' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.---The plaint, in the suit for preemption filed by the appellant on 12-2-2005 pre-empting the sale of the suit property in favour of the respondent effected vide registered sale deed dated 7-7-2000, averring in the plaint that she had learnt about the said sale on 14-4-2004 while appearing in a Court in some other matter and made Talb-e-Muwathibat, was rejected by the Trial Court holding the suit to be time barred in terms of section 30(a) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991 (the Act). The appeal of the appellant against that decision was dismissed and her revision assailing the two verdicts was disallowed through the impugned judgment by the learned High Court. The leave in- this matter was granted vide order dated 17-6-2010 to consider "that peculiar factual perspective of the present pre-emption matter involve question of limitation and interpretation of section 30(d) read with section 30(a)(b)(c) and section 31 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991".
2. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that section 30(a) of the Act is subject to the provisions of section 31 therefor as no notice of sale had been published/issued as required by the latter provision, consequently, the limitation would commence from the date of the appellant's knowledge as per section 30(d) of the Act and/or even independent thereto, thus the suit instituted within four months therefrom was within the prescribed period of limitation. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon a judgment of this Court reported as Mian Asif Islam v.
Mian Muhammad Asif and others (PLD 2001 SC 499).
3.Heard. The above dictum is by a two Members Bench of this Court, one of the Hon'ble Judges has come to the conclusion "Thus we are of the opinion and for the above discussion and the background of the legislation narrated hereinabove the provisions of subsection (2) of section 31 of the Act are mandatory in nature. In addition to it both the sections i,e, sections 30 and 31 are dependent upon each other for the obvious reason that in the former section period for enforcement of right pre-emption within four months from registration is prescribed of sale- deed is prescribed whereas under latter section the registering officer is under legal obligation to issue notice to general public about registration of the sale-deed so that any person may claim his right of pre-emption. Thus, both the sections being mandatory in nature have to be read together in conjunction of each other". Whereas, the other Hon'ble Judge though has agreed with the conclusion of the decision but on other reasons and on the proposition about the interaction and effect of two noted provisions it was held "The word "shall" used in section 30 of the said Act is mandatory in nature, therefore, the period of four months from the date of registration fixed by section 30 cannot be extended because of section 31 of the said Act as official act is presumed to have been duly and regularly performed. Time of four months will run from the date of knowledge of pre-emptor only if the sale is not under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) or clause (d) of section 30 of the Act ,and time cannot be made to run from the date of knowledge of giving of public notice as required by section 31 of the said Act, in case the sale, is through registration of deed. In case the word "shall" used in section 31 of the said Act is held to be mandatory' in nature whereby making the running of time of four months as provided under section 30 of the Act subject to the affixation of the public' notice, it would, negate the . Object of provisions of' section 30 whereunder period of four months fixed for filing the suit for pre-emption is to be reckoned fronz the date of registration of the sale-deed and the effect of not filing the suit within the said period would entail consequence of dismissal of the suit even if the plea for the same is not raised 'as provided under section 3 of the Limitation Act". Be that as it may, the point of limitation in the above context also came under consideration before a three Member Bench of this Court in another case reported as Qasim Ali v.
Rehmatullah (2005 SCMR 1926) and it was categorically held that "It would thus, appear that in the present case, paragraph (a) of section 30 of the Act was attracted and the date of the registered sale-deed was terminus a quo: for computing-the limitation period. The other paragraphs of section 30 (ibid) would have no application. Moreover, the provisions of section.
30 operate proprio vigore And are independent of section 31 of the Act. The period of limitation for filing the pre-emption suits is governed by section 30 and not by section 31 of the Act".
4. We have examined both the judgments and have also applied our mind to the provisions of sections 30 and 31 of the. Act. In our candid view, both these sections are independent of each.Other having no effect and impact on each other. Though it is mandated by section 31 of the Act that a public notice be issued in terms thereof, but by no stretch of interpretation this provision (Section 31) can be held to regulate and control the period of limitation prescribed by Section 30, which section in clear and unequivocal terms prescribes "the period of limitation for a suit to enforce a right of preemption under this Act shall be four months from the date--(a). Of the registration of the sale-deed". If the intention of the legislature was to make the above period of limitation subject and subservient to the requirement of section 31, the legislature would have clearly indicated its intention by the use of appropriate expression and/or words in either of the two sections, such as,' that subject to the issuance of a notice under section 31 the period of limitation shall be four months in the 'cases covered by subsections (a) and (b) of section 30. But, this is not so and, therefore, we cannot read into section 30 by implication or on the basis of any other rule of interpretation the provisions of section 31 and the requirement of notice as a condition precedent for computing the period of limitation and to hold that in the absence thereof (the notice), the date of knowledge shall be the starting point of four months limitation.
5. As regards the question about the effect and interaction of section 30(d) and the preceding clauses (a)(b)(c) thereto, it may be held that section 30 has four parts/components, each of which is a separate and independent provision in its self-contemplating different eventualities for the purpose of limitation of four months, the language in this context of all the clauses of the section are clear and unambiguous, section 30(d) is not an exception to clauses (a) to (d), rather it is a residual provision and would only come into play if none of the preceding clauses are .Applicable/attracted. But, where a case is covered by any specific earlier clause, clause (d) cannot be resorted to. In view of the above, this appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.