' MUNIB AKHTAR, J.---This application, under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. Has been filed by the defendant and arises in the following circumstances. The defendant is the National Highway Authority, which is charged, inter alia, with the development of the national highway infrastructure. For this purpose, the defendant enters into contracts with various contractors in order to carry out construction work in various parts of the country and in relation to different sectors of the national highway network. It appears that one such contract was entered into between the defendant and the plaintiff whereby the latter was awarded a work contract in relation to the Hyderabad-Hala section of the national highway. The project was awarded on or about 7-7-2004 and the formal contract was executed on 13-8-2004. The contract was entered into at Islamabad where the head office of the defendant is located. It appears that a dispute arose between the plaintiff and the Defendant with regard to the scope of the work, and the work actually done by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed an amount in excess of Rs,5.00 crores. This claim was denied by the defendant. The contract contained an arbitration clause and pursuant thereto Mr. Mubin A. Siddiqui was appointed as the arbitrator (hereinafter "the Arbitrator"). Since the Arbitrator apparently resides at Karachi, he found it more convenient to conduct the arbitration proceedings here with the consent of the parties. Ultimately, an award dated 28-4-2010 was made at Karachi by the Arbitrator in terms of which he found that the plaintiff was entitled to a sum of Rs,5,59,59,319/- and directed the defendant to make payment of the same. At the request of the plaintiff, the Arbitrator filed the award along with the record pursuant to section 14 of the Arbitration Act,. 1940 in this. Court on or about 23-6-2010, which was numbered as the present suit and notice issued to the defendant. It appears that in the meanwhile the Defendant, being aggrieved by the award, filed an application under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act in the court of the Senior Civil Judge, Islamabad on or about 1-7-2010, and I am informed that this matter has since been transferred to the Islamabad High Court where it is pending. It is in these circumstances that the defendant has filed the present application on the ground that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear and entertain any matter arising out
2. Learned counsel for the defendant drew attention to the arbitration clause in the agreement, which was in the following terms: "All disputes arising in connection with the present Contract shall be finally settled under the Rules and provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940 of Islamic Republic of Pakistan enforced for the time being and as amended from time .To time by one or more Arbitrators appointed in accordance with said Rules. The place of arbitration shall be Islamabad."
Learned counsel submitted that in fact the arbitration ought to have proceeded at Islamabad, but on the request of the Arbitrator and for his convenience alone, the proceedings were held at Karachi. This was, however, without prejudice to the provisions of the arbitration clause. Learned counsel submitted that by virtue thereof, it was only the courts at Islamabad which had jurisdiction in the matter. He also placed reliance on the definition of "court" given in section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, which is in the following terms: "2(e) "Court" means a civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject- matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under Section 21, include a Sinall Cause Court; ... "
He submitted that therefore the matter could not proceed here on account of lack of jurisdiction.
3. Learned counsel for the plaintiff opposed the application and submitted that this Court had jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He submitted that the arbitrator admittedly resided at Karachi and all the arbitration proceedings were held here with the consent of the parties. The award was also made and announced at Karachi.. He submitted that the present application was merely a belated attempt by the defendant to derail and delay the award being made rule of the court. He submitted that the proceedings under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act filed by the defendant at Islamabad were an abuse of the process of law, since the objections thereby taken could easily have been filed and taken in the present suit. He submitted that since the Arbitrator had filed the award at Karachi prior to the institution of the Islamabad proceedings, the present suit ought to continue and the matter be disposed of in accordance with law. Learned counsel further submitted that this Court had jurisdiction even within the meaning of "court" as given in section 2(c). He submitted that the subject matter of. The reference was the dispute regarding the scope of the work for the Hyderabad-Hala section of the national highway and therefore, the matter came within the jurisdiction of this Court. He further submitted that the defendant admittedly had a regional or branch office at Karachi and was thus carrying on business within the local limits of this Court, which accordingly had jurisdiction. Learned counsel' relied on Ravi Glass Mills Limited v. ICI Pakistan Power Gin Limited 2004 YLR 2503 in support of his submissions. He also contended that in any case Order VII, Rule 10; C.P.C. Had no application to an arbitration matter and that the present application was therefore entirely misconceived.
4. I have heard learned counsel as above and have examined the record with their assistance and considered the case-law relied upon. In my view, for present purposes, it is essential to properly understand and apply the definition of "court" as given in section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, since (at least as presently relevant) it is only a court so defined which has jurisdiction. Of course, it is, quite possible that more than one court may come within the meaning of the definition in section 2(c) in respect of any given arbitral reference, but it is expressly provided in the Arbitration Act itself that once any application has been filed in any one of such courts, then all other proceedings of any nature whatsoever must be taken and pursued therein.
5. When the definition given in section' 2(c) is examined, in my view its meaning is at once clear.
The court has been defined not in relation to the arbitration proceedings but rather in relation to the court that would have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the arbitral reference had a civil suit been filed instead of the matter. Being referred to arbitration. In other words, the definition requires the following exercise to be undertaken if the question arises whether a particular court has jurisdiction for purposes of the Arbitration Act. First, the subject matter of the arbitral reference must be identified. Then, that court must be ascertained which would have jurisdiction if the subject matter so identified had been the subject matter of a civil suit. It is only the court so ascertained that is the "court" within the meaning of section 2(c). As is at once obvious from the second step of the exercise, it is entirely irrelevant for this determination as to where the arbitrator resides or works for gain or where the arbitration proceedings were held or where the award was made. This is so because the basis on which the determination must be made is in essence hypothetical since it is an ascertainment of where a civil suit could have been brought in respect of the subject matter of the arbitral reference. Obviously, if a civil suit were to be or had been filed, then there 'would neither be an arbitrator nor any arbitration proceedings nor award. Furthermore, it must also be kept in mind that in civil suits, the jurisdiction of a court is determined not merely on the basis of where the cause of action arose in whole or in part. Jurisdiction also, inter cilia, lies with that court where the defendant ordinarily resides or works for gain. In carrying out the exercise noted above, it is also important therefore to keep in mind as to which of the parties in the arbitral reference would be the plaintiff in the putative suit and who would be the defendant. Perhaps the point can be illustrated by means of a simple example. Suppose A, who ordinarily resides and works for gain at Karachi, enters into an agreement at Lahore. With who ordinarily resides and works for gain at Rawalpindi. The contract is for the supply of goods at Quetta. Suppose further that A alleges a breach of contract by B by way of non-performance. The contract contains an arbitration clause, and the parties refer the matter. To an arbitrator who ordinarily resides arid works for gain at Peshawar, where the arbitration proceedings take place and the award is made.
Where can be such an award challenged? The subject matter of the arbitral reference is of course the dispute regarding non-performance of the contract. The question therefore is, if such a dispute were to be the subject of a civil suit, where could such a suit be brought? In accordance with well- established principles, it could be filed either at Lahore (where the contract was entered into) or at Quetta (where it was supposed to have been performed). However, it could also be filed either at Karachi or at Rawalpindi, depending on who would have been the plaintiff in such a suit. If were to be the plaintiff, he could not bring the suit at Karachi, but could do so at Rawalpindi. However, if were the plaintiff in the putative suit, the position would be reversed and he could bring the suit at Karachi but not at Rawalpindi. Of course, in the assumed facts of the example, it is who would be the plaintiff, and therefore, the civil suit could have been filed at either ' Lahore or' Quetta or Rawalpindi. Therefore, in terms of section 2(c), the award could be challenged by suitable proceedings filed under the Arbitration Act at any of these three places. However; and this is the crucial point for present purposes, the award could not at all be challenged at Peshawar where it was made and the arbitration took place, and where the arbitrator ordinarily resided or worked for gain. The reason is that such considerations are irrelevant for purposes of section 2(e).
6. Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, the first question is to determine the subject matter of the reference to the Arbitrator. In my view, the subject matter was the claim for payment of an additional amount by the plaintiff on account of the work done by it within the scope of the contract, which claim was of course denied by the defendant Authority. Had a civil suit be filed on this subject matter where would such a suit lie? In my view such a suit would lie at Islamabad, both because the contract was entered into there and the defendant Authority has its head office there as well. As Explanation II to section 20, C.P.C. Makes clear, a corporation is deemed to carry on business at the place where it has its principal office. Learned counsel for the plaintiff referred to the regional or branch office at Karachi, but as the aforesaid explanation makes clear a corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at a subordinate office only if the cause of action arose there in whole or in part. Since the plaintiff, who was the claimant in the arbitral reference, would also have been the plaintiff in the putative suit, the place where the plaintiff has its office (namely Karachi) is irrelevant. Equally, the fact that the Arbitrator ordinarily resides and/or works for gain at Karachi where the arbitration proceedings were held and the award made, is irrelevant. Furthermore, even if the cause of action in the putative suit could in any sense be said to have accrued at least in part at Karachi (which in my view is not the case), this Court would still not have jurisdiction in the matter, since the dispute relates to work done on the Hyderabad-Hala section of the national highway, which is outside the local limits of the original civil jurisdiction of this Court. A learned Division Bench of this Court has, in a recent decision reported as Muhammad Naveed Aslam and others v. Aisha Siddiqui and others 2011 CLC 1176, clarified the law on this point and has held, affirming the decision of the learned single Judge, that if the immovable property in question lies outside the territorial limits of the original civil jurisdiction of this Court, then no suit will lie here even if the cause of action arose in part at Karachi. However, this is a moot point, since as noted above, in my view, the cause of action for any putative suit in respect of the subject matter of the reference did not at all arise at Karachi.
7. Insofar as the decision of the Lahore High Court relied upon by learned counsel for plaintiff is concerned (see para 3 herein above), in my view that does not support his case. It may be noted that the relevant agreement in that case had an arbitration clause which expressly recognized that the arbitration was to take place at Karachi and that any award made on any reference could be instituted at Karachi. It appears that in the facts of that case, the courts at Lahore and Karachi both had jurisdiction in the matter. Notwithstanding the express choice made in the agreement itself, and the arbitration proceedings having been conducted at Karachi and the award having been made here, the learned arbitrator filed his award at the civil courts at Lahore. A jurisdictional objection was taken but was dismissed by the learned trial court and against this dismissal a revision petition was filed in the Lahore High Court. The revision was also dismissed by the High Court by means of the decision relied upon. Thus, if anything, the case cited by learned counsel for the plaintiff goes against him rather than supporting his submissions.
8. As regards the submission that Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C.-does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it suffices to refer to section 41 of the Arbitration Act, which states that the provisions of-C.P.C. Are applicable to court proceedings taken under the said Act.
9. I am accordingly of the view that this Court does not have any jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the present case and that therefore, the award is to be returned for filing before the court of competent jurisdiction. Since proceedings have already been launched at Islamabad that is now the only place where the award can be filed. Accordingly, this application is allowed. Let learned counsel for the defendant Authority give the particulars of the proceedings pending, as noted above, before the Islamabad High Court within one week and the office is directed to remit the award along with the record filed by the Arbitrator to that Court for such consideration and orders as may be deemed appropriate.