1. ' FAISAL ARAB, J.---Respondent No.2 filed eviction application against the appellant on several grounds. However, the Rent Controller granted eviction on the grounds of personal need and default in payment of rent for the months of September and October, 2007.
2. ' The appellant was tenant of the first floor portion of the premises in question, whereas there was another tenant on the ground floor as well.
3. ' Counsel for the appellant has contended that in the eviction application there was a simple assertion of personal need not duly described as to in what manner the premises would be required by respondent No.2, therefore, the impugned judgment granting eviction on personal need suffe.Rs from legal infirmity. He further contended that during the pendency of the proceedings, the ground floor portion was vacated by the tenant and thereafter it was re-let by the respondent No.2 instead of occupying the same himself, which fact itself establishes that there was no personal need of respondent No.2.
4. ' As regards the plea of default, counsel for the appellant has contended that the rent for September and October, 2007 was tendered through money order on 17-11-2007, which tender was within 60 days grace period as envisaged under the law but the Rent Controller granted eviction taking into consideration the time fixed in the tenancy agreement that was executed between the parties on 28-3-2005. He contended that the agreement that was executed on 28-3-2005 was for a period of 11 months and after its expiry, the default is to be reckoned after the expiry of 60 days grace period and not 15 days and when this 60 days period is taken into consideration, no default in the payment of rent is established. He, therefore, contended that the eviction was wrongly ordered by the Rent Controller.
5. ' Counsel for respondent IN o.2, on the other hand, contended that the ground floor portion which was vacated by the tenant was not re-let to any other tenant but was given to one of the relatives of the respondent No.2, who was allowed to occupy the same temporarily. He further contended that the plea of personal need was not shaken in the cross-examination and that rights of the parties are to be determined as were available to them on the date of the institution of the proceedings and not at any subsequent stage, therefore, vacation of the premises during pendency of the case is immaterial. In support of his contentions, he relied upon 2006 CLC 274 and 2001 SCMR 671. As regards default in the payment of rent, he contended that the tenancy agreement itself provides that rent is payable in advance on 5th of each calendar month and in the present case as the rent for September and October, 2007 was tendered for the first time through money order on 17-11-2007 there was clean default in payment of rent. In support of his contention he relied upon PLD 2003 Karachi 34.
6. ' As regards the plea of personal need it has come on record that the ground floor was vacated by another tenant of the respondent No.2 and thereafter respondent No.2 allowed someone else either on rent or on account of his relationship to occupy the same. The landlord has to establish that his personal need is genuine. When the ground floor was vacated by the previous tenant and if there was personal need of the landlord. He instead of allowing someone to occupy it should have himself occupied it. Allowing someone else to occupy the premises establishes that his personal need was not genuine specially in the background when nothing has been brought on record to establish that the ground floor portion was not suitable for the requirement of respondent No.2. No doubt there is no need for establishing anything else except that the landlord needs the premises for his personal need and he does not have to give any further details as to how he will utilize the same as obviously residential premises is to be utilized for residential purpose only., however, subsequent events can be taken into consideration as held in PLD 1978 SC - 220. Thus failure of the respondent No.2 to occupy the ground floor portion without any justification recoils. Against his plea of personal need. The Rent Controller has clearly erred in granting eviction on the ground of personal need.
7. ' Insofar as the ground of default in the payment of rent is concerned, it is an admitted position that there was written tenancy agreement which provides specific time for payment of rent i.e. Rent to be paid in advance on 5th of each calendar month. The contention of the counsel for the appellant that the agreement has expired and, therefore, the 15 days' grace period provided under section 17(2)(i) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 would not apply but 60 days grace period would apply, is misconceived. Specific time with regard to payment of rent was provided in the Rent Agreement. After expiry of initial term of tenancy he has himself chosen to continue with the tenancy, therefore, he is bound to adhere to the terms and conditions on which premises was let out to him. He is hound by all the obligations created under the written agreement which are otherwise enforceable in law. In the present case, admittedly the rent of September and October.
8. 2007 was tendered on 17th November, 2007 i.e. Well beyond the statutory period of 15 days. The default period commenced from 21-9-2007. Thus insofar as finding on default in the payment of rent for the months of B September and October, 2007 are concerned, eviction was rightly ordered by the Rent Controller. The appeal on the plea of default is dismissed along with the listed application.