' The facts of the case are that the learned Controller by his Order dated 11-6-1974 directed the appellant to deposit the rent from January, 1974, to 31-5-74 before 2-7-1974. He further directed him to deposit the rent for the month of June, 1974, before 15th of July, 1974. He, however, observed that so far as the arrears of rent for the period 6-3-1973 to 31-12-1973 were concerned, the appellant prima facie was not found liable to deposit the same as he had produced in the Court rent receipts in lieu of the amount of rent paid by him for the said period. The execution of the rent receipts for, the said period was, however, denied by the respondent landlord. The learned Controller, after recording the statements of the parties, and without holding that his signatures on the rent receipts tallied with his specimen signatures, held that prima facie rent for the said period has been paid by the appellant.
2. Thereafter, when the case was taken up by the learned Controller on 28-11-1974 it was brought to his notice that the arrears of rent for the period June, 1974, to May, 1974, were not deposited before 2-7-1974, as directed by the Court; and further rent for the month of July, 1974, was deposited on 14- 9-1974.
3. According to the respondent landlord, the arrears of rent were deposited on 13-7-1974 whereas the rent of July, 1974, which was liable to be deposited before 15-8-1974, was deposited in the month of September, 1974. The learned Controller after holding a short inquiry held that the appellant had not explained the reasons as to why he could not deposit the rent within time. In the circumstances ejectment order was passed against the appellant by the learned Controller on the date as mentioned above. The appellant filed appeal against the said order before the learned Additional District Judge, Multan, who rejected the same by his order dated 25-1-1975. The appellant has now come up to the High Court and has challenged the validity of the impugned orders against him by both the Courts below.
4. The main argument as advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the Controller was not satisfied with regard to the default allegedly committed for the period preceding the institution of the ejectment application, therefore, he had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case and pass the impugned order against the appellant. He has argued, on the basis of the provision of section 13(2) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance that unless the Controller is satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the property subject matter of the proceedings no order as provided under the provision can be passed against the tenant. Since, as mentioned above, according to the learned counsel, the Controller himself was not satisfied with regard to any default having been committed by the appellant for the period preceding the institution of the ejectment application, therefore, no order as contemplated by section 13 could be passed against the appellant. There is no doubt that the learned Controller held that prima facie the appellant was not liable to deposit the arrears of rent for the period prior to the institution of the ejectment application, but that does not mean the he finally adjudicated upon the issue as to whether the appeal ant had or had not defaulted in the payment of rent due from him, which was the basis of the ejectment application. A regular inquiry was yet to be held about the genuineness of the rent receipts produced before the Court by the appellant. As mentioned above, the receipts for the period June, 1973, to December, 1973, have been denied to have been executed by the respondent. The learned Controller, merely on the basis of the receipts, held that for the time being the appellant was not to deposit the rent for the said period as the signatures on the rent receipts prima facie tallied with the signatures of the respondent. However, it cannot be denied that final adjudication in this behalf was yet to be made.
There is no denying the proposition that the relevant provision as mentioned above authorises the Controller to pass ejectment order against the tenant if he feels satisfied himself that the tenant has defaulted in the payment of rent. But in the present case the stage for satisfying himself was to be reached by the Controller when he was to hold regular inquiry with regard to the genuineness or otherwise of the rent receipts. If he had ultimately found that there was no default on the part of the appellant then he would not have passed any ejectment order. The provision of section 13(6) of the Ordinance authorities him to direct the tenant to deposit all the rent due from him, if any before the issues are framed; and also to deposit rent regularly till the final decision of the case, before the 15th day of each month. Since he did not find the appellant, on tentative basis only, liable to deposit such rent, therefore he did not pass any such order. However as discussed above it was not his final adjudication of the matter as that stage was not yet to be reached. In this view of the matter the learned Controller was competent to pass ejectment order in case of noncompliance of his previous order directing the appellant to deposit the future monthly rent.
5. It has also been argued on behalf of the appellant that since the delay was not intentional, therefore, the order of ejectment should not have been passed.
' I am afraid, the contention has no force in the circumstances of the case. It was for the appellant to show that the delay was not intentional in the particular circumstances faced by him. He did not put in any application explaining the reasons and for condonation of the delay. In the absence thereof it cannot be held that the delay was not intentional.
6. In view of the discussion made above both the Courts below have rightly passed the impugned orders against the appellant ejecting him from the premises in question. There being no force in the appeal the same is hereby dismissed, without any order as to costs.