' SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.---The applicant is a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) filed a suit for recovery of Rs,94,660.50 on 2-7-1987 against the present respondent (hereinafter called the defendant). The plaintiff firm dealt with selling of shoes on wholesale basis to various parties in Pakistan as well as Karachi. It delivered goods to defendant and plaintiff alleged that at the time of delivery of goods to defendant full particulars of goods and their value were disclosed and defendant was required to deliver goods to a branch of bank in Gujranwala.
The consignment did not reach the consignee. Defendant made part payment and suit with the following prayers was filed:--
(i) A decree for a sum of Rs,94,660.50
(ii) For interest at the rate of 15% from the filing of this suit.
(iii) Cost of the suit.
(iv) Any other relief under the circumstances of the case.
2. Vide judgment dated 23-12-2000 and decree dated 26-12-2000 the suit was decreed. The entire decree read as under:-- "SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF RS.94,660.50 Plaint presented on 23-7-1987. Prayer as under:--
(i) A decree for a sum of Rs, 94,660.50
(ii) For interest at the rate of 15% from the filing of this suit.
(iii) Cost of the suit.
(iv) Any other relief under the circumstances of the case.
' This suit is coming for final disposal on 23-12-2000 before Miss. Akhtar Sultana, Ist Senior Civil Judge Karachi (South), in the presence of advocate for the parties. It is ORDERED that the suit of the plaintiff be and the same is hereby decreed with no order as to costs."
3. Being aggrieved by the decree, appeal was filed by the defendant being Civil Appeal No,99 of 2001. It was dismissed vide judgment dated 24-1-2004. Civil Revision was filed in this Court which was disposed of vide order dated 27-10-2004 and the matter was remanded to the Appellate Court for decision on merits. Order of this Court was assailed before the Supreme Court in C.P.L.A.
No, 890-K of 2004. The Supreme Court set aside the order of this Court and restored judgment of the trial Court as that of the First Appellate Court. Thereafter an application was filed in the Execution Application. The application is in the following words:-- "It is prayed on behalf of the. Decree Holder that this honourable Court may be pleased to add further interest of Rs,42,594 in the amount shown in the said execution application being Rs,345,510 total decretal amount comes to Rs,384,104.00 as per judgment announced on 19-7-2006 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Petition No, 890-K of 2004."
' This application was allowed by the trial Court vide order dated 23-12-2006. In conclusion the trial Court observed as under:-- "I have considered above submissions, perused the record and the case-law referred to. Perusal of the judgment and decree dated 23-12-2000 passed in Civil Suit No, 1582 of 1987 shows that the Civil Suit No, 1502 of 1987 was decreed with no order as to costs, meaning thereby that whatever was prayed in the said civil suit was decreed except the cost, accordingly the instant application, filed by the D/H is allowed. There is no order as to costs."
4. An appeal under section 104, C.P.C. Was filed by the defendant and while concluding the Appellate Court observed as under:-- "Since the judgment and decree of trial Court is silent about the interest as such the same is deemed to have been refused. The order passed by the trial Court allowing the application under section 151, C.P.C. Read with Order VI Rule 17, C.P.C. Is without any justification. The judgment and decree would not to modified/altered by the above impugned order. I, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 23-12-2004, thereby dismissing application under section 151, C.P.C. Read with Order VI Rule 17, C.P.C. Allowing the interest which was not mentioned in the judgment and decree. However, no order as to costs."
' This Revision Application has been filed to challenge that order.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the interest is included in the decree and therefore perforce to the interest has to be paid.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Amir Malik, learned counsel for the defendant referred to section 34(2), C.P.C. And submitted that where decree is silent with respect to the payment of interest it is deemed to have been refused. He relied upon Province of Punjab through Secretary Industries, Government of Punjab, Civil Secretariat, Lahore v. Burewala Textile Mills Limited 2001 SCM R 396 and Syed Ghulam Abbas and others v. Mst. Khurshid Begum. 1980 CLC 1636.
7. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and have also gone through the record. Since the entire case turns on section 34, C.P.C., for ease of reference the same is reproduced below:--
34. Interest--(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.
(2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such aggregate sum as aforesaid from, the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefore shall not lie."
8. Section 34, C.P.C. Is in two parts. The first part provide that the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged:--
(a) from the date of suit to the date of the decree;
(b) for any period prior to institution of the suit;
(c) further interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable from the date of decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.
' As can be seen from, it this provision i,e, subsection (1) of section 34, C.P.C., deals with three periods. Firstly, between date of institution of suit and date of decree; secondly period prior to institution of suit'and thirdly period after the date of decree. Thereafter comes subsection (2). It deal with only further interest from the date of decree to the date of payment or an earlier date. It is only the third of the above two situations that subsection (2) of section 34, C.P.C. Is applicable to.
Therefore subsection (2) of section- 34, C.P.C. Cannot be made applicable to the first two situations i,e, interest from the date of institution of suit to the date of decree or interest for any period prior to institution of the suit. Thereafter it is provided in subsection (2) that for the situation contemplated in subsection (2) i,e, in third situation contemplated in subsection (1), if the Court is silent about interest it shall be deemed to have refused such interest. Certainly the Court in its decree has been silent about the rate of interest or payment of interest and therefore perforce it has to be accepted that it has not ordered further interest or any period after the date of decree.
9. But what is the position in respect of the period between the date of institution of the suit and the.Date of decree. (The second situation i,e, period prior to institution of suit was not even prayed for in the suit and therefore is not at all a question up for consideration). In the suit interest at the rate of 15% from the date of filing of the suit was prayed. The suit was decreed on 26-12-2000.
Silence in the last part of the decree does not attract the provisions of subsection (2) of section 34, C.P.C. In respect of the period from the date of institution to date of decree. The suit was decreed.
The only conclusion that one can arrive at is that it was decreed as prayed. Consequently the applicant is entitled to simple interest at the rate of 15% from the date of institution of the suit to the date of decree.
10. In. Burewala Textile Mills Limited's case (supra), it was a question relating to future interest after date of award and in Ghulam Abbas's case (supra), it was observed that the executing Court cannot go beyond the decree. Obviously there cannot be any cavil, with these propositions.
11. Result of the above discussion is that this Revision Application is allowed and the applicant is held entitled to payment of simple interest at the rate of 15% .From the date of institution of suit to the date of decree.