1. DORAB PATEL, ACTG. C. J.-The petitioner was employed by the first respondent as a supervisor. The first respondent's establishment included male and female workers and on 17-11-1973, the petitioner was charge-sheeted on the complaints of two female workers that he had misbehaved with them, as the petitioner in his reply denied the allegations against him, the first respondent's Management held an enquiry. The petitioner participated in the enquiry and produced evidence, but as the enquiry report was against him, the first respondent, to whom we will refer as the respondent, sent him, by registered post, a second show-cause notice, but it is admitted that this notice was not delivered to the petitioner. However, according to the learned counsel, when the petitioner reported for duty the next day, he was informed that he had been dismissed and he was not permitted to work, therefore, after- serving a grievance notice, he filed an application under section 25 A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance in the Junior Labour Court, Karachi. Both the parties produced evidence and one of the grievances of the petitioner was that he had not been served with any dismissal order. However, the Junior Labour Court dismissed the petitioner's application, therefore, he filed an appeal in the Labour Court and learned counsel informed us that the appeal was allowed and the case remanded on the strange ground that the order of the Junior Labour Court was not legible. Therefore, on 3-2-1975, the Junior Labour Court wrote an order which was presumably legible dismissing the petition.
2. The petitioner challenged this order in an appeal in the Labour Court and it would appear that the appeal was allowed by consent and the case remanded to the Junior Labour Court for giving a fresh decision. On this second remand neither party produced evidence, but by its order dated 26- 8-1975, the Junior Labour Court allowed the petitioner's application and ordered his re-instatement.
3. We would pause to point out here that this order was contrary to the order of the Junior Labour Court dated 3-2-1975 and was passed on the same evidence as both parties had declined to produce further evidence on the remand of the case. Therefore, it is not surprising that the respondent challenged this order of the Junior Labour Court in appeal, which was allowed by the Labour Court on 19-8-1975, and so the petitioner filed a writ petition in the Sind & Baluchistan High Court against this order of the Labour Court.
4. The respondent contested the writ petition but after examining the prolonged litigation between the parties, the learned Judge, who heard the writ petition agreed with the view of the Labour Court that the enquiry against the petitioner bad been fair and that he had misbehaved with the female members on the respondent's staff. But the petitioner had challenged the Labour Court's order dismissing his grievance application on two further grounds. The first was that he had not received the second show-cause notice and the second was that his services had not beep terminated. The learned Judge examined these contentions and as to the second show-cause notice, he stated in his judgment of 25-8-1978 :- "Presumably, the petitioner himself may have declined to accept the letter or may have temporarily shifted from that place, but whatever may have been the case for the non-service of the second show-cause notice on him, it does appear to me that respondent No. 3 had fulfilled his obligations in this behalf. Moreover, it appears that the petitioner was served with this show-cause notice a second time before the Labour Director."
5. Then as to the other grievance of the petitioner that he had not been served with a valid dismissal order, the learned Judge partly accepted this contention and held that the order of the dismissal had been -passed on 5-4-1974, therefore, he held that- "it could only take effect from the date andno oil an earlier date. The dismissal of the petitioner thus would be deemed to be legally effective not from 17-1-1974 but from 5-4-1974, when the order was passed and was apparently also communicated to the petitioner as appears from the endorsement on the order. The petitioner thus appears to be entitled to his legal remuneration for the period between 17-1-1974 and 5-4-1974."
6. Subject to the relief thus granted, the writ petition was dismissed, therefore, the petitioner has filed this petition for leave.
7. We have examined the evidence with the assistance of Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad, and at the outset, we have to emphasize that we agree with the concurrent findings of the Labour Courts and of the High Court that the enquiry held by the respondent against the petitioner was conducted both fairly and in accordance with the law. But, this is, prima facie, fatal to the petition for leave, because it means that it has been proved that the petitioner had misbehave with female members of the respondent's staff. It also means that the petitioner's dismissal was amply justified by his misconduct, which had been proved beyond doubt.
8. However, according to learned counsel, the effect of paragraph 12(3) of the Standing Orders of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, (hereinafter called the said Ordinance), was that the petitioner could not be dismissed "except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken." But, as the petitioner had been informed by a mere oral order after the second show-cause notice, not to report for duty, the further submission was that the petitioner's employment had not been lawfully terminated. Now, although the respondent had not issued a written order of dismissal after its second show-cause notice, and merely prohibited the petitioner from working by an oral order, the respondent proved that it had later passed a written order of dismissal on 5-4-1974, therefore, the learned Judge held that the petitioner's employment had been terminated on 5-4-1974 and had ordered that his play and emoluments should be paid to him upto that date. We have examined this order of 5-4-1974 and we are satisfied that it complies with the provisions of Standing Order 1213) of the said Ordinance, therefore, there is no merit in learned counsel's submission.
9. Mr. Lftikhar Ahmad's only other submission was that the High Court had erred in setting aside the Labour Courts' order, because the petitioner had not been served with a second show-cause notice and that as the respondent had dismissed him without giving him a hearing, this was illegal in view of the provisions of Standing Order 15(4). This plea had been raised in the High Court also, but it was repelled by the learned Judge with the observation that "the petitioner himself may have declined to accept" the second show-cause notice and that "the petitioner was served with this show-cause notice a second time before the Labour Director." Mr. Lttikhar Ahmad took us through the record and submitted that these observations were based on a misreading of evidence.
10. The argument is without force. The observation that the petitioner "himself may have declined to accept the letter" is based on conjecture and not on evidence. Next, as to the observation that the show-cause notice had been served on the petitioner in the presence of the Labour Director, even the learned Judge has not observed that this was before the order 6 terminating the petitioner's appointment, or that the respondent had heard the petitioner before passing the order of 5-4-1974.
11. Clearly, therefore learned counsel's criticism of the view taken in the judgment under appeal is correct. However, the question is of the effect of the failure to give a second show- cause notice.
12. When we invited learned counsel to refer us to the provision of law, which made a second show- cause notice mandatory, learned counsel cowl C only refer us to Standing Order 15(4). But this provision does not state in terms that a second show-cause notice is necessary before an employer terminates his workmen's services and the position might well have bees different, if there had been such a provision in the Standing Order. In order to overcome this difficulty, learned counsel submitted that the provision for a second show-came notice was implied in Standing Order 15(4), because a workman was entitled to be heard by his employer before he was dismissed, and learned counsel also relied on the fact that leave had been granted by this Court to examine this question. Now, although leave ha been granted to examine the validity of the construction which learned counsel seeks to place upon Standing Order 15(4), this provision, for example, p is quite different from Standing Order 12(3). And, as unlike Standing Order 12(3), Standing Order 15(4) does not in terms refer to a second-- show-cause notice, the petitioner's conduct is not irrelevant to his appeal to the principles of natural justice. As we explained, the finding that the petitioner was harassing female members of the respondent's staff has become final, and cannot be questioned in this Court. But, as any employer would have dismissed a workman misbehaving with female members of the staff, learned counsel's appeal to the principles of natural justice has a hollow ring, and, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the plea borders on technicality.
13. Additionally, this is not an appeal by right, but a petition by special leave, which has arisen out of a writ petition. That is very important because the remedy of a writ petition is not available to a person, who has z come with unclean hands to the Court, and it would be an under statement to say that the petitioner had come with unclean hands to the Court. Therefore, we venture to think, it would have been better if the writ petition had been dismissed on this short ground that the discretionary remedy of a writ petition was not available to a person, who had approached the Court with unclean hands. Accordingly, in all the circumstances discussed, we would hold that it is not a fit case for the grant of special leave and, therefore, we dismiss the petition.
14. ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.-I agree.