' IJAZ UL AHSAN, J.---This Constitutional Petition arises out of order dated 1-11-2010 passed by a learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi. Through the impugned order an application under Article 77 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order filed by the respondents Nos.1 to 3 was allowed and the said respondents were permitted to produce secondary evidence 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner filed a suit for recovery of possession, permanent injunction and compensation for illegal use of half of Market No,U-542, Peshawari Street, Mochi Bazar, Rawalpindi City. The respondents contested the suit and claimed that they had obtained half portion from the eastern side of the suit property on rent through an agreement dated 30-8-2000, subject to payment of Rs,2,000 per month as rent. The original agreement dated 30-8-2002 was allegedly in the custody and possession of Muhammad Ashraf, the landlord, who passed away .During pendency of the suit, In view of the fact that the agreement was not in possession of the .Respondents, they moved an application to present a photocopy of the agreement in question as secondary evidence.
3. The petitioner contested the application on different grounds and took the stance that the suit was filed on 22-11-2003, the entire evidence of the petitioner had been recorded by the year 2005, the suit had been fixed for evidence of the respondents on various dates of hearing. However, every possible effort was being made to prolong the proceedings. It was averred that the respondents were colluding with the owner of the eastern side of the property to deprive the petitioners of their lawful rights. They had neither authorized any person to enter into an agreement relating to the suit property nor had they themselves entered into any such agreement. The document sought to be produced was fake and could not be allowed to be produced by way of secondary evidence at such belated stage. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court dismissed the application holding that the application was a delaying tactic and an afterthought.
Aggrieved of the aforesaid order, the respondents filed a revision petition which was heard by an Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi. Vide order dated 1-11-2010, the revisional court allowed the petition, set aside the order of, the learned Civil Judge and accepted the application of the respondents under Article 77 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order.
4. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Additional- District Judge, Rawalpindi, lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon 'the petition. He further submits that the document sought to be produced as secondary evidence was never brought on record nor was it mentioned in the list of reliance filed with the written statement.
The document is an afterthought and cannot be allowed to be produced in evidence.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents, on 'the other hand, submits that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court is to be determined with reference to the valuation given in the plaint and cannot be connected to escalation in the price of the property during pendency of the suit or happening of any other subsequent event that may increase the monetary value of the claim with the passage of time. As far as the question of the agreement is concerned, a photocopy of which is sought to be brought on record, the learned counsel has drawn my attention to the written statement filed by the respondents in which there is specific reference to the agreement dated 30- 8-2002 which was in the custody and possession of Muhammad Ashraf, the landlord. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to the list of documents and reliance filed with the written statement in which the document in question has been relied upon. The case of the respondents is that since the original agreement was in custody and control of Muhammad Ashraf, who lived in Karachi and passed away during pendency of the suit, it is not possible for the respondents to produce the said document in original. They are entitled to be permitted to produce a copy of the said agreement by way Of secondary evidence in terms of Article 77 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.
6. .I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record.
7. A perusal of the plaint indicates that the total compensation sought by the petitioners at the time of filing of the suit was in the sum of Rs,520,000. Although future rent was also claimed, the same is not material for the purposes of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court or the appellate forum. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to a document which shows the estimated rental value of the property from 6-11-2002 to 6-11-2010. In the said document which does not appear to be a part of the record of the trial court, the rental value of the property in question has been calculated to be in excess of Rs,49,40,150. The suit was filed in 2003.
In my view, the said amount of Rs,49,40,150 which is claimed to have accumulated during the past eight years while the suit was pending is not relevant for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction of the appellate forum.
8. In Messrs Voyage De Air, General Sales Agent, Shaheen Air International and another v. Shaheen Air International Pvt. Ltd. And 4 others (2006 CLC 173), this Court examined this question end held that forum of appeal is to be determined on the basis of original value of the suit and pecuniary jurisdiction of the District. Judge was always to be derived from valuation in the plaint. Section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, as amended in 2002 provides that appeal against a decree or order of the Civil Judge would lie to the District Judge, if the value of the original suit in which such decree or order was made did not exceed Rs,2.5 million, and to the High Court in any other case. Jurisdictional value of the present suit was fixed and determined by the plaintiff in the sum of approximately Rs,520,000. Neither the defendant nor the trial court or the appellate court had questioned the original jurisdictional value of the suit. If the court had disagreed with the determined jurisdictional value of the suit, it could have passed an order under section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, fixing the value after framing an issue and affording an opportunity to the parties to produce evidence. This was not done. Therefore valuation of the suit for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction would be the same as fixed by the plaintiff in the plaint. The learned Additional District Judge was therefore within his jurisdictional powers to entertain and decide the appeal.
9. In the aforesaid context, reference may also be made to Ilahi Bakhsh and others v. Mst. Bilqees Begum (PLD 1985 SC 393). In the said Judgment it was held that the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction in matters of appeal would be the same as in the plaint.
10. As for the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the agreement dated 30-8- 3003 was not relied upon by the respondent, the same is not borne out from the record. There is specific referent to the agreement dated 30-8-2002 in paragraph-4 of the written statement. The list of documents under Order XII, Rule 10 and List of Reliance under Order VII, Rule 14 filed with the written statement, which was filed in 2004, also contain specific mention of the said agreement.
Therefore the assertion that the agreement is an afterthought does not carry much weight.
11. As far as maintainability of this petition is concerned it is only in exceptional circumstances that this Court interferes in exercise of Constitutional Jurisdiction against orders passed in civil revision.
Reference in this regard may usefully be made to Mst. Iqbal Begum through her Legal Heirs v.
Muhammad Akbar and 5 others (1992 CLC 232), wherein this Court held that where the trial court had disallowed production of oral and documentary evidence after closing of evidence by the defendants and the revisional court had allowed production of additional evidence, the revisional order whereby defendants were allowed to produce additional evidence could not be deemed to have been passed without jurisdiction. No jurisdictional defect having been pointed out in the order in question, the same would not warrant interference in exercise of Constitutional Jurisdiction. The High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the revisional order which was deemed to be final and not open to any further scrutiny by the High Court. Where no perversity or arbitrariness could be demonstrated in the impugned revisional order which indicates exercise of jurisdiction by the revisional court after proper judicial application of mind to the lis before passing such order, the same could not be set at naught in exercise of Constitutional Jurisdiction only because a different view was possible on the facts placed before the said court. Reference in this regard may also be made to Nawabzada Malik Habibullah Khan v. The Pak. Cement Industries Limited and others (1969 SCM R 965) and Abdul Aziz Shah and another v. Abdul Ghafoor and another (1985 SCM R 221).
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed any other ground in support of this petition. In view of the above,. I am not persuaded to hold that the order passed by the revisional court is arbitrary, perverse or in excess of jurisdiction. The perusal of the order indicates that the learned revisional court has passed the impugned order after due application of judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The order is based upon the correct appreciation and interpretation of the law on the subject.
13. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed.