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1981 SCMR 244

MUHAMMAD ISMAIL MEMON vs GOVERNMENT OF SEND AND Another

Citation1981 SCMR 244
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition No. K-191 of 1980
Date1981-01-07
Judge(s)Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim, Sheikh Anwarul Haq
ResultPetition dismissed

ORDER

1. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-This petition seeks leave to appeal against the order dated the 16th of March, 1980, made by the Sind Services Tribunal, whereby an appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of stoppage of four increments, was dismissed.

2. The allegation against the petitioner was that while working as Assistant City Survey Officer, Karachi, he had acted in an illegal and unauthorised manner by allowing the amalgamation of a plot measuring about 4,000 sq. Yds. With the land already leased out to some persons, in spite of the fact that their request in this behalf had been rejected earlier by the Deputy Commis--sioner of Karachi. A regular inquiry was held against the petitioner, as a result of which he was found guilty, and the Member, Board of Revenue imposed on him, by his order dated the 31st July, 1977, the punishment of the stoppage of four increments. The petitioner filed a review application, but the same was rejected on 16-10-1977. Thereafter he filed a departmental appeal, which was dismissed on the 16th of September, 1978, and this order was communicated to the petitioner on the 20th of September, 1978.

3. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Services Tribunal by post from Khipro, where he was stationed at that time. It is stated that the appeal was despatched from Khipro on the 19th of October, 1978, and was received at the Karachi Post Office on the 23rd of October, 1978, and was received at the office of the Tribunal on the 31st of October, 1978. The Services Tribunal has held that, in the first place, the appeal had not been filed in accordance with the procedure laid down in rule 7 of the Sind Services Tribunal (Procedure Rules), 1974, which required that the appeal shall be presented to the Registrar of the Tribunal during office hours personally by appellant or by his counsel. Instead of following this procedure the petitioner had sent his appeal by post, with the result that there was, in fact, no competent appeal before the Tribunal. In the second place, the Tribunal has also taken the view that as the period of limitation allowed by section 4 of the Sind Services Tribunal Act, 1973; is only 30 days from the date of Communication of the final order passed in appeal by the depart--mental authority, the appeal should have been filed by the petitioner by the 20th of October, 1978, but it was instead received in the office of the Tribunal on the 31st of October, 1978, and was, therefore, clearly barred by time.

4. It appears that before the Tribunal, a plea was made for condonation of delay on the ground that during the relevant period the petitioner was not allowed to leave his station of posting, as his presence was required urgently in connection with anti-locust work. The Tribunal, however, did not accept this plea on the ground that it was vague and was not supported by any evidence.

5. Leave to appeal is sought on the following grounds;

(a) Even though rule 7 of the Sind Services Tribunal (Procedure Rules) lays down that an appeal should be presented personally by the appellant or his counsel yet there is no prohibition in the rules against submission of an appeal by post ; and, therefore, it could not be said that the appeal had not been properly instituted

(b) That the Tribunal was in error in thinking that the appeal was barred by time, as, in fact, it had been despatched from Khipro by the petitioner within the period of 30 days allowed by law ; and,

(c) That, in any case, the Tribunal acted improperly and harshly in refusing to condone delay as there was no reason to doubt the statement made by the petitioner that he was not granted leave by his superiors because of his pre-occupation with anti-locust.

6. We regret we see no merit in these submissions. The procedure for presenting appeals before the Services Tribunal has been prescribed by rule 7 of the relevant rules, and it is clear that the appeal had to be presented in that manner, and not otherwise. It is an entirely misconceived argument to say that there is no rule prohibiting the submission of appeals by post. It is well settled that if the law requires a matter to be done in a certain manner, then it should be done in that manner and none other. The Services Tribunal was, therefore, right in thinking that the petitioner had not, in fact, presented a proper appeal before the Tribunal in accordance with its rules of procedure. On this short ground alone the petitioner's appeal was liable to be rejected.

7. The Tribunal was again right in taking the view that the appeal was barred by time, as it was received in the office of the Tribunal on the 31st of October, 1978. Its despatch by the petitioner by post on an earlier date was completely irrelevant for the purpose of calculating the period of time taken by the petitioner in filing the appeal. It was in the discretion of the Tribunal to condone delay on the basis of facts presented before it. If the Tribunal was not satisfied with the ground urged in this behalf by the petitioner, we do not see how we can substitute our own satisfaction for that of the Tribunal.

8. For all these reasons, we are satisfied that the Services Tribunal has acted properly in rejecting the petitioner's appeal. The present petition also fails and is hereby dismissed.

Cited by 10 cases

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