' The present petition arises out of the following facts and circumstances: ' The authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Rahiin Yar Khan, had passed an order dated 18-12-1979 directing the Lever Brothers to deposit an amount of Rs, 18,614 with the said Authority.
Agahlst the said order, the Lever Brothers filed an appeal before Punjab Labour Court No, 8, Bahawalpur, which had the territorial jurisdiction to hear appeal, but was not functioning at that time. The Lever Brothers submitted an Application No, R. Y. K. 4/80-Punjab before this Tribunal for the transfer of the said appeal to Punjab Labour Court No, 9, Multan. This Tribunal vide order dated 20-1-1980 transferred the said appeal to Punjab Labour Court No, 9, Multan.
2. On 10-1-1980 the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1(..80 Rahim Yar Khan modified its earlier order dated 18-12-1979 whereby the amount was enhanced. Against the order dated 10-1- 1980 Lever Brothers filed an appeal on 9-2-1980 before Punjab Labour Court No, 8, Bahawalpur, which was functioning at that time, since this appeal was dirzetly connected with the earlier appeal, so another application for transfer of the earlier appeal was filed. This Tribunal vide order dated 5-3-1980 transferred the earlier appeal pending before Punjab Labour Court No, 9, Multan to Punjab Labour Court No, 8, Bahawalpur.
3. Mr. Muhammad Suleman Malik, petitioner, has moved two separate applications for vacation of transfer orders dated 20-1-1980 and 5-3-1980 and to start contempt proceedings against the Lever Brothers.
4. The main argument advanced by the petitioner is that since a Labour Appellate Tribunal has got no revisional jurisdiction against an order passed by a Labour Court under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, this Tribunal has got no power to transfer appeal from one Labour Court to another. Another argument advanced is that the words used in subsection (7) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or "any application or proceeding" and not appeal, hence no appeal can be transferred from one Labour Court to another.
5. The word "any" used before the word "application" in subsection (7) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 covers both the words "application" as well as "proceedings". In other words, the expression "any application or proceedings", has to be read as "any application or proceeding". No doubt the word "appeal" as such is not mentioned in subsection (7) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but we have to see whether the word "proceeding" includes appeals or proceedings on the appellate side of a Labour Court. A proceeding before a Labour Court can be on the original side or the appellate side, under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or under any other law like the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The expressions "proceeding" or any "proceeding" are to be interpreted liberally as no restriction has been placed upon the word "proceeding" by the Legislature and will include all kinds or nature of proceedings under any appropriate law, pending before a Labour Court which will undoubtedly include proceedings on the appellate side. The Legislature has not confined the word "proceeding" to a particular kind or nature of proceedings under any particular statute. In the absence of any such restriction or qualifying word used with or after the word "proceeding", it can reasonably be inferred that the expressions "proceeding" or "any proceeding" mean and will include any kind of proceedings whether on original or appellate side of a Labour Court, whether under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or any other law like the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and, therefore, can be transferred by a Labour Appellate Tribunal from one Labour Court to another.
6. As regards the contention that this Tribunal has held in the case Lyallpur Cotton Mills, Faisalabad v. Iftikhar Russain that a revision petition against the order of a Labour Court passed under section 17 of the Paymant of Wages Act is not competent before Lhe Tribunal, would not affect the power of the Tribunal under subsection (7) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Lack of revisional jurisdiction under subsection (3-a) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance,1969 against an order passed by a Labour Court is an appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, does not necessarily mean lack of power under section 38(7) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to transfer an appeal from one Labour Court to another.
7. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted, it will create serious complications. If the Tribunal has no power to transfer an appeal from one Labour Court to another then the next question which would arise is as to who-else can exercise that power. There is nothing in the statute empowering any other Authority to take such action. Mr. Suleman has indirectly limited that on the administrative or executive side the Secretary, Labour Department of the Provincial Government may be competent to take such action in suitable cases. In the absence of any specific provision of law in this behalf, it is not desirable to presume any such power in favour of the executive in judicial matters over the judicial officers Presiding Officers) of the Labour Courts. It is not denied that in all judicial matters is a Labour Appellate Tribunal which has the administrative control over the Labour Courts as all their decisions are subject to scrutiny by way of appeal or revision before a Labour Appellate Tribunal and not the Labour Department. Judicial Control in judicial matters of the Labour Courts resides with the Labour Appellate Tribunal, otherwise it is likely to affect the independence of the Labour Courts.
8. Taking into consideration the relevant provisions of law coupled with the facts and circumstances of the case, I am clearly of the view that under subsection (7) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 a Labour Appellate Tribunal alone is competent to transfer an appeal pending under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 from one Labour Court to another. The opposite-party making applications in this behalf did not commit any contempt. In1 fact in the peculiar circumstances that was the correct step taken. Accordingly, I find no force in this petition and dismissed the same. 1980 PLC 568 (d)