1. ' SRUJAAT ALI KHAN, J.---Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has prayed for setting aside order dated 15-12-2011 whereby the learned Rent Tribunal Lahore dismissed .The petition for leave to contest filed by the petitioner and accepted the ejectment petition filed by respondent No.1 as well as order dated 13- 3-2012 by virtue of which the learned Appellate Court, while affirming the order passed by the learned Rent Tribunal, Lahore, dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner.
2. Succinctly, the facts, forming background of this is are that respondent No.1 filed an ejectment petition before the learned Rent Tribunal Lahore (respondent No.2) contending therein that he rented out one shop to the petitioner in January 1999, but he, in connivance with other tenants, occupied two other shops also and now rent of three shops along with 5% annual increase amounting to Rs.81,622 is due against the petitioner which he is reluctant to pay. The petitioner filed an application for leave to contest the same before respondent No.2 which was dismissed vide order dated 15-12-2011 against which he filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge Lahore (respondent No.3) which too was dismissed vide order dated 13-3-2012; hence this petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that both the courts below have failed to note that respondent No.1 was not able to establish his ownership qua the disputed shops, therefore, he was not entitled to file ejectment petition against the petitioner; even otherwise, respondent No.1 was estopped from filing of the ejectment petition especially when respondent No.1 himself moved an application before the Town Officer Regulation, Ravi Town, Lahore, regarding the demise of shops in dispute; that both the forums below have not attended to the important question that in fact the shops in dispute were owned by Nazool Branch and. Respondent No.1 has nothing to do with them; that the learned Rent Tribunal as well as the learned Additional District Judge has failed to appreciate that on an application filed by the petitioner, the shops in dispute have already been leased out to the petitioner by the City District Government Lahore and he is paying the rent regularly; that the petitioner has been condemned unheard as he was not given the chance to contest the ejectment petition filed by respondent No.2; that both the courts below while passing the impugned orders have not paid any heed to the fact that ejectment petition was not maintainable in absence of any Tenancy Agreement between the parties; that both the forums below have not taken into consideration the documents produced by the petitioner and that the findings of the forums below are based on surmises and conjectures. In addition to his oral submissions, learned counsel has also relied upon the cases reported as "Kumar Krishna Prosad Lal Singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd., and others" (AIR 1937 PC 251), "Province of Punjab and another v. Mufti Abdul Ghani" (PLD 1985 SC 1), "Sh. Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad Nisar and 2 others" (1991 CLC 99) and "Rehmat Ullah v. Ali Muhammad and another" (1983 SCMR 1064).
4. Conversely, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1, while defending the impugned orders, submits that after admission by the petitioner as tenant of respondent No.1, it does not lie in his mouth to claim that respondent No.1 failed to establish his ownership qua the shops in dispute; that once a tenant is always a tenant and prior to handing over the possession to the owner he cannot claim any benefit on any document prepared subsequently; that the findings of facts recorded by the learned Rent Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge are not open to interference by this Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction and that the respondent who is already going from pillar to post for recovery of the rent due against the petitioner cannot be made to suffer any further. In support of his contentions learned counsel has referred to the cases reported as "Mst. Tabassum v.. Waqar Hussain and another" (2011 MLD 351), "Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad" (2005 PSC 106), "Kalsoom Akhtar and 3 others v. Muhammad Aslam and 13 others" (KLR 1996 CC 411) and "Madrissa Darul Uloom Al-Baqiat-ul-Slehat Registered v.
2. The Additional District Judge" (PLD 1992 SC 401).
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the documents appended with this petition, I have straightway noted that the petitioner has knowingly omitted to attach certain important documents. With this petition inasmuch as the application for leave to contest, despite the fact that the same has important bearing on the outcome of the /is between the parties. As a result, this court has been left with no option but to decide this petition on the basis of material available on the file.
3. ' Firstly, taking up the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent No.1, I am of the view that as per observation of the learned Rent Tribunal in the opening paragraph of the impugned order, dated 15-12-20.11, the petitioner himself filed an application on 6-12-2010 with the prayer to deposit the monthly rent before the Court as respondent No.Lowner was not issuing the rent receipt. After having admitted himself to be the tenant of respondent No.1, the petitioner cannot shrug off his liability on the ground that respondent No. 1 was not the owner of the shops in dispute. While dealing with somewhat similar question, the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the matter of Madrissa Darul Uloom Al-Baqiatul-Slehat Registered (supra) has inter alia held that-- "In the present case the respondent having admitted that he was inducted as a tenant under a written agreement, cannot challenge the title of the appellant without first surrendering the possession to him."
4. ' Similarly, in the case reported as "Shah Meer and 6 others v. Ghulam Hussain" (2012 YLR 148) the law has been laid to the following effect:- "*It is a settled principle of law that where the tenant denies relationship of landlord and tenant and such relationship stands proved, then no other course is left for the Court, but to order his eviction*."
5. ' The said view has also been fortified in the case of "Haji Jumma Khan v. Haji Zarin Khan" (PLD 1999 SC 1101) wherein it has been held that:-- "On the basis of dictum laid in afore-quoted reports we unhesitatingly hold that petitioner cannot legitimately resist maintainability of ejectment proceedings pending against him on the ground of sale-agreement. Suffice it to observe that genuineness or otherwise of such agreement and its consequential effort will be independently determined by the Civil Court. However, in the instant case we are satisfied that issue regarding relationship of tenancy and personal bona fide requirement of respondent-landlord has been correctly decided by the Courts below. There does not appear any material defect or legal infirmity with regard to conclusions drawn in the impugned judgments. Accordingly the petition having no merit is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused."
6. ' Similarly, the. August Supreme Court of Pakistan in .The case of "Ghulam Samdani v. Abdul Hameed" (1992 SCMR 1170) has held that:-- "Anyhow Mst. Zartaj Siddiqui, besides the decree of exclusive ownership in her favour, is also the 'daughter and heir of Mst. Zainab Bibi and Din Muhammad, is by operation of law one of the landlords of the suit house and the respondent only a tenant under her and liable to eviction on the application of appellant who is the successor-in-interest of Mst. Zartaj Siddiqui being a transferee from her. The relationship of landlord and tenant is thus established between the appellant and the respondent and rightly held so by the Rent Controller vide his order, dated 24-1-1985. The learned High Court omitted to consider that Mst. Zartaj Siddiqui, besides being armed with a decree of ownership, was also the heir of Mst. Zainab Bibi and was included in the category of landlord. No independent evidence was required of her to establish .That the respondent was inducted by her as a tenant because the respondent, on his own showing, is in occupation of the suit house since the time of his father under Mst. Zainab Bibi, The findings of the learned High Court are, therefore, not legally sustainable."
7. ' Thus, in view of the afore-quoted judgments it has been established that once a person admits himself to be tenant of somebody else he cannot wriggle out from the said tenancy on the ground that the title of the landlord is not established.
8. ' Now, reverting to the petitioner's contention that in absence of any written agreement, the ejectment petition before the Rent Tribunal was not maintainable, I am of the view that the said plea of the petitioner stands contradicted from the fact that he himself approached the learned Rent Tribunal with an application dated 6-12-2010, much prior to the filing of the ejectment petition by respondent No.1, to deposit the rent in the court. If there was no tenancy between the parties, the petitioner should not have approached the learned Rent Tribunal for deposit of the rent. Even otherwise, despite expiry of the Tenancy Agreement if the parties continue with the said tenancy, it would be presumed that the parties would be governed by the terms and conditions of the previous Tenancy Agreement. In this regard, a reference can safely be made to a case reported as "Khalid,Jaysed v. Muhammad Imran" (2004 MLD 577) wherein while dealing with an identical question, it was inter alia held as under:-- "*Under law when a tenant enters into a rented premises under some written agreement, after lapse of period mentioned therein, terms and conditions settled between the parties through written agreement, continue to govern the terms and conditions of the tenancy and it by no stretch of imagination becomes oral tenancy "
9. ' In view of the law laid down in the afore-quoted case, it is crystal clear that as the petitioner continued in the rented premises as tenant, he was bound by the terms and conditions of the earlier agreement executed between parties and cannot seek any escape from the said tenancy.
10. ' Insofar as the petitioner's plea that as the Tenancy Agreement was not in conformity with the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, the Ejectment Petition could not be entertained by the learned Rent Tribunal Lahore, suffice it to observe that as per section 9(b) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, if the landlord deposits 10% of the annual rent, as fine, then any defect in his tenancy would stand cured. In the case in hand, according to Para No.6 of the order dated 15-12-2011 passed by the learned Rent Tribunal Lahore, respondent No.1 has already deposited the amount of fine, therefore, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is hereby spurned.
11. ' As far as the petitioner's plea that he has not been given the chance to defend himself, as his application for leave to contest was outrightly dismissed by the learned Rent Tribunal is concerned, I am of the view that grant of leave in rent matters is not a grace rather the Rent Tribunal has to see as to whether sufficient grounds are available to grant such leave or not. The said question has already been thrashed in the case of "Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal v. Umar Mahmood Kasuri and another"
12. PLD 2008 Lah. 250 wherein it has inter alia been held that:-- "11. As is clear from the above language, it is not in fact a discretion of the learned Rent . Controller.
13. The law says if the tenant "makes default his defence, shall be struck off and landlord put in the possession of the property without taking any further proceedings in the case." It is therefore, not an option for the learned Rent Controller. In the presence of this language, since there was no option, the order dated 30-4-2005 even otherwise was not enforceable. This a party of the continuation of the same proceedings. The learned Rent Controller directed for production of the evidence which was subject to payment of determined amount of rent. On non-fulfilment of the obligation in terms of default and non-payment, he was legally bound to strike off the defence and was thus obviously obliged to do what he did."
14. ' A survey of the above quoted paragraph of the reported case, makes it evident that it is obligatory on the Rent Tribunal to see as to whether requisite grounds for grant of Leave to contest are available or not. Insofar as the case in hand is concerned, a perusal of the order passed by the learned Rent Tribunal, Lahore brings it to light that while dismissing the application of the petitioner for Leave to contest the learned Rent Tribunal gave plausible reasons. Thus, the said order is not amenable to interference by this court and that too in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction.
15. ' Even otherwise this court rarely exercises its Constitutional jurisdiction to upset the findings of facts recorded by two forums below rather this court can exercise such discretion in the cases wherein the orders impugned are apparently erroneous. If any case-law is required on this point, a reference can safely be made to a very illuminated judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as "Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others" (PLD 2007 SC 45) wherein their lordships, the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, have laid down the, law to the following effect:-- "*The learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to point out any legal or factual infirmity in the concurrent finding on the above question of fact to justify the interference of the High Court in the writ jurisdiction and this is settled law that the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is not supposed to interfere in the findings on the . Controversial question of facts based on evidence even if such finding is erroneous. The scope of the judicial review of the 'High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution in such cases, is limited to the extent of misreading or non-reading of evidence for if the finding is based on no evidence which may cause miscarriage of justice but it is not proper for the High Court to disturb the finding of fact through reappraisal of evidence in writ jurisdiction or exercise this jurisdiction as a substitute of revision or appeal.
16. ' In sequel to above discussion, we are of the considered view that the interference of the High Court in the concurrent finding of the two Courts regarding the existence of relationship of land and tenant between the parties was beyond the scope of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution and consequently, we convert this petition. Into an appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and allow the appeal with no order as to costs."
17. ' A perusal of the afore-quoted portion of the judgment of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan makes it abundantly clear that this court has very narrow scope to interfere in the orders passed by the lower forums in rent matters.
18. ' While dealing with the question of default in payment by the tenant, in the matter of "Ahmad Ali alias Ali Ahmad v. Nasar-ud-Din and another" (PLD 2009 SC 453) their lordships of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan have held that when a tenant defaults in payment of rent he is liable to be evicted. In this case the default of the petitioner in payment of rent is evident from his application for deposit of rent in the court.
19. ' Now reverting to the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that as Nazool Branch was holder of the paramount title, the attornment made by the petitioner in its favour is legal and valid and has the effect of terminating the tenancy between the petitioner and respondent No.1, the same is without any merit. Admittedly, the petitioner was inducted into possession of the shops of respondent No.1 as tenant and after constructing the same the petitioner cannot deny his tenancy under respondent No.
1. Further, regarding attornment in favour of the holder of the paramount title, the law is well-settled that a tenant cannot put an end to the tenancy under his landlord by attorning in favour of holder of paramount title except that when it becomes necessary in order to save himself from ejectment from the premises. In such a case, it must be shown that the tenant has acted under compulsion and imminent threat of eviction. In absence of such a circumstance, the voluntary attornment by him in favour of the holder of paramount title cannot destroy the tenancy between him and his landlord. Moreover, under section 116 of the Evidence Act, no tenant of immovable property during the continuance of the tenancy can be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had title in the immovable property at the beginning of the tenancy but later on that extinguished. It is indeed open to a tenant to prove subsequent flaw in the title of the landlord by way of ouster by the holder of a paramount title and his attornment to the latter without actually going out of possession is not permissible. In order to prove that an eviction by a person with a paramount title may constitute a good defence, the party evicting must have a good title and the tenant should have been forced to adopt the course of attorning himself to a person of paramount title. It can happen only when the person armed with an authority to eject has actually ejected the tenant and he subsequent to his ejectment may become the tenant of such a person. It can also happen in a case where the tenant is in the imminent danger of ejectment at the hand of a person who has established his paramount title. In such a case the tenant, if he attorns, it will be against his will. In the present case, nothing has been placed on the record to show that there was any such imminent threat of ejectment, which had compelled the petitioner to attorn in favour. Of City District Government, as otherwise he would have been evicted from the shop in question. While dealing with such a question, the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Munjri Khan and others v. Faridoon and 5 others" (1995 SCMR 678) has inter alia held as under:-- "The aforesaid judgments from the Indian jurisdiction relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants are of no avail to him, inasmuch as although the appellants took a vague objection in the written statement that the landlord had ceased to be the owner, yet it appears to have been abandoned_ later as it is neither reflected in the issues framed in the suit nor in the arguments before the High Court. The appellants were, therefore, rightly denied equitable relief in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. Furthermore, the induction of the appellants as tenants has since been admitted, they are estopped to repudiate the title of their landlord as held by this Court in Muhammad Anwar v. Abdul Shakoor (1982 SCMR 1120). Also see Muhammad Ismail and Bros. v.
20. Muhammad Tahir (1981 SCMR 139) wherein the petitioner came in possession of the disputed land as tenant of the police. It was pleaded that though the Superintendent of Police inducted the petitioner therein into possession of the land in dispute as tenant, yet he was not the owner thereof.
21. The contention was repelled holding that irrespective of whether he was or was not the owner of the land, he was the landlord of the petitioner therein as the latter had been paying rent to him, hence estopped to refute his title so long he was in possession of that property. Further, in Ismail Brothers v. Kavil Ram (PLD 1981 SC 545) while explaining the principle underlying section 116 of the Evidence Act, it was held by this COurt that the express words of the law restrict and confine it to the status and character of the landlord "at the beginning of the tenancy". The tenancy does not prima facie begin at the stage of renewal of a continuing tenancy. A determinative finding for which the stage has not yet arrived, will have to be recorded whether the principle of such an estoppel possibly be extended to foreclose an examination of subsequent change in character and status of the landlord.
22. ' Insofar as the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, I am of the view that the same is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case inasmuch as the question involved in the matter of Kumar Krishna Prosad Lal Singha (Supra), was that of estoppel likewise, in the case of Rehmat Ullah (Supra) leave was granted to consider the question whether in case where tenant denies the relationship of tenant and landlord and doubt is created about ownership of disputed premises, Rent Controller or Appellate Court can evict tenant leaving him to seek redressal of his grievance from civil court on question of title or fraud committed upon him by the landlord. It is important to mention over here that in the said case, the tenant totally denied the presence of relationship of landlord and tenant, therefore, the said judgment is at polls apart from the question involved in the present case. Similarly, in the case of Sh. Muhammad Hanif (Supra) the ejectment petition was dismissed on the ground that the allotment in favour of the landlord was cancelled by the Notified Officer but in the matter in hand no such question is involved. Further, a perusal of the order .Passed by the learned Rent Tribunal brings it to light that the order regarding demolition of the shops in dispute has already been challenged by respondent No.1 before the competent Court, thus at this juncture it cannot be said that title of respondent No.1 is not established. Insofar as the case of Province of the Punjab through Education Secretary (Supra) leave was granted to examine whether respondent was owner or not but in the case in hand the petitioner himself has admitted that he was regularly paying rent to respondent No.l.
23. ' For the afore-noted reasons, I am of the opinion that learned counsel for the petitioner has miserably failed to point out any illegality or perversity in the impugned orders justifying interference by this court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, I see no merits in this petition, which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.