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1981 PLC 779

MUHAMMAD SALEEM vs CHAIRMAN, KARACHI PORT TRUST , ,

Citation1981 PLC 779
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No, KAR-557 of 1980
Date1980-08-17
Judge(s)Z. A. Channa
ResultCase remanded

DECISION ' The services of the appellant, who was employed as a Carpenter in the K.P.T., the respondents herein, were terminated on the ground that he had over-stayed his leave without prior permission.

The Medical Certificate submitted by the appellant in support of his contention that he had fallen ill at his native place and was, therefore, unable to report for duty on the expiry of the leave granted, was rejected by the Chairman, K.P.T., despite the fact that it was supported by the Chief Medical Officer. The appellant challenged the orders of termination of his services before the Labour Court which rejected it on the ground that the grievance petition filed by him was barred by limitation. On appeal, this Tribunal held that the grievance petition filed by the appellant is within time and accordingly remanded the case to the learned Labour Court for decision on merits. On remand, the Labour Court has once more dismissed the appellant's grievance petition, this time on the ground that the claim for reinstatement in service by the appellant is based on Standing Order 12 (3), but since the Standing Orders are not applicable to the K.P.T., the appellant's grievance petition was not maintainable. In coming to this decision the learned Labour Court relied upon the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Imam Bux v. Trustees of the Port of Karachi (Appeal No, KAR-405 of 1979, decided on 18th December, 1979). The appellant has once more approached this Tribunal in appeal against the said decision.

2. Mr. Mughees Ahmed Samdani, the learned representative of the appellant, has raised a two-fold contention in support of the appeal. His first contention was that the application of the Standing Orders will be excluded in respect of an establishment only if it has properly framed A-- Statutory Rules of Service, Conduct and Discipline. He submitted that if such rules have not been framed by the competent authority or are not framed in accordance with the Statute under which they purport to have been framed they cannot be considered to be valid statutory rules and will not have the effect of excluding the application of the Standing Orders. The learned representative invited my attention to Appendix B-I of the K. P. T. Digest of Rules. The said Appendix contains the K.

P. T. Officers and Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules. According to the recitals made in the above Appendix the rules were approved by Board's Resolution, dated 15th March, 1968, and were sanctioned by the Government of Pakistan, vide their letter, dated 25th June, 1969. The learned representative submitted that inasmuch as the K. P. T. Act requires that the rules must be framed with the prior sanction of the Government of Pakistan whereas in the instant case the sanction is a post facto one and follows the approval of the rules by the Board of Trustees, the rules in question cannot be considered to have been framed in accordance with the requirements of the statute and have, therefore, to be ignored. The argument of the learned representative is attractive but on a closer examination of it I find it to be without substance. The requirement of law is not that approval of the Government should b obtained before even the Board drafts. The rules but such approval must precede the framing of the rules. Obviously the Government cannot be expected to accord its approval to rules which are yet to be drafted and are not in existence even in draft form.

The word "framed" in the Statute has been used, in my opinion, in the sense of enforcing or bringing into operation. The rules in question were admittedly enforced after approval thereto of the Government of Pakistan was obtained. As such, I am of the view that rules have been properly framed.

2. It was next contended by Mr. Mughees Ahmed Samdami that the plea that the Standing Orders were not applicable to the K. P. T. Had not been initially raised by the K. P. T. And consequently this plea could not have been entertained or upheld by the learned Labour Court. This contention is not quite correct. In their written objections to the grievance petition, the very first objection taken' by the respondents is that the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to try the matter. In other words the respondents were taking the plea that the grievance petition in question was not maintainable by the learned Labour Court. In any case, since the question whether the Standing Orders are or are not applicable to the K.P.T. Goes to the root of the matter it involves1.8 the question of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and hence this objection can be taken at any time, as has been held by their Lordships] of the Privy Council.

4. For the reasons discussed by me, I find no merit in this appeal and, accordingly, dismiss the same. Appeal dismissed.

1981 L C 781 [Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind] Present : Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal KARACHI SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. versus ALLAH RAKHA CHAUDHR Y Appeal No, KAR-460 of 1980, heard on 25th August, 1980.

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)- -- S. 25-A read with West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)

Ordinance (V of 1968), S.

0. 10-C (1)-Workeman claiming payment of statutory bonus-No longer in service-Cannot make grievance petition before Labour Court. [p. 7811A Zahid Hamid for Appellant.

Ashraf Hussain Rizvi for Respondent. Date of hearing : 25th August 1980.

DECISION ' This appeal is directed against a decision of the learned Second Labour Court, given on 12th May 1980, directing the appellants herein to pay compulsory bonus to the respondent under Standing Order 10-C (1) in addition to the bonus already received by him. The respondent, in his grievance petition, has claimed that he was entitled to receive bonus under Standing Order 10-C (1) equivalent to one month's pay for the year 1976-1977, in addition to the bonus for one month for the said year received by him in accordance with the settlement between the appellant organization and the representatives of the workman executed on 10th June 1977. The appellants resisted the grievance petition on the grounds that it was time-barred, that the respondent had in fact already been paid Bonus under Standing Order 10-C (1) and that no grievance notice, as required by section 25-A, I.R.O., had been given by the appellant to the respondent organization. These contentions were repelled by the learned Labour Court which has passed the impugned Order.

2. The learned Labour Court, has it appears, overlooked the fact that admittedly when the respondent filed his grievance petition he had ceased to be an employee of the appellant organization and hence was not a worker of the appellants. It has been held by this Tribunal in the case of Noor Muhammad v. Shah Textile Mills Ltd., decided on 29th October, 1979, on the basis of the definition of worker, as given in the I.R.O., that a person who has ceased to be in the employment of an organization, cannot be held to be a 'worker' of that organization and hence is not' entitled to prefer a grievance petition against it under section 25-A, I.R.O. This aspect of the case has not been considered by the learned Labour Court. According to Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi, the learned representative for the respondent, the respondent had, subsequent to the filing of his grievance petition, been reinstated in service by the appellant organization but he was once more dismissed and he second dismissal order has been challenged before a Labour Court. There is, however, no evidence on record, to these important facts. I would, accordingly, set aside the impugned order of the learned Labour Court and remand the case to it for giving a decision on the issue whether the respondent's grievance petition was maintainable after giving an opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on this important issue which involves question of jurisdiction.

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