' CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J.--- This is an appeal with the leave of the Court, against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 15-10-2009 by which the appellant's compulsory retirement order from the post of Senior Civil Judge under the provision of Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001 is upheld and his appeal is dismissed.
2. The summary of the facts is that the appellant who was in a judicial service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, served as Civil Judge, Dhirkot in the year 2006 and as Senior Civil Judge, Muzaffarabad in the year 2008. During his service on these stations allegedly he was found guilty of misconduct. The Chief Justice High Court (hereinafter referred to as authority) after consideration of initial reports decided to proceed against him under the provision of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001. The authority vide order dated 7-8-2008 appointed Mr. Abdul Rashid Sulehria (District and Sessions Judge/Chairman Income Tax Tribunal Muzaffarabad (as he was then) as Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer served the appellant the following list of allegations: {{ URDU TEXT }} {{ URDU TEXT }}
3. The appellant submitted detailed explanations in response to list of allegations. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry, recorded statements of Mr. Muhammad Younis District and Sessions Judge Muzaffarabad (of time), Abdul Waheed Mughal Reader Senior Civil Court, Anees Ahmed Record Keeper, Adil Hussain Stenographer, Muhammad Yousaf Reader, Syed Zulfiqar Hussain Superintendent, Ch. Shabir Ahmed Advocate and Ms. Rahat -Farooq, Advocate, and appellant was also personally heard by the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer after completion of required proceedings appreciated all the relevant proof and finally vide report dated 5-9-2008 found the allegations proved against the appellant. The Inquiry Officer recommended compulsory retirement with all pensionery benefits and in case of lacking required length of service for retirement, as alternate reversion to the lower post as Private Secretary was proposed.
4. On receipt of the Inquiry Report the authority served show cause notice upon the appellant why the recommended punishments may not be imposed? In response to show cause notice explanations were submitted and he was also personally heard by the Authority on 13-10-2008.
Authority concurring with inquiry report issued order of compulsory retirement of the appellant on 15-10-2008. The appellant preferred representation before the Prime Minister under section 9 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001, on its dismissal vide order dated 3-11-2008, appeal in the Service Tribunal was filed on 22-11-2008, which has been dismissed through the impugned order.
5. The appellant, who personally argued the case, repeated his version as stated in his explanations and written arguments. The appellant although has not denied the factual aspect of the allegations, however, he claims innocence on the basis of explanation extended by him. The gist of his version allegation-wise is summarized as following:--
(i) that the allegation No,1 doesn't fall within mischief of misconduct because all the alleged acts are performed in capacity of Judicial Officer which have got protection under the provisions of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850. He further explained and argued that in majority of cases, the judgments were written; however, in some cases drafts were prepared and due to inefficiency and shortage of the staff the judgments couldn't have been finalized. He contended that such practice is an ordinary routine of the Court because due to load of judicial work additionally performance of duties as Sub-Registrar over and above inefficiency of the staff, occurrence .Of such infirmities and discrepancies are natural;
(ii) the declaratory decrees in the suits filed on the basis of agreement to sell, have been granted in the light of the principle of law laid down by the High Court in Usman Shah's case, moreover, the parties compromised and there remains nothing controversial, especially when there was ban on the registration of sale-deeds, in such situation the jurisdiction of the Civil Court doesn't stand ousted, hence the decrees have been validly passed. He also claimed that such like decrees have also been passed by some other judicial officers but only he has been treated in discriminatory manner;
(iii) The allegation of contradictions in the (Monthly Reports) for the period of January to June, 2008, is against facts and is incorrect. The reports are based on correct figures.
(iv) According to his version the allegation of misconduct regarding appointment of his brother is a past and closed transaction, therefore, the same cannot be reopened. The salary drawn by Muhammad Sabir, has already been refunded. The matter was brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of the time before whom he appeared, apologized and the proceedings were 'dropped, that is why the appellant has been subsequently promoted by the authority. The matter of his seniority was favourably decided and some favourable orders have also been issued by the authority, which means that if there was any such alleged misconduct, that has been duly pardoned and waived.
' While arguing on overall aspects of the case, he submitted that even the alleged acts of misconduct, on their face value, don't fall within the definition of misconduct, as is defined in the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001. The list of allegation and show-cause notice have been served by the Inquiry Officer, which is violation of statutory provisions of law because this can only be served by the authority. Thus, the whole proceedings are violative of law and are not sustainable. He further argued that he has been condemned unheard. He approached the Authority, who has refused to hear him and in this regard he has referred to a copy of chit (Annexure P.I.); and
(vi) Lastly his contention is that as the order has been passed by the Chief Justice, whereas according to law the authority is High Court, thus the whole process is without lawful authority. In respect of technical objection, he explained that it is mere omission, whereas the requirement of law has been fulfilled by signing and incorporation of the verification, thus the objection is without lawful authority. He prayed for acceptance of appeal and placed reliance on the following legal precedents:-- PLD 1988 SC (AJ&K) 42, PLD 1963 AJK 81, 1980 CLC 1946, 1989 MLD 3319, 2005 PLC (C.S.) 1015, 1993 SCMR 633, 2009 SCR 18, 2004 PLC (C.S.) 1378, PLD 70 Pesh.
81.
6. Raja Sadaqat Hussain, the learned counsel for respondents argued that signing of memo. Of appeal, according to statutory, is mandatory, whereas the appellant's appeal filed in the Service Tribunal was unsigned. He vehemently argued that there are concurrent findings of facts against the appellant. The Inquiry Officer's findings are accepted by the Authority after due deliberation and hearing of appellant. The learned Service Tribunal, passed the impugned judgment by concurring with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and Authority, therefore, the appellant has failed to make out any legal ground for interference by this apex Court in the impugned order. He further argued that although there is cogent evidence which proves the guilt of the appellant but in presence of appellant's own stand as brought on record in his reply submitted in response to list of allegations and show cause notice amounts to confession, and according to principle of law admitted facts need not to be proved. He further contended that the Inquiry proceedings and order passed by Authority and impugned order are quite consistence with the principles of law and justice, therefore, appeal is not maintainable.
7. After hearing the arguments of the parties we have minutely gone through the impugned judgment, Inquiry Report, detailed order of the Authority, the written arguments submitted by the appellant and all other record.
8. First of all we would like to attend the preliminary objection of the respondent that the appeal filed before the Service Tribunal was not signed by the appellant. The clause "F" of Rule 7 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules which deals with the proposition, is reproduced as under:- "7. Every memorandum of appeal shall;
(a) ..........................................
(b) ..........................................................................................................................
(c) ..........................................................................................................................
(d) ..........................................................................................................................
(e) ..........................................................................................................................
(f) be singed or thumb impressed by the appellant and verified at the foot by the appellant or his counsel."
' The perusal of the memorandum of appeal reveals that it has been verified and signed by the appellant at its foot, however, at the end of the prayer clause and before the verification although the name of the appellant is written but the signature is omitted. In our opinion, the signing the verification by the appellant is a substantial compliance of rule. Mere absence of signature at the end of the prayer clause, doesn't amount to non-compliance of the rule because the rule itself doesn't call for twice signing the memo. Of appeal. Moreover, no penalty, for failure to sign has been provided by the statute. This Court while dealing with an identical question under the parameteria provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, in Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din's case (PLD 1988 SC (AJ&K) 42) observed as following:--- "Other aspect of the case is that in absence of duly, made appointment of the counsel who signed the pleadings, it shall be deemed as if the pleading of plaintiffs, was not signed. This was violative of rule 14, Order VI, C.P.C. It is undenying that a suit cannot be dismissed for absence of signature of plaintiff on the plaint. This, again, is considered as formal defect, rectifiable at any stage. In present case, it may be said, as the plaint was not duly signed it suffered from this defect. The answer is that in this situation plaintiffs could have been asked to sign the plaint at subsequent stage. The suit could not be dismissed on this ground. The Court was empowered to call the plaintiffs to sign the plaint to do away with the defect. On this premises, it is permissible to hold that on signing the Vakalatnama, at subsequent stage, and removal of the defect, the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted on the date of presentation of the plaint and its registration in the office."
(Underlining is ours)
' Whereas the same view has been reaffirmed in Muhammad Reaz Khan's case (PLD 1990 SC (AJ&K)
13).
' The apex Court of Pakistan, while attending to the identical legal proposition of omission to sign written statement in Muhammad Anwar Khan's case (PLD 2002 SC (AJ&K) 491), observed as following:--- "We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. None has appeared for the respondents despite notice and as such they have been preceded ex parte.
We have noticed that the learned Single Judge has A dismissed F.A.O. On the ground that the petitioners-defendants neither signed their written statement on their behalf nor any request was made by them asking the trial Court to permit them to sign the same. Since they did not sign written statement, as such learned Judge was of the view that no indulgence should be shown to them and discretion exercised by the learned trial Court was apt and proper. We are sorry to hold that this sort of approach to determine the lis is not appreciated. The duty of the Court is to do substantial justice and in this case the petitioners have been made to suffer simply on a technical ground." (Underlining is ours)
' In the light of above discussed principle of law enunciated in the reports, it is held that the preliminary objection raised by the respondents is not maintainable, which is repelled.
9. The next important point raised is a legal question of exercising powers of authority, whether these powers are exercisable by the Chief Justice alone or by the council of Judges of the High Court. The appellant has placed reliance on clause "L" Rule 112 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules, 1984. This question doesn't require any detailed deliberation as it has already been resolved by this Court in Civil Appeal No,116 of 2004 titled Munir Ahmed Chaudhry v.
Mrs. Nurgis Aftab Raja and others, decided on 14-10-2009 wherein it has been observed as under:-- -B "After going through the above mentioned arguments and the record of the case we may observe here that as far the subordinate judiciary is concerned, it is only the High Court which has to superintend, control and issue orders in respect of appointments, promotions and preparation of seniority lists etc. This power is exercised by the High Court under Rules known as the High Court Procedure Rules, 1984 and other enabling provisions relating to the establishment of Judicial Boards etc. The High Court Procedure Rules namely. Rules 111, 112, 113 and 114 deal with the executive and administrative business of the Court. Rule 111 authorizes the learned Chief Justice of the High Court to appoint one of the Judges of the High Court to be the Judge in administrative departments and according to the coal provisions can perform following functions: `111. (1) Subject to these rules, the Chief Justice may from time to time appoint one of the Judges of the Court to be the Judge in the Administrative Department.
(2) The Judge in the Administrative Department shall have the power to pass orders on the following matters:
(a) all returns and statements, not being returns to precepts and Judicial orders or explanations called for by particular Judges or Benches;
(b) matters arising out of the review of all periodical returns and statements furnished by the subordinate Civil, Criminal and other Courts subordinate to the High Court;
(c) applications and routine references connected with the admission and enrolment of pleaders:
(d) any other matter which the Chief Justice may, by a special or general order, refer to the Judge for orders."
Rule 112 deals with the cases which are to be decided in Judges meeting. The relevant part of the provision is reproduced as under:--
(k) all appointments, posting and promotions which by law are made by the Court and which are not otherwise expressly provided for by, these rules:
(1) all recommendations for the dismissal or suspension from office of Judicial Officers or for taking any administrative action against any one of such officers;"
Now coming to Rule 114 which is reproduced in verbatim along with the amendment pressed into service by Mr. M. Tabassum Afttab Alvi. The learned counsel: "114. The Court has delegated the following administrative functions and powers exercisable by it to the Chief Justice and any orders passed or action taken in respect of the matters by the Chief Justice shall be deemed to be the action and orders of the Court:
(a) grant of privilege, casual or station leave for Judicial Officers;
(b) grant or renewal of license to a Pleader or Advocate;
(c) permissions to a Judicial Officer to hold spot trail;
(d) permission to a Judicial Officer to appear as a witness;
(e) allowing or disallowing joining time or/an Advance T.A. To Judicial Officers on their transfer;
(f) conferment of Magisterial powers (Judicial) and powers to try offences summarily on Judicial Officers;
(g) investment of pecuniary jurisdiction on Judicial Officers; and
(h) Delimitation of the territorial jurisdiction of Courts." (Underlining is ours)
Through amendment vide notification dated 17-7-2000, sub-rule
(i) has been added after sub-rule (h) which reads as under:
(i) Powers under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Judicial Service Rules, 1999.
' The opening part of Rule 114 clearly reveals that even if the Chief Justice exercises any power in total exclusion of other Judges, his orders and actions shall be deemed to be the actions and orders of the Court. We, therefore, hold that under Rule 8 of the Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1976, the first respondent to be impleaded in the appeal before the Service Tribunal is the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir through its Registrar and the Chief Justice or the learned Judges of the High Court should not be impleaded as respondents in the Service Appeal before the Service Tribunal." (Underlining is ours)
' Following the above dictum, it is held that according to the amended provisions of Rule 114 of the High Court Procedure Rules, the powers and functions under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Judicial Service Rules, 1999 exercisable by the High Court have been specifically vested in the Chief Justice, thus the Chief Justice is the competent authority and in the matter in hand, there is no violation of law by exercising powers of the authority by the Chief Justice.
10. Another important question raised is that all the alleged acts of misconduct relates to judicial functions, under the provisions of the .Judicial Officer Protection Act, 1850, such acts have got immunity, therefore, no proceeding can be initiated on the basis of such judicial act. For convenience the relevant provision of the Judicial Officers Protection Act is reproduced as following:-
1. Non-liability to suit of officers acting judicially, for official acts done in good faith, and of officers executing warrants and orders. No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction: ' Provided that he at the time, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of; and no officer of any Court or other person, bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any such Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court, for the execution of any warrant or order, which he would be bound to execute, if within the furisdiction of the person issuing the same."
' The bare recital of this provision clearly connotes that the immunity is only to the extent of civil liability and this is also with the condition if the acts are done in good faith. No immunity from criminal liability or disciplinary actions or misconduct proceeding has been provided by this law.
Thus, the argument of the appellant that his alleged acts of misconduct do not fall within the mischief of the 'misconduct' due to the provisions of the Judicial Officer Protection Act, is without any substance.
11. The next legal question raised on behalf of the appellant is that the list of allegation and show cause notice have not been served by the authority, whereas under the provisions of the Removal from Service (Special Powers) 'Act, 2001, it is mandatory that the list of allegations and show cause notice must be served upon the accused by the authority and any departure from the statutory provision vitiates the whole proceedings. We have considered the arguments of the appellant, but this argument appears to be result of some misconception. Under the provisions of section 5 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001 the Inquiry Officer or as the case may be, the Inquiry Committee shall have to communicate to the accused the charges and the statement of allegations specified in the order of inquiry passed by the competent authority. Thus in the instant case the communication of statement of allegation by the Inquiry Officer is in accordance with the provisions of law. The communication of the statement of the allegation by the authority is not the requirement of law. Whereas the appellant himself has pleaded this fact that after submission of the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer, the authority has also served upon him'the show cause notice and provided the opportunity of hearing. Thus the appellant couldn't succeed to point out any departure made in the proceedings from the mandatory statutory provisions..
12. Another argument advanced by the appellant is that the alleged acts do not fall within the definition of the "misconduct" as defined in clause 'b' of section 2 of Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001 The referred clause is reproduced as under:-- "(b) "Misconduct.--- includes conduct prejudicial to good order or service discipline or conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman or involvement or participation for gain either directly or indirectly in industry, trade or speculative transactions or abuse or misuse of the official position to gain undue advantage or assumption of financial or other obligations to private institutions or persons such as may cause embarrassment in the performance of official duties or functions."
' The phraseology of this clause clearly conveys that the definition is not complete and comprehensive rather it speaks that among others the ingredients stated in the clause also include in the definition of the misconduct. Whereas, under clause 'D' of Rule 2 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977, the misconduct is defined as following:-- "(d) "misconduct" means conduct prejudicial to good order or service discipline or contrary to the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules as applicable to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir or conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman and includes any act on the part of a civil servant to bring or attempt to bring political or other outside influence directly or indirectly to bear on the Government or any Government officer in respect of any matter relating to the appointment, promotion, transfer, punishment, retirement or other conditions of service of a civil servant."
' The term "misconduct" has very broad scope and it includes the conduct prejudicial to good order or service discipline or contrary to the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules. The alleged acts of the appellant incorporated in the statement of the allegations, prima-facie, fall in the definition of the misconduct, therefore, this argument has no substance.
13. After dealing with the legal question raised in appeal, now we advert to the merit of the case. As it has already been observed that the appellant has not denied the factual happening of the alleged acts of misconduct as incorporated in the statement of allegations. For instance, while submitting his explanation in regard to allegation No,1, he states that:- {{ URDU TEXT }} ' Whereas, regarding allegation No,2, he has very frankly admitted that the decrees on the basis of agreement-to-sell have been granted but the same have been granted following the judgment of the High Court handed down in Usma n Shah's case. Moreover, according to appellant's version all the decrees have been validly passed under the provisions of enforced law. He extended the following explanation:- {{ URDU TEXT }}
14. The reply regarding the allegation No,3 reads as under:- {{ URDU TEXT }} ' Whereas, he has submitted explanation on the allegation regarding appointment of his brother as following:-- {{ URDU TEXT }} Thus in presence of the above reproduced explanations of the appellant, there remains no doubt and controversy that all the acts in the statement of allegation have been admitted by the appellant, hence there remains no necessity of any further proof regarding the factual aspects of the case. The only aspect of the case, which requires deliberation, is whether the. Explanations and reasoning extended by the appellant, justifies such acts to exonerate him from the liability. At three different stages the concerned authorities (Inquiry Officer, Authority and the Service Tribunal) have concurred that the explanations and reasoning, extended by the appellant are not acceptable. The explanation of the appellant regarding his first allegation that due to some inefficiency of staff or some other exigencies, the judgments and orders have been announced without writing or completion could be acceptable if it rendered in rare cases and exceptional matters, but as the report shows that in a few days' time announcement of judgments in more than two dozen cases without proper drafting of judgments and decrees is unbecoming conduct of a . Judicial Officer of the status of Senior Civil Judge, which cannot be ignored only for the reason that the staff is inefficient or due to availing leave, the judgments and drafts have not been finalized.
15. The explanation of the appellant that he has granted decrees in the suits filed on the basis of agreement-to-sell, following the dictum of the High Court laid down in Usman Shah's case. On the other hand he has shown ignorance regarding the judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject reported as 2007 SCR 235 titled Said Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf and 2 others. The perusal of the referred judgment of the High Court titled Muhammad Usman Shah v. Muhammad Azeem and another decided on 17-10-2003, reveals that in this case the High Court has not laid down the principle of law that a declaratory decree of ownership, merely on the basis of agreement to sell can be granted rather the referred case has its own peculiar long litigation history and specially the High Court, on the proved facts that the plaintiff has not only averred that he has obtained a piece of land through agreement to sell but also pleaded that residential house has also been constructed upon the said land and these facts have also been proved by the report of the commission after spot inspection. Thus, in view of these peculiar and special facts, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the High Court, in this judgment, has enunciated principle of law that in every case of agreement to sell a declaratory decree of ownership can be granted. It is amazing that on the one hand, an unreported case of the High Court is relied upon by the appellant, but at the same time regarding a reported judgment of the Supreme Court, the appellant's version is that:- {{ URDU TEXT }} ' According to constitutional provisions sections 42-B and 44-B of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, the judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court are binding upon the subordinate Court to the extent that it decides the question of law and enunciates the principle of law. As it has already been observed that in the unreported judgment of the High Court, the case of Usman Shah, no principle of law has been enunciated, whereas in the reported judgment of this Court (2007 SCR 235) the principle of law on the subject has been categorically laid down as under:- "Suffice it to say that in presence of law regulating the transfer of immovable property which holds the field, any transfer made in violation of that law cannot be accepted and any person who violates the law to save the costs of the stamp-papers, registration and other fee cannot be allowed to do so. Fixing the price of the suit land as Rs,100 to save the registration fee in facts amounts to fraud."
Thus the explanation extended to by the appellant appears to be a lame excuse, which doesn't match with law knowing person and specially the Judicial Officer of status of a Senior Civil Judge.
16. The most glaring act of misconduct is the appointment of his real brother as a Junior Clerk in violation of statutory provisions. According to admitted facts the appointment was made without advertisement of post and without lawful authority. It is not acceptable that merely due to ignorance of the notification the appointment has been made. The appellant has admitted the appointment of his brother without lawful authority, refunding the salary drawn, thus this sole act is such a glaring misconduct, which overshadows all other aspects of the case. The sole explanation in this regard that the matter is a past and closed transaction as it was brought to the notice of the authority and after tendering apology, it has been dropped. All these versions of the appellant, are verbal. He has failed to substantiate his version by bringing on record any proof or document. Thus in absence of any proof, it cannot be claimed that the act of misconduct after due process of law has been finalized and dropped. It appears that for the first time proper inquiry, in this regard, has been held. Neither this matter was previously inquired nor any order, in this regard, has been passed by the authority. Therefore, it is not acceptable that this falls in the domain of past and closed transaction and amounts to double jeopardy. The same is the position regarding the version of the appellant that some other Judicial Officers have also passed decrees of ownership on the basis of agreement to sell and he has been met discriminatory treatment in this regard, but he has failed to bring on record that any other judicial officers' such conduct has been reported and the concerned authority after inquiry and proof doesn't dealt with the same according to law.
The I question of discriminatory treatment can only be raised if any other judicial officer on the same allegation after initiation of proceeding and proof has been acquitted or exonerated from the charges. In absence of any such proof the question of discriminatory treatment doesn't arise.
17. So far as the legal precedents referred to by the appellant are concerned; we have considered the same but due to peculiar facts and distinguishable features, those have no nexus with the case in hand, therefore, any detail discussion is not useful.
18. The judgment of the Service Tribunal is a speaking one as well as the inquiry report is also well reasoned, whereas the authority has passed orders after due application of mind and providing the appellant the opportunity of hearing. It is regrettable that the appellant in memo. Of appeals used the language and phraseology offending the norms of the pleadings. The appellant's version that he has been refused right of hearing by the authority and in this regard he has placed on record a chit annexure "PI", which reads as following:-- {{URDU TEXT}} ' The wording of this chit clearly indicates that the appellant attempted to approach the authority during the preceding of the inquiry. The authority has directed him to approach the Inquiry Officer and avoid to contact the authority, which is a proper and judicious 'conduct of the authority. It is regrettable that the appellant has tactfully attempted to use this chit as misleading tool, whereas he himself has placed on the record a notice dated 7-10-2008 annexure "PH", which speaks that:- {{ URDU TEXT }} ' Thus the juxtaposition perusal of these two documents clearly unveiled the reality and mental approach of the appellant, which, in our opinion, is not like a Judicial Officer. The Judicial Officers as compared to any other public servant are expected to maintain high caliber and integrity. The apex court of Pakistan in Ch. Shabbir'Hussain's case (PLD 2004 SC 191), while attending the question of judicial officer's integrity, has observed.As under:-- "5. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties have received our anxious consideration. However, before proceeding to determine the questions involved in these appeals we deem it necessary to observe that although all the civil servants are bound to be honest having unblemished integrity, the Judicial Officers are supposed to excel in this trait of character in view of the sacred and sensitive nature of their duties and the pivotal position which justice occupies in Islam according to the following verse of the Holy Qur'an:Qur'an:-- 0' You who believe, the maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for Allah's sake though it may be against your ownselves or your parents or near relations, be the rich or poor, Allah is most competent to deal with them both, do not follow your low desires lest your deviate, and if you swerve or turn aside then Allah is aware of what you do." (Sura 4, Verse 135).
' Islam also enjoins that those who perform the functions of Judges must not only posses profound knowledge and deep insight but also be men of integrity and capable of holding the scales of justice even under all circumstances. We, therefore, cannot help remarking that Judicial Officers are expected to guard their reputation jealously and the Reporting Officer/Countersigning Officers are obliged to assess their conduct after careful consideration and without being led away by any prejudice or bias."
' In the light of the above observation of the apex Court of Pakistan, we expect from the Judicial Officers that according to the requirement of the office they hold, they will strive for maintaining their unimpeachable character, integrity, inefficiency and ability according to the golden principles as laid down by the Sharia for a Judicial office holder.
19. It is another sad aspect of the story that the appellant in his explanations has claimed innocence on the basis of ignorance of law. For instance, while extending the explanation regarding allegation No,3-B, he has submitted:-- {{ URDU TEXT }} ' The same is the case regarding a reported case 2007 SCR 235, wherein the principle of law has been enunciated by this Court. The appellant explained: ' Whereas at the same time he has claimed to be expert of law:- {{ URDU TEXT }} The conduct of the appellant is not only contradictory but also not like a Judicial Officer. It is suffice to say that it is a universally accepted and celebrated principle that ignorance of law is no excuse.
While all over the world a lay man cannot -claim the excuse of ignorance of law how such excuse can be -available to a Judicial Officer. The appellant has failed to point out any illegality in the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal, In the light of the hereinabove discussed detail reasons, we don't find any substance in the appeal, which is hereby dismissed with costs.