MUHAMMAD ANWAARUL HAQ, J.---This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 8-11-2004 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sialkot whereby all the respondents were acquitted from the charges under sections 302 and 149, P.P.C. In case F.I.R. No. 328 of 2001, under sections 302, 148, 149 and 109, P.P.C., Police Station Satrah, Tehsil Daska, District Sialkot, registered with the allegation against the respondents that they along with their co-accused namely Tahir Saleem and Muhammad Riaz (Proclaimed Offenders), in furtherance of their common intention had committed the Qatl-e-amd of complainant's son Muhammad Ansar by causing him fire-arm injuries with their respective weapons. However, the learned trial Court vide impugned judgment has convicted four respondents namely Muhammad Amin, Sikandar Hayat, Raza Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Jamil Razzaq under section 148, P.P.C. And sentenced them to three years' R.I. Each along with a fine of Rs.10,000 each.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of this appeal contends that the prosecution has produced overwhelming evidence on record against the respondents; that the complainant had no enmity with the respondents and no question of false implication or substitution arises in this case; that ocular account furnished by the prosecution is supported by the medical as well as other supportive pieces of evidence; that the learned trial Court has wrongly acquitted the respondents from the charge as the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence against respondents to connect them with the alleged commission of crime as they shared common intention with their co-accused; that acquittal of the respondents is the result of mis-reading and non-reading of the prosecution evidence on record; that learned trial court was not justified to acquit the respondents from the charge of murder of complainant's son Muhammad Ansar and that the respondents are liable to be convicted and sentenced.
3. On the other hand, learned Deputy Prosecutor-General supports the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court.
4. We have heard the arguments and have also scanned the record summoned through the order dated 19-10-2005.
5. We have noticed that deceased had received injuries at Point "A" shown in the site-plan Exh.PR, whereas the complainant P.W.15 and his two sons Mazhar P. W.16 and Azhar P. W.17 had seen the occurrence while standing at point 'IV at a distance of more than 770 feet. It does not sound to reason that how they could describe the weapons and seats of injuries. It was a case of cross firing between the complainant party and the accused wherein different weapons were freely used by the parties, the fact that a large number of empties scattered over a large area were collected by the police indicates that occurrence did not took place as mentioned in the F.I.R. While lodging the F.I.R. Complainant alleged that shot resulting into death of the deceased was fired by Tahir Saleem accused P.O. In this case. No injury on the person of the deceased was attributed to any of the twenty eight respondents. A subsequent improvement of the complainant through supplementary statement regarding attribution of an injury to Zahid Saleem/respondent is an afterthought on the face of it, as no importance is attached to a supplementary statement in preference to the F.I.R. We respectfully rely on the case of Khalid Javed and another v. The State (2003 SCM R 1419) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that First Information Report is a document, which is entered at the complaint of the informant into a book, maintained at the police station under section 154, Cr.P.C. And is signed/thumb-marked by the informant while the supplementary statement is recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. And is not signed, F.I.R. Brings law into motion and the police under section 156, Cr.P.C. Starts investigation of the case, any statement or further statement of the first informant recorded during the investigation by the police would neither be equated with F.I.R.
Nor read as part of the same and the value of the supplementary statement therefore, will be determined keeping in view the principles enunciated by the superior Courts in this behalf.
6. We have further noticed that there is blackening around injury No. 2 (wound of entry) that is a circumstance wholly against the case setup by the prosecution as fire was allegedly made from about 400 feet. Dr. Zafar Iqbal Baig (P.W.10) who had conducted the postmortem examination opined that all the three injuries on the person of the deceased could be the result of one fire shot.
We are of the view that eye-witness account and medical evidence are at variance and do not coordinate with each other. Report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (Exh. PGG) is not of any help to the prosecution being negative qua the respondents.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant is unable to point out any infirmity, legal or factual error in the impugned judgment. He also remained unable to point out any particular or specific misreading or non-reading of the evidence on the part of the learned trial Court.
8. It is settled principle of criminal dispensation of justice that when an accused is acquitted from a case after regular trial, he enjoys double presumption of innocence. We respectfully refer the case of Iftikhar Hussain and others v. The State (2004 SCM R 1185), wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under:-- "It is well settled principle of criminal administration of justice that when an accused is acquitted of the charge, he enjoys double presumption of innocence in his favour and Courts seized with acquittal appeal under section 417, Cr.P.C. Are obliged to be very careful in dislodging such presumption."
In case of Azhar Ali v. The State (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 632) Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under:-- "(17) For conversion of judgment of acquittal into a conviction judgment, the principles have long been settled and are being followed by the Courts in the sub-continent. This Court in the case of "Inayatullah v. The State (PLD 1979 SC 956) recognized that "Superior Courts have consistently laid down certain defined and fundamental principles for regulating their jurisdiction in the case of acquittal appeals."
(18) These fundamental and regulatory principles were defined and endorsed from time to time. In the case of "Sheo Swarup and others v. King Emperor" AIR 1934 Privy Council 227 (2), it was held that:- --------------- the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as:
(1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses;
(2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, as presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial;
(3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and
(4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses . "
The Court in the case of "Yar Muhammad and 3 others v. The State" 1992 SCM R 96 observed that:-- "Unless the judgment of the trial Court is perverse, completely illegal, and on perusal of evidence no other decision can be given except that the accused is guilty or there has been complete misreading of evidence leading to miscarriage of justice, the High Court will not exercise jurisdiction under section 417, Cr. P.C. In exercising this jurisdiction the High Court is always slow unless it feels that gross injustice has been done in the administration of criminal Justice.................
And that the judgments of the learned Sessions Judge is perverse or is a result of complete misreading of evidence or that it is due to incompetence, stupidity or perversity that he has reached any distorted conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice."
9. We are satisfied that in this case the learned trial Court has given detailed, convincing and plausible reasons for acquittal of the respondents and same are based upon accepted principles of criminal jurisprudence, we therefore, find no justification to summon the twenty-eight respondents in this appeal, resultantly, appeal in hand stands dismissed.