment is made against different post and different scale, therefore, the judgment is distinguishable. The judgment of the Service Tribunal is consistent with the principle of law and justice, which doesn't call for interference. Thus, finding no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed.